

# THE LIFE OF THE SPIRIT IN GEORGE SANTAYANA AND ITS APPLICATION TO THE IDEA OF CHRIST\*

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## CHAPTER III

### THE NATURE OF THE SPIRIT AS DISTINGUISHED FROM THAT OF THE PSYCHE

*I will beg the reader to distinguish sharply two levels of life in the human body, one of which I call the spirit and the other the psyche. By spirit I understand the actual light of consciousness falling upon anything—the ultimate invisible emotional fruition of life in feeling and thought. On the other hand, by the psyche I understand a system of tropes, inherited or acquired, displayed by living bodies in their growth and behaviour. This is the specific form of physical life, present and potential, asserting itself in any plant or animal (RM, 139).*

#### 7. Name and Nature of the Spirit

Analogous to the comparison of Spirit with a born child who waits with open eyes is also the meaning of the «baptismal» name or rather names which Santayana gives to him. He says:

Spirit is an awareness natural to animals, revealing the world and themselves in it. Other names for spirit are consciousness, attention, feeling, thought, or any word that marks the total *inner* difference between being awake or asleep, alive or dead.

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\* Continuation from *Theologia*, No 47, April - June 1976, p. 361.

This difference is morally absolute; but physically the birth of spirit caps a long growth during which excitability and potentiality of various kinds are concentrated in organisms and become transmissible. The *outer* difference between sleeping and waking, life and death, is not absolute; and we may trace certain divergences between the path of transmission of the psyche and the basis of distribution for the spirit (RS, 18).

Spirit itself as a name<sup>1</sup> indicates this difference between life and death, as also the other names for spirit, awareness and consciousness, indicate on the other hand, the difference between being awake and asleep.

Spirit, according to Santayana, «is the consciousness proper to an animal psyche» (RS, 43), or, as he says elsewhere, «the animal roots of spirit» are «in the psyche» (RS, 59). So spirit as consciousness «can arise only in an animal psyche» (RS, 42); «it is merely the psyche become conscious» (RS, 65), «for so long as life remains purely vegetative it seems to be unconscious»<sup>2</sup>. The «becoming» of psyche from unconscious to conscious is characterized by Santayana as «the passage from dark physical excitability to the *qui vive* of consciousness». And, as he explains, this passage seems to be produced by «the passage from vegetation to action» (RS, 16). So, spirit as the *qui vive* of consciousness is a state of being actual, it is spirit risen into *actuality* (RS, 49), «it is pure light and perpetual actuality» (RS, 18). He says:

By spirit I understand the actual light of consciousness falling upon anything—the ultimate invisible emotional fruition of life in feeling and thought (RM, 139).

Now, «every point, as actual», according to Santayana, «is morally central and primary» (RS, 51). So, the relations between actual moments of spirit cannot be other than moral relations. This «impossibility of other than moral relations between the moments of spirit follows from their immaterial nature. Immateriality lifts them above the region of interaction, relativity, potentiality, fusion, or flux. Therefore moments of spirit cannot be situated by their external relations» (RS, 50), for «an actual moment, or moment of spirit, possesses an internal

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1. The word «spirit» (L. *spiritus*) is akin to the Latin verb *spirare* (= to breathe, blow). In this sense *spirare* has also the meaning to live, as for example, in the expression *dum spiro spero* (= as I live, I hope). Spirit, therefore, means the breath of life, life itself.

2. RS, 55. Santayana, as we shall see below, distinguishes between the vegetative and animal psyche (RS, 16).

intensive unity, even when aware only of change and distraction»<sup>3</sup>.

From what we said about the actuality of the spirit, we can understand that «the spiritual fruits are internal or tangential to, not consequent upon it, like the natural fruits: they may be omnipresent in existence, but only by everywhere transmitting existence into essence» (RE, 10). «They are a passage into essence» (RE, 11), and into «contemplation at the end» (RE, 12). In this sense, then, Santayana says:

Intuition is the innocent expression of action (RE, 11). It is indeed the intuition of essences in their own category, when the things that may embody them are absent or non-existent, that makes up the essence of spirit, in its various forms of feeling, sense, thought, memory, or knowledge. Spirit is the actuality of the unsubstantial. It belongs to the nature of spirit to be cognitive» (RE, 129).

#### 8. Psyche as Distinguished in Nature from the Spirit

Considering all we said in the previous section about the nature of the spirit, it is evident that the spirit as cognitive and immaterial is different from the body which is material, though a man identifies himself with both of them. Santayana says:

A man habitually identifies himself as much with his body as with his spirit; and since both are called 'I', it is no wonder if what happens in each is felt to be also the work of the other (RS, 10).

In the sequel he finds that both body and spirit «are realizations of the same fact in two incomparable realms of being» (RS, 10). These two realms, of course, are the realm of matter to which man belongs by his body and the realm of spirit to which man belongs by his spirit; for «man, as Aristotle would say, is a compound; he exists at once in the realm of matter and in that of spirit» (RS, 280) which «spirit», according to Santayana, «is logically incomparable with body» (RS, 10).

The body, Santayana says, «places man quite correctly in the

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3. RS, 49. Santayana determines the subject of his book, *The Realm of Spirit*, as the moral relation between the moments of spirit in their spiritual support, contradiction, and fulfillment, which, as he explains, «is fundamentally the same subject as that of Dante's *Divine Comedy*» (RS, pp. 49-50).

realm of matter amongst other bodies» (RS, 15). He uses also the term «organism» which «still designates the body». «A body», he explains, «is an organism only by virtue of its vital power of nutrition and reproduction» (RS, 15). Now, «the self-maintaining and reproducing pattern or structure of an organism, conceived as a power, is called a psyche» (RS, 15). Santayana says in his *Soliloquies*:

Psyche, as I use the term, is not a material atom but a material system, stretching over both time and space; it is not a monad; it has not the unity proper to consciousness; nor is it a mass of 'subconscious', mental discourse. The Psyche may be called a substance in respect to mental and moral phenomena which (I think) are based on modes or processes in matter, not on any material particle taken singly; but the Psyche is not a substance absolutely, since its own substance is matter in a certain arrangement—in other words, body (SE, 221n.).

So, «in calling psyche material...», Santayana explains in the *Realm of Matter*, «she is a *mode* of substance, a trope of habit established in matter» (RM, 140). «The psyche», as Jacques Duron explains also in the case of Santayana, «may be called material, but just in a certain point only. Material by the substantial elements which enter her composition»<sup>4</sup>.

Santayana distinguishes further between the vegetative and animal psyche. «When the organism waits for favourable opportunities to unfold itself, the psyche is vegetative; when it goes to seek favourable opportunities, it is animal»<sup>5</sup>. He distinguishes also between psyche and soul though they both denote the same Greek word *ψυχή*. «The same thing that looked at from the outside or biologically is called the psyche, looked at morally from within is called the soul» (RS, 16). And, since

4. Jacques Duron, *La pensée de George Santayana*, Paris, Librairie Nizet, 1950, p. 442.

5. RS, 16. Comparing Psyche with a good mother, Santayana describes her in her «vegetative peace» (RS, 62) or «in her green days, in her cool vegetable economy» (SE, 224), as he characterizes the vegetative life of Psyche, as follows: «At first, when she was only a vegetative Psyche, she waited in a comparatively peaceful mystical torpor for the rain or the sunshine to foster her, or for the cruel winter or barbarous scythe to cut her down; and she never would have survived at all if breeding had not been her chief preoccupation; but she distributed herself so multitudinously and so fast amongst her children, that she has survived to this day». Later, in her animal life, «she found a new means of safety and profit in locomotion; and it was then that she began to perceive distinct objects, to think, and to plan her actions—accomplishments by no means native to her» (SE, 222).

«spirit is in fact involved in feeling and knowing life from the inside» (RS, 16), we can understand that «a psyche, when spirit awakes in it, is turned into a soul» (RS, 16). In other words, «psyches take on the character of souls when spirit awakes in them. Spirit is an awareness natural to animals, revealing the world and themselves in it» (RS, 16). From this alone, it is plain that «the place of spirit is in a psyche» (RS, 43).

So, «spirit is a form of life» (RS, 49), as also psyche, on the other hand, is another form of life. Santayana says:

I will beg the reader to distinguish sharply two levels of life in the human body, one of which I call *the spirit*, and the other *the psyche* (RM, 139). Spirit everywhere expresses the life of nature, and echoes its endeavour; but the animal life which prompts these feelings is itself not arbitrary; it passes through a cycle of changes which are pre-ordained. This predetermined, specific direction of animal life is the key to everything moral; without it no external circumstance could be favourable to us; and spirit within us would have no reason to welcome, to deplore, or to notice anything» (SE, 219). The psyche, being essentially a way of living, a sort of animated code of hygiene and morals, is a very selective principle; she is perpetually distinguished—in action, if not in words—between good and bad, right and wrong. Choice is the breath of her nostrils (SE, 222; also RS, 16).

In this sense, therefore, «life where it has arisen, is by definition a nucleus of Will, and a point of reference for imputing good and evil» (RS, 61). But, especially of the will in the psyche and in the spirit we shall talk in the next chapter after the comparison, we now come to make, of Santayana with Aristotle as concerns the nature of the soul in general.

### 9. Santayana's Doctrine of Psyche and Spirit Compared to Aristotle's Doctrine of Soul

We compare Santayana with Aristotle because of the similarities of their doctrines on the topic that Santayana calls psyche<sup>6</sup>, and also because of his reference to Aristotle as concerns what the former calls spirit. Generally, besides Plato's influence on Santayana's doctrine of «essences», Aristotle also influenced Santayana, according to Munitz,

6. For this reason, Jacques Duron in his book, *La pensée de George Santayana*, comparing also Santayana with Aristotle on this theme of psyche, finds «a remarkable analogy between the theory of functions of the psyche in Santayana and the theory of the powers of the psyche in Aristotle» (p. 442).

in an equal degree in his naturalism<sup>7</sup> though Butler believes that «Santayana leaned more on Plato than on Aristotle»<sup>8</sup>. In any case, the influence of Aristotle on Santayana is obvious, especially with respect to his doctrine of substance. Santayana himself agrees; by the term substance, according to his own words, he means the same thing that Aristotle meant, «who gave the name of substance to compound natural things actually existing» (RM, 20). According to «Aristotle's theory of substance»<sup>9</sup>, as Edwin Wallace explains, «the real being, the substantial truth, the essential nature of things—for by all these terms we may translate the Greek expression — lies in the union of two elements»<sup>10</sup>, «it is a combination (*σύνολον*) in which matter merges in form and form gains reality through an as yet unformed matter. And in some such sense as this Soul is the substance — that is, the concrete reality or substantial truth of body. Soul therefore, Aristotle elsewhere says, is the realization of the body (*ἐντέλεια σώματος*)»<sup>11</sup>, it is, according to Aristotle's own words, *ἐντελέχεια ἢ πρώτη σώματος φυσικοῦ οργανικοῦ*<sup>12</sup> (the earlier perfect realization of a natural organic body<sup>13</sup>); *ἐντελέχειά τις ἐστὶ καὶ λόγος τοῦ δυνάμιν ἔχοντος εἶναι τοιούτου*<sup>14</sup> (a kind of full realization or expression of the idea of that which has potentially the power to be of such a character<sup>15</sup>). *Ἀναγκαῖον ἄρα τὴν ψυχὴν οὐσίαν εἶναι ὡς εἶδος σώματος φυσικοῦ δυνάμει ζωὴν ἔχοντος*<sup>16</sup> (Thus then the soul must necessarily be a real substance, as the form which determines a natural body possessed potentially of life<sup>17</sup>).

So, when Santayana characterizes the psyche as «a *mode* of substance, a trope or habit established in matter» (RM, 140), he understands it in the same manner as Aristotle who defines soul as *οὐσία ἢ κατὰ τὸν λόγον· τοῦτο δὲ τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι τῷ τοιῷδι σώματι, καθάπερ εἴ τι τῶν ὀργάνων φυσικῶν ἦν σῶμα*<sup>18</sup> (the substance, so far as this is expres-

7. M. K. Munitz, *The Moral Philosophy of Santayana*, p. 109.

8. R. Butler, *The Mind of Santayana*, p. 161.

9. E. Wallace, *Ἀριστοτέλης περὶ ψυχῆς* or *Aristotle's Psychology* (in Greek and English), Cambridge, The University Press, 1882, pp. xxxixf (Introduction).

10. *Ibid.*, p. xl.

11. *Ibid.*, p. xli.

12. *Ἀριστοτέλης, op. cit.*, Bk. II, Ch. I, sec. 6 (412b, 5).

13. E. Wallace's translation (See *Aristotle's Psychology*, p. 61).

14. *Ἀριστοτέλης, op. cit.*, Bk. II, Ch. II, sec. 15 (414a, 27-28).

15. E. Wallace's translation (*Op. cit.*, p. 71).

16. *Ἀριστοτέλης, op. cit.*, Bk. II, Ch. I, sec. 4 (412a, 19-20).

17. E. Wallace (*Op. cit.*, p. 61).

18. *Ἀριστοτέλης, op. cit.*, Bk. II, Ch. I, sec. 8 (412b, 10-12).

sible in a definition, i.e., the essence, of a body of a certain kind<sup>19</sup>). So, as Wallace remarks, «in Aristotle's own peculiar phraseology, soul is the substantial reality or essence (*οὐσία*) of the body»<sup>20</sup>. Like Aristotle, Santayana also determines psyche as the essence of the body (RM, 146) and as «the principle of the habits of living beings, transmitted by a seed» (SE, 221). It is obvious, then, that Santayana understands psyche in terms of soul (Gr. *ψυχή*) in Aristotle: «the vital principle; the formal cause, essence, or entelechy of a natural organic body»<sup>21</sup>. In this sense, therefore, Santayana, like Aristotle, acknowledges that «all natural organisms have psyches, and are at the same time in dynamic relations to the whole physical world» (RS, 16). Man as an organism has a psyche, too. And this «human psyche» is «like that of other animals» (RS, 63).

All this concerns the similarities of Santayana's doctrine of psyche to Aristotle's doctrine of soul. But, Aristotle by soul means something more than Santayana's psyche. And this is what determines one of his differences. As Wallace remarks in general «it may be said at once that no English word can fully represent what Aristotle meant by *ψυχή*»<sup>22</sup>. If Aristotle meant simply by *ψυχή* (soul) what Santayana means by psyche, which is the exact translation of the Greek *ψυχή*, then man would not have any difference from the other animals which, according to Santayana, have also a psyche like that of man. But, according to Aristotle, *ἑτέροις [ζώοις] δὲ [ὑπάρχει] καὶ τὸ διανοητικόν τε καὶ νοῦς, οἷον ἀνθρώποις καὶ εἴ τι τοιοῦτον ἕτερόν ἐστιν ἢ καὶ τιμιώτερον*<sup>23</sup> (others [animals], as for instance men or other beings similar or superior to them, if there be any such, possess also understanding and reason<sup>24</sup>). Especially of this *διανοητικὸν τε καὶ νοῦ* (understanding and reason), Aristotle says the following important words: *Περὶ δὲ τοῦ νοῦ καὶ τῆς θεωρητικῆς δυνάμεως οὐδὲν πω φανερόν, ἀλλ' εἴκει ψυχῆς γένος ἕτερον εἶναι, καὶ τοῦτο μόνον ἐνδέχεται χωρῖζεσθαι, καθάπερ τὸ αἰδίον τοῦ φθαρτοῦ*<sup>25</sup>

19. The Oxford Translation of Aristotle (See Aristotle, *Selections*; ed. by W.D. Ross, U.S.A., Scribner's Sons, 1938, p. 201).

20. Wallace's Introduction to *Aristotle's Psychology*, p. xxxix.

21. With such words Glenn R. Morrow defines the soul in Aristotle (*Dictionary of Philosophy*; ed. by D. D. Runes, p. 296). Referring to Aristotle on the topic of the psyche, Santayana says: «Such is the only scientific psychology, as conceived by the ancients, including Aristotle, and now renewed in behaviourism and psychoanalysis» (RM, 141).

22. Introduction to *Aristotle's Psychology*, *op. cit.*, xlviii.

23. *Ἀριστοτέλης, op. cit.*, Bk. II, Ch. III, sec. 4 (414b, 18-19).

24. Wallace's translation, p. 73.

25. *Ἀριστοτέλης, op. cit.*, Bk. II, Ch. II, sec. 19 (413b, 26-29).

(With regard to reason and the faculty of thought... [it] would seem to constitute a different phase of soul from those we have already noticed and it alone admits of separation, as the eternal from the perishable)<sup>26</sup>.

From what Aristotle says about reason (*νοῦς*) as a separate faculty of the soul and as «eternal» (*αἰδώς*), it is evident that reason is the essential characteristic of man who, because of this, is different from all other animals. Considering this, we can understand why «man had been defined by Aristotle to be a rational animal» (ICG, 209). It is this «element in man, absent in the lower animals, namely the intellect» that, «according to him [Aristotle], was divine and immortal; it came into the human psyche 'from without the gates', and reverted at death to its divine source» (ICG, 225). Santayana characterizes this belief of Aristotle's as «a scientific error» (ICG, 236). He asks:

Why did Aristotle maintain that the intellect came into the psyche from outside? The reason he offers is that intellect has no special organ. Without replying that the nervous system or the brain or certain parts of it or the rational web and 'central exchange' of all impressions and habits are its organ, it is evident to the layman that the whole man is the organ of his intelligence (ICG, 235).

And Santayana in opposition to Aristotle concludes:

Intellect is thus internal to the psyche and potential there, just as the psyche itself is internal and potential to the organism. Aristotle might well have turned his sarcasms about migrating souls into sarcasms about migrating intellects (ICG, 235).

It is obvious, then, from our general account of intellect or reason in Aristotle that he regarded soul in a wider sense than that in which Santayana regarded psyche. Soul in Aristotle, as including intellect, includes also what Santayana means by spirit, to which essentially the Aristotelian intellect in general (intellect in its theoretical and practical employment) corresponds<sup>27</sup>. Though Santayana accepts that «spirit is natively intelligent», he does not agree with Aristotle, «because spirit is not, as Aristotle supposed, a disembodied act of thinking about

26. Wallace's translation, *op. cit.*, 69.

27. See what Wallace says in general about the «unsatisfactory conception of *θυμὸς* (spirit) in Plato» in reference to Aristotle's psychology (Introduction to *Aristotle's Psychology*, p. cxxviii). Cp. with Santayana's *Realm of Spirit*, p. 16. Santayana himself talks of spirit as that «which Aristotle called intellect or reason» (RS, 46).

thinking, or a hypostasis of general ideas, but is the passionate and delicate flowering of some animal soul, to whom much that exists in the world is inimical, and much would be lovely that does not exist» (RS, 219). This spirit, then, which in Santayana replaces mainly what the intellect occupies in Aristotle's psychology, is different in origin from intellect, as Aristotle understands it. Intellect in Aristotle as divine and immortal came into the soul from outside, while intellect and therefore spirit in Santayana is «internal to the psyche» as deriving its origin from matter. It is this difference that forces Santayana to make the contrast between «animal psyche» in his philosophy and «supernatural soul» in the theology of the Catholic Church which for the construction of its «Christian theory of the soul» «began to look to Aristotle rather than to Plato»<sup>28</sup>. Another difference of Aristotle, and also of the orthodox teaching of the Church, from Santayana as concerns the conception of the human soul especially is that the intellect as included in this soul is simply, according to Aristotle, one of its faculties, the highest, while spirit in Santayana, as quite immaterial, is different in nature from psyche which, besides being immaterial, is material, too. Thus two, psyche and spirit, which, as Butler remarks for Santayana, «are definitely distinguished»<sup>29</sup>, constitute in his philosophy two components of man besides the third one, that of the body.

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28. ICG, 224; see also the whole chapter entitled: «The Animal Psyche and the Supernatural Soul» (*Ibid.*, pp. 221-236).

29. Butler, *The Mind of Santayana*, p. 199.

## CHAPTER IV

## THE WILL IN THE SPIRIT AND THE WILL IN THE PSYCHE

*The psyche becomes a particular instance of universal Will, found whenever the form to be maintained is organic and preserved by nutrition and reproduction. Then spirit, too, may be called an expression of Will, since it arises at a specially energetic phase in the life of the psyche, namely, when the range of adjustment and control begins to extend beyond the body (RS, 54-55).*

10. Of the Three Faculties of the Soul; Especially of the Will (Schopenhauer's Influence on Santayana)

From what we said in the previous chapter about the two-fold nature of the soul, the psychic and the spiritual, we can understand how they must be distinguished from the three faculties of the soul: reason, feeling, and will. Santayana talks of the three faculties both in the case of the spirit and of the psyche. He talks, for example, about a psyche (the animal psyche) which begins to «think» (SE, 222), which «must first exist and sustain itself by its 'intelligent' adaptations to the ambient world» (RE, 9), which has generated the intelligence (RS, 59). In a similar manner he talks also about the volitive and affective or passive faculties in the psyche. These faculties, then, are presupposed and involved in the spirit when it arises or awakes in the psyche. For this reason, among the various names that Santayana gives to the spirit are also «feeling» and «thought» (RS, 18; also RE, 129). As concerns the will he says that «it was impossible, logically as well as physically, that a living spirit should exist where there was no Will» (RS, 107). This «Will», he says, «is no doubt deeper than intelligence in the spirit, as it is in the animal; yet will without intelligence would not be spirit, since it would not distinguish what it willed or what it suffered» (RS, 16).

That the psyche and the spirit involve, separately from each other, as two different natures of the soul, the cognitive, the volitive, and the affective faculties, is evident in general from their relation to consciousness whose three aspects are these three faculties. Though Santayana gives to the spirit the name of «consciousness», this does not mean that the psyche is unconscious for, as he explains concerning the spirit, «it is the consciousness proper to an animal psyche» (RS, 43), and as such, therefore, spirit «can arise only in an animal psyche» (RS, 42; also 59), but not in the vegetative psyche «for so long as life remains purely vegetative it seems to be unconscious» (RS, 55). So, the characterization of the spirit as «consciousness» shows simply that the three faculties of intellect, feeling, and will are in higher degree in the spirit than in the psyche. From among these three faculties, then, we are going (now) to talk in this chapter of the will in particular, for in Santayana's psychology «spirit is a form of Will, involved in the functioning of a special organ» (RS, 87); and in this sense, therefore, «spirit too exists by virtue of a specific Will» (RS, 68).

Concerning the will in general, «Santayana», according to M.K. Munitz, «follows Schopenhauer in recognizing the priority of will over the intellect»<sup>1</sup>. As J. Duron also remarks, «the one and the other affirm in short the *priority of the will*, principle of a radical irrationalism»<sup>2</sup>. However, Santayana believes that this priority of the Will in Schopenhauer is a mythological symbol. He says: «The 'Will' in Schopenhauer was a transparent mythological symbol for the flux of the matter. There was absolute equivalence between such a system, in its purport and sense for reality, and the systems of Spinoza and Lucretius» (PP, 248). «Mythological certainly from the point of view of a naturalism which

1. M. K. Munitz, *The Moral Philosophy of Santayana*, p. 54. The influence of Schopenhauer on Santayana was great, especially during the first period of his life, as one can see from his philosophy of that period, characterized as «pessimistic in its coloring» (*Ibid.*, p. 9). As a young man Santayana was «an enthusiast of Schopenhauer» (J. Duron, *La pensée de George Santayana*, p. 51). «Schopenhauer was one of his favourite writers» (*Ibid.*, p. 41). When «he discovered Schopenhauer» (*Ibid.*, p. 80), he was an undergraduate yet at Harvard. He «had been charmed by Royce's Schopenhauer, and during his post graduate year or two in Berlin had heard Deussen give his lectures on Schopenhauer's nirvana». Finally, «when he returned, in 1888, to take his doctor's degree under Royce, he begged to write on Schopenhauer» (Herbert W. Schneider, *A History of American Philosophy*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1947, p. 410. See also J. Duron's mentioned book in French, p. 82).

2. J. Duron, *op. cit.*, p. 410.

excludes all metaphysics» so that we can say, according to J. Duron, that «the philosophy of the *Life of Reason* is that of the *World as Will*, transported into the key of a pure naturalism»<sup>3</sup>. «And when Santayana talks of this 'will which is behind the ideas', the analogy becomes remarkable»<sup>4</sup>.

According to J. Bentley's interpretation of Schopenhauer's philosophy of will, «will is the primary, timeless, spaceless, uncaused activity that expresses itself in man as impulse, instinct, striving, yearning, craving — Man knows himself as a phenomenon, as a part of nature, as an extended organic body. The will is the real self, the body is an expression of the will»<sup>5</sup>. Like Schopenhauer, to whom «the 'Will' was as evident in mechanism as in animal life»<sup>6</sup>, Santayana teaches also the same thing about the universal will and man's will.

#### 11. Will in the Spirit and Will in the Psyche

«After the descriptive manner of Schopenhauer and other German philosophers», says Santayana, «we may give the more modern name of universal Will, provided we are aware of using this term poetically», to what «the ancients could reasonably speak of a Soul of the World», that is, to an «animating form of dominant system of tropes». By this term, then, he means «*the observable endeavour in things of any sort to develop a specific form and to preserve it*» (RS, 53). In this sense, therefore, as he explains, he writes the word with a capital (ES, 53) and uses it for the «two connected movements in nature, one in human behaviour, the other in its effects and conditions» (RS, 54).

Santayana distinguishes in general between universal Will which

3. J. Duron, *Ibid.*

4. *Ibid.*, p. 144. However, though Santayana follows Schopenhauer in recognizing the priority of will and thought, on the other hand, he sympathizes also with the Indians (*Apologia Pro Mente Sua* in PS., 569), he does not accept the Buddhist ideal of desirelessness or will-lessness (the denial of the will) which Schopenhauer upholds (See, for example, *The World as Will and Idea*; tr. from the German by R. B. Haldane and J. Kemp, London, 1896, Vol. I, Bk. 4, pp. 530-532). In opposition to Schopenhauer as concerns this ideal, Santayana accepts that «will is not *not to will*» (RS. 177).

5. John Bentley, *Philosophy; An Outline-History*, pp. 97-98.

6. Essay on H. Bergson (WD, 72). The «Will» of Schopenhauer, as Santayana remarks in this essay, is like the *élan vital* of H. Bergson or the «Unknowable Force» of Herbert Spencer (WD, 70).

is everywhere in «its potential impulses» (RS, 83) and specific Wills, that is, Wills in molecules which «have become plastic organisms» (RS, 57), and which have a «definite impulse», that is, an impulse which «has terminated materially» (RS, 70). So, the «primal Will» in a man, for example, «is a part of the universal Will in nature, of the groundless character of fact everywhere» (RS, 75); it is «the self-arrangement of matter, by its own impulse, into some distinct form, which it is possible to rest or to repeat. Such is the Will to exist and to be something in particular» (RS, 84). In this sense we can talk of the «particular Wills» of «plants and animals» (RS, 83), as also of «the specific Will of the psyche» (RS, 61), which psyche, according to Santayana, is distinguished into vegetative and animal psyche (RS, 16; also RM, 139). So, «in animals universal Will takes the form of a psyche» (RS, 124). Generally, as Santayana explains:

the psyche becomes a particular instance of universal Will, found whenever the form to be maintained is organic and preserved by nutrition and reproduction. Then spirit, too, may be called an expression of Will, since it arises at a specially energetic phase in the life of the psyche, namely when the range of adjustment and control begins to extend beyond the body; for so long as life remains purely vegetative it seems to be unconscious (RS, 54-55).

We may then say that the «consciousness of Will in the spirit» (RS, 79) arises not in the vegetative psyche which is unconscious<sup>7</sup>, but in the animal psyche, for «spirit is the consciousness proper to animal psyche» (RS, 43). In other words, «spirit arises whenever Will in one place finds it profitable to mark, trace, and even imitatively to share the movement of Will elsewhere» (RS, 55).

From what we said we can see that Santayana distinguishes between Will in the psyche which is «an instance of universal Will» and Will in the spirit which is a «form of Will» (RS, 87), «an emanation of universal Will» (RS, 124), and which «exists by virtue of a specific Will» (RS, 68). Concerning the latter (Will in the spirit) in its relation to the universal Will, Santayana says that «universal Will, in evolving spirit, satisfied one of its potential impulses; this impulse is the Will proper to spirit anywhere» (RS, 83). In other words, spirit «crowns some impulse, raises it to actual unity and totality, and being the fruition of it, could not arise until the organ had matured» (RS, 8). This impulse, which

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7. RS, 55; see also p. 66: «The vegetative psyche never suffers consciously».

the spirit crowns and raises to an actual unity and intense realization of existence, is «the impulse of psyche». It is this impulse that, «making for a specific perfection of form and action, underlies the spiritual distinction between good and evil» (RS, 16). In this sense, therefore, the psyche is «a sort of animated code of hygiene and morals» (SE, 222; also 219). So, as M.K. Munitz remarks, «in impulse we have the stuff of morals; the substance of life is the multifarious complex of its desires and its needs»<sup>8</sup>. «Santayana thus follows Aristotle in recognizing desire as the single, ultimate cause of actuality»<sup>9</sup>.

Santayana, according to Munitz again, uses the term «impulse» sometimes in a narrower and sometimes in a broader sense. In the narrower sense of the term «natural impulse» includes the biological expression of some bodily or organic tensions, such as the drives of hunger or sex impulses. In the broader sense of the term, on the other hand, impulse «includes not only such things as drives of hunger and sex, but various economic, parental, or political interests of social life, as well as the interests of imagination and reflexion as these express themselves in science, art and religion»<sup>10</sup>. In other words, the distinction of impulse into the narrower and broader sense is a distinction which refers to «what is sometimes called the 'lower' or irrational side of human nature, in contrast to the 'higher' or rational side, as the latter is expressed in the imaginative and reflective activities of religion, art and science»<sup>11</sup>. So, as we can understand, this contrast in the language of Santayana is between what he calls Will in the psyche and Will in the spirit.

## 12. The Conflict and the Harmony of the Will in the Spirit or Man's Will with the Rest of the Psyche and of Nature or God's Will

The conflict between matter and spirit, according to Santayana, is a «conflict between Will in the spirit and Will in the rest of the psyche and of the world» (RS, 80). This conflict concerns man only among all the creatures, for «plants and animals», as Santayana explains, «accept this natural chaos, and never swerve from allegiance to their particular Wills» (RS, 83). Thus in the case of man only we can talk of a con-

8. M. K. Munitz, *The Moral Philosophy of Santayana*, p. 53.

9. *Ibid.*, pp. 53-54.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 53; see also the following pages.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 54.

flict between «human behaviour», on the one hand, and «its effects and conditions» on the other hand: these «two connected movements in nature» for which Santayana uses the word Will because, as he explains, «we are rather recognizing the original seat of those conflicts and endeavours which agitate the spirit only because, in the first place, they agitate the animal psyche and the material world» (RS, 54). Of this conflict then between Will in the spirit and Will in the rest of the psyche and of the material world, Santayana says the following in his *Realm of Essence*:

This possible conflict between matter and spirit is a family quarrel; it is not a shock between independent forces brought together by accident, since spirit cannot exist except in matter, and matter cannot become interested in its formations and fortunes save by creating a spirit that may observe and celebrate them. How happily spirit and matter may lead their common life together appears in play at the beginning, and in contemplation at the end. It is only in the middle when animal faculties are inwardly perfect and keen enough to be conscious, but are outwardly ill-adjusted and ignorant, that trouble arises; because the mind sees and wants one thing, and circumstances impose something different, requiring a disposition and a form of imagination in the animal to which his play-life is not adapted. Spirit—the voice of the inner nature in so far as it is already formed and definite—accordingly suffers continual defeats, by the defeat of those animal impulses which it expresses; and if these impulses become confused or exhausted, it sinks with them into vice or discouragement. It would soon perish altogether, and annul the moral problem which its existence creates, unless in some way a harmony could be re-established between the individual and the world (RS, 11-12).

This harmony between the individual and the world is a harmony between Will in the spirit and Will in the rest of the psyche and of the world. In this sense, as Santayana explains, «the Will in spirit [is] not separable from the animal Will» (RS, 65).

Thus «where matter and spirit move in harmony spirit may adopt the Will in nature as the Will of God or more proudly and histrionically as its own will» (RS, 80). «At such moments», Santayana explains, «the Will at work in the spirit becomes unanimous with the Will of nature working beyond the animal soul. In religious parlance, it becomes identical with the Will of God»<sup>12</sup>. In other words, the harmony re-established

12. RS, 66. This harmony of the Will in spirit and the Will in nature lies in the freedom of the spirit, as, on the other hand, the «division between the Will in nature and the Will in spirit» causes the slavery of spirit (RS, 147).

between matter and spirit or between «the Will visible in matter and in the laws of nature» (RS, 72) and the Will in the spirit is a harmony between the Will of God, for matter in Santayana as «the source of everything» (RM, xi) «is symbolized under the name of God» (RM, 205), and «man's Will» which involves «the deepest and most ancient currents of his being», «the primal Will in himself» which «is a part of the universal Will» (RS, 75). In this sense, therefore, Santayana finds «universal affinities of the Will in the spirit» (RS, 62).

They are these universal affinities, then, that make Santayana characterize the conformity or harmony of the spirit to and with universal Will as «universal knowledge and universal love» (RS, 68-69), these two objects of the spirit which, as Santayana understands them, concern mainly intuition, being essentially cognitive, and union as spiritual love. Of these two, then, intuition and union, we come now to talk in the following chapter.

(To be continued)