

## MORAL DEVELOPMENT AND EDUCATION:

*Educational Implications of the Early Greek Patristic Anthropology  
and their Relation to Modern Theories of Moral Education*

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### *P r e f a c e*

*This study attempts to present the early Greek patristic ideas concerning man's moral development and education, and, moreover, to compare briefly these ideas to classical thought, to Western Christianity, to some non-orthodox Christian movements and to modern theories prevailing in the field of moral education. The description of the anthropological, psychological and educational concepts of the early Greek fathers is primarily based on the Macarian corpus and secondarily on the writings of the Cappadocian, Antiochean and other early Greek patristic writers.*

*The Macarian corpus was chosen because (i) it is an educational rather than a dogmatic work which endeavors to facilitate the moral and spiritual development of its audience and (ii) because it has influenced greatly Eastern spirituality and, therefore, is rated among the most representative works of Eastern patristic tradition.*

*The Macarian writings have been accused of being Pelagian and Messalian in their anthropology and soteriology. This accusation, for reasons stated above, reflects on the entire Eastern tradition. Therefore, we have undertaken the double task to show how Macarius' works relate to orthodox views on these matters and, moreover, to compare his teaching and that of the Eastern writers in general, to Pelagianism and Messalianism.*

*Following the general patristic thought, the writers studied here portray three images of man: the image of the pre-fallen man, the image of fallen man, and, finally, the image of restored and perfect man. These images are found to differ considerably from these two movements.*

*In addition to that, we describe the early Greek patristic understanding of moral development as a gradual process and its methodological approaches, and we compare them to the cognitive developmental approach to moral education. In that sense this work is a comparative study in the field of educational anthropology, studying the main aspects of educational systems deriving from different persuasions.*

## ABBREVIATIONS

ANF	Ante-Nicene Fathers, ed. A. Roberts.
BT	G. Butterworth, <i>Origen on First Principles</i> .
DOP	Dumbarton Oaks Papers.
et al.	et alii (and others).
f	and the following line(s) or page(s).
Ibid.	Ibidem (in the same place).
Loc. Cit.	loco citato (in the place cited).
NSSE	National Society for the Study in Education.
Op. Cit.	opere citato (in the work cited).
PG	Patrologia Graeca, ed. J. P. Migne.
PL	Patrologia Latina, ed. J. P. Migne.
PNF	Nicene and Post-Nicene Fathers, ed. P. Schaff.
POR	Patrologia Orientalis, ed. F. Graffin.
SCH	Sources Chrétiennes, ed. H. de Lubac.
ST	O. Stählin, <i>Clemens Alexandrinus</i> , vols I-II.
SPCK	Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge.
VHP	Vivliotheke Hellenon Pateron.

## INTRODUCTION

I. *Purpose, Value and Delimitation of the Study.*

The writings which the manuscript tradition attributes to Macarius the Egyptian (c. 300-390) present a short but rather complete doctrine concerning God, Christ, the angels, the demons, man and, finally, the Church. The present study intends to deal mainly with Macarius<sup>1</sup> doctrine of man and its implications for moral education. The issue of man has always been fascinating and has attracted a lot of attention in both Classical Greece and the Christian world. Today, moreover, the question of man has lost nothing of its force<sup>2</sup> and remains as the main subject of a number of fields of knowledge, some of which belong to humanities and some to sciences.

In the Greek world Socrates turned the discussion to the question of man, after the first causes had been discussed by the pre-Socratics.<sup>3</sup> The same happened to the Christian world; the doctrines of

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1. In the present study we call the author of the corpus studied Macarius instead of the more correct Pseudo-Macarius. The author of the corpus remains unknown and is believed to represent fifth century Asiatic Christianity. All references to Macarian writings will be given in a parenthesis right after the quoted passage. The page number refers to the 41st volume of the patristic series «Vivliotheke Hellenon Pateron» (VHP), which follows the critical edition of H. Dörries. When a reference is to a work other than the fifty *Homilies* the page number refers to the 42nd volume of the VHP, where the rest of the Macarian corpus is published.

2. J. Aggasi, *Towards a Rational Philosophical Anthropology*, p. 28, note 6. Throughout his history thinking man has evolved sets of beliefs in his attempt to define himself. These beliefs changed as man's perceptions of the universe have changed; often the new beliefs came as a reaction to the immediate past. Thus, the Age of Enlightenment is thought to have emerged partly as a reaction to the Baroque period and, therefore, it emphasized the importance of reason in opposition to ignorance and superstition of the period before. Likewise, Romanticism, with its emphasis on feelings, came as a reaction to the «rationality» of the Age of Enlightenment; see G. I., Brow, «The Training of Teachers for Effective Roles», in K. Ryan, *Teacher Education*, p. 175 f.

3. In Plato's *Phaedo*, Socrates says that in his youth he had studied what the philosophers had to say on the origin of the world, but he soon gave up this science of nature because he was not satisfied with the sort of explanations offered;

the Trinity and Christology were first dealt with by the Church Fathers and then the issue of man appeared as a central question in the beginning of the fifth century. It is true that the Fathers had occasionally touched it in their conflict with the Gnostics in earlier times.<sup>4</sup> However, what brought it to the centre of the arena was not this conflict, but a conflict which took place within the Church; this was caused by the opposed interests of Eastern Christianity and Western Christianity. In that dispute the anthropological question came up in relation to two approaches to redemption favoured differently in the two parts of the Christian world. The Eastern Fathers tended to emphasize the role of human freedom more than the Western Fathers did; the latter, convinced of the sinfulness and the corruption of the post-Adamic man, made salvation dependent wholly upon Grace.<sup>5</sup>

Macarius, as it will be pointed out below, is not the type of the systematic expiator of any doctrine, but he is a devoted spiritual teacher who meditates upon the question of man. The correct knowledge of man's nature makes the task of an educator easier and more efficient; the need for such a knowledge generated the paedagogical anthropology, which lately has developed into an independent branch of education, as it will be shown below.<sup>6</sup> Macarius, moreover, is anxious to share with his readers his views on man and also the personal experience he had in the field of spiritual life, hoping that this would help them to develop themselves more easily and safely. It is in this respect that he presents his anthropological views. Man in Macarius' writings is always seen in relation to God, Christ, his Church and the spiritual world rather than isolated. Thus, anthropology becomes a key issue which introduces the student of Macarius to all the other aspects of his teaching mentioned above, i. e. theology, Christology, soteriology,

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in his *Before, and after Socrates* F. M. Conford explains Socrates' dissatisfaction by arguing that the explanations given by the old philosophers offered a detailed picture of how the event came about and not why it came about; Socrates was interested in the latter, see p. 1f; cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysica*, I VI, 987b.

4. Anthropology was one of the four themes dealt with by the revealed and saving *gnosis*, the other three being theology, cosmology and eschatology; see H. Jonas, «Delimitation of the Gnostic Phenomenon; Typological and Historical», in *Le Origini dello Gnosticismo*. p. 92.

5. H. W. Robinson, *The Christian Doctrine of Man*, p. 179.

6. In his *Theologike kai Anthropologike Theoresis tes Agoges* C. Gregoriades gives a rich bibliography on paedagogical anthropology, see p. 106 note 350.



angelology and ecclesiology. The writer believes that this is one of the easier, if not the easiest way for one to approach Macarius.

Macarius has not shared the good luck of some other writers of the patristic era who, having been condemned in their own time, have lately found advocates who applied all their scholastic dexterity in order to restore them in the eyes of contemporary man. With Macarius we find the opposite case;<sup>7</sup> since the 17th century he has been accused of Pelagianism, Messalianism and deliberate plagiarism.<sup>8</sup> The judgments have often been passed by applying criteria alien to Eastern spirituality. Capable scholars in the field of Church history and patristics have indicated how dangerous it is to evaluate documents of Eastern spirituality with standards of Western theology.<sup>9</sup> A more positive approach to the works themselves might prove to be more useful than that of ancient and modern heresiologists. Therefore, the writer intends to analyze Macarius' writings in order to find out whether or not his views on anthropology and the other fields related to it form a coherent system and, moreover, if this system fits in the context of Eastern patristic thought. It is hoped that such a study will show how much Macarius moves within the Eastern contemporary framework; when found outside it, the direction he is pointing at will be studied, and, moreover, the severity of his divergences. It is also the intention of the writer to study the educational implications of Macarius' doctrine of man by discussing his answers to the main question set forth by educational anthropology. These questions were of primary interest to Macarius since they are closely related to his understanding of the process of man's restoration and moral development, as it is shown in chapter IV.

Studying the writings of Macarius, one does not limit his interests to an isolated writer of insignificant importance, but on the contrary, exposes himself to the thought of a master whose influence in both East and West is almost as great as that of Pseudo-Dionysius.<sup>10</sup> In the East Macarius' works became a classic and they are practically inseparable

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7. J. Meyendorff, «Messalianism or Antimesalianism? A Fresh Look at the 'Macarian' Problem», in P. Granfield, *Kyriakon*, voll II, p. 585.

8. C. Bonis, *Makariou tou Aigyptiou Eisagogica*, VHP, vol. 41, p. 138; cf. C. Oudin, *De SS Macariis*, PG. 34, 378f.

9. A. Vööbus, *History of Ascetism in the Syrian Orient*, vol. I, p. 183 and J. Meyendorff, *Op. Cit.*, p. 590.

10. J. Meyendorff, *Loc. Cit.*

arable from Eastern Christian spirituality.<sup>11</sup> In the post medieval West Macarius was known and is said to have influenced J. Arndt, G. Arnold, J. Wesley,<sup>12</sup> the founder of Methodism, and others; moreover, as Benz demonstrates in his *Die protestantische Thebais*,<sup>13</sup> he contributed a lot to the development of a mystic and pietistic movement, which started in West Germany and gradually expanded to Western Europe and America during the 18th century.

In the Christian East, however, Macarius was more widely read as it is proven by the extant Greek, Syrian, Arabic and Slavic versions, most of which come from the early medieval period.<sup>14</sup> For the first Western translation one has to wait until 1559 when J. Picus produced the first Greek publication accompanied by a Latin translation.<sup>15</sup> Then they were translated into German by G. Arnold (1696) and into English by J. Wesley (1749). Lately scholarly research has provided us with a critical edition of the Macarian writings and, moreover, with a considerable number of studies.<sup>16</sup>

## II Terminology.

We have mentioned above that early Greek Patristic anthropology lies at the centre of our interest. The term anthropology, however, has fluctuated in usage considerably and has been used by various fields of knowledge to denote different disciplines. In the 16th to 18th centuries the term was used purely in a physical sense as synonymous with human anatomy and physiology.<sup>17</sup> In the modern acceptation anthropology treats more particularly of man's origin and place in the animal kingdom, his individual and racial development, the physical and mental changes he has undergone during his career on the globe and, finally, his development of articulate speech and the principles of religion, ethics, altruism and sociology, which at the present time constitute the great landmarks of human civilization.<sup>18</sup>

11. J. Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought*, p. 123.

12. J. Quasten, *Patrol. III*, p. 162f; A. Outler, *John Wesley*, pp. 9 and 274f.

13. E. Benz, *Die Protestantische Thebais* (Akademie in Mainz, 1963).

14. A Syriac MS which contains the *Homilies* of Macarius is dated as early as A. D. 534; see J. Quasten, *Op. Cit.*, p. 163.

15. J. Quasten, *Op. Cit.*, p. 162.

16. In his *Patrology III*, J. Quasten mentions more than fifty-five studies done mostly in the first part of the present century, see p. 165 f.

17. J. M. Baldwin, *Dictionary of Philosophy and Psychology*, vol. I. p. 52.

18. R. Murro, «Anthropology» in *Encyclopedia of Religion and Ethics*, vol. I, p. 561.

The term anthropology is, moreover, used currently in reference to that branch of philosophy and theology whose theme is the phenomenon of man and answers questions related to the origins and nature of man, his present state, his abilities and shortcomings, his potentialities and, finally, his destiny.<sup>19</sup>

Both philosophical and theological anthropology see man as an individual and as a member of the human community. What characterizes theological anthropology is that its views are not *philosophoumena* but statements of faith. Moreover, theological anthropology sees man in relation to God and shows him to be dependent upon God for his origin, nature, condition, dignity and destiny.<sup>20</sup> Modern scholarship uses also such terms as «Pauline anthropology», «Cappadocian anthropology», and in the present study we can speak of «Macarian anthropology». In those cases the term anthropology is used not to describe a systematic and scholarly anthropology, but a rather Pauline or Cappadocian or Macarian teaching regarding man, and, further, to describe it, not as a closed system, but rather as a limited way of approaching and shedding light on man's nature. Thus, these terms refer not to a scholarly discipline, but to a «picture of man» as this is described by a particular writer.<sup>21</sup>

It is also important to make clear what we mean by paedagogical anthropology. The term has gained general acceptance and is used to denote a branch of general paedagogy.<sup>22</sup> Paedagogical anthropology

19. J. Aggasi writes that philosophical anthropology centers round the question «what is man?» and is supposed to offer a general view of man, an overview, a metaphysical foundation for the various sciences of man. Moreover, he claims that these days philosophical anthropology is an increasingly popular subject of university curriculum, usually under the title «philosophy of man», in parallel to «philosophy of mind»; see his *Op. Cit.*, pp. 24 and 28 note 6. This interest is also illustrated in the educational works of E. L. Thorndike, who emphasizes the importance of knowledge of what man's nature is and, moreover, of the laws which govern changes in it; see E. L. Thorndike, *Educational Psychology: The Original Nature of Man*, p. 1f.

20. J. A. Fichter, «Theological Anthropology» in *Catholic Encyclopedia*, vol. I, p. 613 f.

21. G. C. Berkouwer, *Man: The Image of God*, p. 32.

22. Paedagogy in general is divided into two main branches (i) the Systematic Paedagogy and (ii) the Historic Paedagogy. The former is again divided into General Paedagogy, Special Paedagogy and Comparative Paedagogy. Furthermore, General Paedagogy is divided into Paedagogical Anthropology, Paedagogical Ethics and Paedagogical Psychology. Finally, the latter is divided into General Didactic

has as its subject man and aims at understanding him through the process of education. Thus, it discusses such issues as these: whether or not man is an *animal educandum*, the aim of education, the limits of education, the factors which can influence man's development, the process of his development, etc. It is understood that these questions have been answered differently throughout history. In this study we will discuss Macarius' views on them, which are expected to be within the framework of early Christian thought.

The value of this kind of study is that it enables the reader of Macarius, and the Christian literature in general, to understand better the educational tactics adopted by the Christian world. As it is clear from Macarius and other early Christian writers, the Church Fathers conceived themselves as educators,<sup>23</sup> had defined aims in mind, and they consciously employed specific methods in order to realize them. All these, however, are discussed below in chapters IV and V.

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Methodology and Special Didactic; see A. Danases, *Themati ke tes Paedagogikes Epi-stemes*, p. 18 f.

The term educational anthropology, however, is also used by modern scholarship in reference to that branch of cultural anthropology which studies the practice of education, i. e., methods, goals, etc., in a crosscultural perspective, including both primitive and modern societies; see G. F. Kneller, *Educational Anthropology*, p. 15f and C. K. Nicholson, *Anthropology and Education*, p. 2 f.

23. In his *History of Religious Education*, R. Ulich notes that almost all Fathers felt themselves compelled to write about, or touch upon, the problem of the right upbringing of children; see p. 36. Moreover, it should be noted that most of the Fathers devoted themselves to the moral education of adults; on account of their educational activities the distinguished ascetics earned the title «professors of the desert», See E. G. Matsagouras, *The Early Church Fathers as Educators*, p. 101.

## CHAPTER I

### MAN'S CREATION, COMPOSITION AND HIS PLACE IN THE CREATED WORLD

The more philosophically minded Fathers express a special interest in creation. Macarius, however, is neither a philosopher nor a systematic theologian like Origen and the Cappadocians. He is a religious teacher and remains to a large extent untouched by the philosophical and theological questions of his time.<sup>1</sup> Therefore, his basic interest is man's moral development and his redemption. When he speaks of the world and the process of its creation it is mainly done in relation to man.

The background of what he says is the Old Testament doctrine of creation, as this appears in the traditional teaching of the Church. God created everything *ex nihilo* and is the author of the entire reality (XVI, I, p. 237, 4f). What he has created forms the world of man and the spiritual beings and the physical world.

#### I. *Angelology.*

The spiritual beings are called by Macarius νοεραὶ οὐσΐαι, and they are divided into angels, souls and demons (*Ibid.*) The arrangement of them reminds one of Origen.<sup>2</sup> Concerning the time of their creation Macarius does not say anything explicitly, but one passage in his writings seems to suggest that he is following the common opinion of the Fathers,<sup>3</sup> namely that the invisible world was created before the visible one (XL 5, p. 337, 28f).<sup>4</sup> If that is the case then one may say that

1. This is true as far as the fifty *Homilies* are concerned. In the other *Homilies* attributed to Macarius one finds references to Christological questions.

2. *De Principiis* I, 8 f., VHP 16, p. 306, 16f.

3. *De Princ.* 2.8:2-6, BT, 125 f. Gregory Naz., *Oratio XXXVII.* 9-10, PG. 36, 320, 21; Chrysostom, *In Genesim Hom.* II. PG. 53, 29. Others, however, had expressed the view that both worlds were created at the same time; see Epiphanius, *Panarion* LXV. 4-5.

4. Origen argues that the material world was created after the fall of the rational beings in the intelligible universe in order to serve as a place of penance, see *De Principiis* II. 3:4-5. BT, 87 f; cf. BT, XXXIII f and 239 note 5.

the spiritual beings were created before time, since time began with the creation of the physical world.

Macarius, like many other Fathers,<sup>5</sup> speaks of the angels as having no body (ἀσώματοι) (XVIII. 7, p. 251, 21); such a view is away from the Semitic tradition which does not make a distinction between body and the spiritual part of a created being, and, therefore, sees the angels as beings of fire and describes their bodies.<sup>6</sup> Especially, in one passage Macarius seems to speak of them as incorporeal and spiritual beings: Πᾶσαι αἱ νοεραὶ οὐσὶαι λέγω δὴ ἀγγέλων καὶ ψυχῶν καὶ δαιμόνων, ἀκέραιοι ὑπὸ τοῦ Δημιουργοῦ ἐκτίσθησαν (XVI. 1, p. 237,4f). These views, however, do not express Macarius' mind on the matter. Elsewhere he elaborates on this topic and makes clear that the angels are not altogether spiritual, since after their kind they are bodies; Ἐκαστον γὰρ κατὰ τὴν ἰδίαν φύσιν σῶμά ἐστι, ὁ ἄγγελος, ἡ ψυχὴ, ὁ δαίμων· ὅτι καὶ λεπτὰ ἐστίν, ἐν ὑποστάσει καὶ χαρακτηρὶ καὶ εἰκόνι κατὰ τὴν λεπτότητα τῆς φύσεως αὐτῶν σώματα τυγχάνει λεπτὰ (IV. 9, p. 162, 3f; cf. *Neue Hom.* XXVI. 4, vol. 42, p. 125, 16f).

From the passage quoted above it is obvious that the angels' corporeality is of a refined kind; this is also attested by another passage where Macarius argues that the angels were created complete in themselves and perfectly simple (XVI. 1, p. 237,4 f). This suggests that in Macarius' view the angels do not share a common matter with the sensible world. This notion is also found in Basil, who identifies the intelligible matter of the angels with the light and fire;<sup>7</sup> this, however, has not been accepted by the other Cappadocians. Gregory of Nyssa argues that the angelic intelligibles are of a higher order than fire,<sup>8</sup> which is intermediary between the intelligible and sensible nature, and the other Gregory suggests that the angels are the nearest spiri-

5. Chrysostom, *In Gen. Hom.* XXII. 2.

6. B. J. Bonsirven, *Palestinian Judaism in the Time of Christ*, p. 34 f; Origen remarks that ὄνομα ἀσωμάτου οὐκ ἴσασιν οὐ μόνον οἱ πολλοί, ἀλλ' οὐδὲ ἡ γραφή, see *De Principiis*, pref. 8 and IV. 3:15, BT 5 and 312.

7. I. P. Sheldon-Williams, «The Greek Christian Platonist Tradition from the Cappadocians to Maximus and Eriugena», in A. H. Armstrong, *The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, p. 435. In his *De Spiritu Sancto*, XVI. 38 Basil argues that the angels' nature is an immaterial fire, an aerial spirit.

8. Gregory of Nyssa, *C. Eunomium* II. 12. PG. 45, 1004A and *In Exaem.*, PG. 44, 80D-81A; 81C-D; 116B; 121A.

tual thing to corporeality, but he hesitates to affirm that they are corporeal.<sup>9</sup>

Macarius cannot be accused of inconsistency for arguing in one case that the angels are incorporeal (XVIII. 7, p. 251, 21) and in another that they are bodies in themselves, as we have seen. Patristic literature explains the apparent inconsistency by arguing that the angels are called incorporeal in comparison with man and corporeal in comparison with God. Didymus the Blind writes on this matter: πνεύματα δὲ (sc. οἱ ἄγγελοι), καθὼς πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἀσώματοι· οὐ κληθέντες πνεύματα τοῦ Θεοῦ... ἀλλ' ἄγγελοι λειτουργοί, καὶ σώματα οὐράνια, διὰ τὸ ἀπειρώς ἀπέχειν καὶ ὑφίζανειν τοῦ ἀκτίστου πνεύματος τοῦ Θεοῦ.<sup>10</sup> The same argument is also presented by John of Damascus; he writes :

Ἄγγελος τοίνυν ἐστίν, οὐσία νοερά, ἀεικίνητος, αὐτεξούσιος, ἀσώματος, Θεῷ λειτουργοῦσα, κατὰ χάριν ἐν τῇ φύσει τὸ ἀθάνατον εἰληφυῖα, ἥς οὐσίαν τὸ εἶδος καὶ τὸν ὅρον μόνος ὁ κτίστης ἐπίσταται. Ἀσώματος δὲ λέγεται καὶ ἄυλος, ὅσον πρὸς ἡμᾶς· πᾶν γὰρ συγκρινόμενον πρὸς Θεόν, τὸν μόνον ἀσύγκριτον, παχύ τε καὶ ὕλικόν εὐρίσκεται, μόνον γὰρ ἄυλον τὸ θεῖον ἐστὶ καὶ ἀσώματον.<sup>11</sup>

From this it is obvious that for John of Damascus materiality implies corporeality; he is not in line with the Cappadocian theory of the non-existence of matter, according to which the body is the result of the meeting of intelligible universal forces.<sup>12</sup> Origen admits the existence of an Aristotelian prime matter, without dimension, and argues that, since the fall of the *logika*, all the rational beings, souls and angels included, cannot exist apart from a bodily relationship.<sup>13</sup> Origen

9. Gregory Nazianzen, *Oratio* XXVIII. 31. PG. 36, 72A; see also I. P. Sheldon-Williams, *Op. Cit.*, p. 435.

10. Didymus the Blind, *De Trinitate* II. 4, PG. 39, 481B.

11. *De Fide Orthodoxa* II. 3, PG. 94, 865B-866A.

12. A. H. Armstrong, «The Theory of Non-Existence of Matter in Plotinus and the Cappadocians» in *Studia Patristica*, vol. V (1962), p. 428. A. H. Armstrong argues that this is a doctrine which the Cappadocians probably took from Plotinus. The theological purpose for adopting this doctrine is to eliminate as completely as possible the pagan idea of a matter co-eternal with God. In this view the Cappadocians stand apart from the general patristic tradition, which Macarius seems to follow; cf. *Ibid.* p. 428 f.

13. A. H. Armstrong, *Op. Cit.*, p. 429; *De Princ.* 2. 2:2; 12.3:2; 4.3:15, BT, 81, 84 and 312. Matter, according to Origen, is a common changeable substratum, which has no form or qualities, and, therefore, it is capable of receiving the forms of every type of body and assuming the most diverse transformation; see A. Tripolitis, «The Doctrine of the Soul in the Thought of Plotinus and Origen», p. 115.

moves within the Platonic tradition and argues that the rational beings, though in their own nature incorporeal, *have* a body of fine, ethereal and invisible nature.<sup>14</sup> In his *Com. on John*. 13, Origen, like Macarius and the other writers mentioned above, speaks of the angels and other heavenly beings, such as saints, as being incorporeal, but at the same time he makes clear that they are called so in relation to the earthly bodies, since their bodies are of a fine ethereal texture. Absolute incorporeality, explains Origen, is the property of the Trinity alone.<sup>15</sup> The closer to God a creature is the finer texture of body it has.<sup>16</sup> Obviously Macarius stands apart from Origen's line of thought on the matter, to which Didymus and other ecclesiastical writers adhere. Such views, however, are not peculiar to Christian writers but they are found also among Middle Platonists and Neoplatonists, as we shall see below in our discussion on the nature of the soul.

Since Macarius allows some sort of fine corporeality for the intelligible beings, he argues that the angels have an image (εἰκὼν) or a form (μορφή), which in fact is the same as that of the soul (VII. 7, p. 188, 40f). Concerning the demons' form Macarius says nothing, but his views on the angels' form should apply to them as well.

All these spiritual beings, says Macarius, were created by God and they were good in their original state, and they were all endowed with free will. Some of them, however, ἰδίῳ θελήματι ἐξετράπησαν τοῦ προσήκοντος λογισμοῦ and they chose the way of evil (XVI. 1, p. 237, 6 f). This indicates that the spiritual beings, though they were created good, were not perfect by nature, otherwise their fall would not have been possible. Christianity attributed instability to all creatures of all levels,<sup>17</sup> and the world of angels is not excluded from this law. The nature of their fall, however, is nowhere given by Macarius but it is clear from the passage above that he regarded as sinful their choice to abandon the cause for which they were created.

Macarius does not use the story of Gen. IV, according to which the angelic fall took place after some angels came down to earth and

14. *De Princ.* 2.2:2, BT, 81; 4.3:15, BT, 312. see also *C. Celsum.* 7. 32, VHP, 10, p. 146,32 f.

15. *De Principiis.* 2.2:2, BT, 81; 1.6:4; 4.3.:15, BT 58 and 312. This is so because the Trinity alone is uncreated.

16. *C. Celsum.* 4. 57, VHP, 9, p. 276, 6 f; 6.77, VHP, 10, p. 118, 17 f; cf. 3.4, VHP, 9, p. 184, 10 f. Cf. Tripolitis, *Op. Cit.*, p. 116.

17. For a fuller discussion of this doctrine see A. H. Armstrong, «Salvation Plotinian and Christian», in *Downside Review*, spring 1957. p. 126 f.



contracted marriages with women. Giants sprung from this union, who were harmful to both men and beasts. The sinful angels taught men a knowledge which proved to be disastrous for mankind. This story had been used by post-exilic apocryphal writings, such as *The Ethiopic Book of Enoch* (VI-XI), in order to explain the presence of evil in both the celestial and terrestrial planes. This theory, however, was never used by Rabbinical theology and, moreover, never provided a Biblical foundation for the doctrine of the fall developed by the Christian Fathers.<sup>18</sup> The latter accepted another tradition according to which the demons are angels who revolted against God.<sup>19</sup> Macarius seems to adhere to this tradition.

Concerning the good angels in particular, Macarius explains that their main task is to serve God (*angels Neue Hom. LXXVIII. 1, vol. 42, p. 100, 6*), to minister to the saints (XV. 44, p. 233, 16-23) and to assist men in their effort to gain salvation (*Ibid.* line 6). When a sinner is saved the angels rejoice in heaven (XXX. 3, p. 299, 23). Macarius does not say how the hosts of the angels are organized; he just mentions Michael and Gabriel as archangels — Raphael is not mentioned — the angels and the powers (XV. 2, p. 247, 19 f.), without making clear what the difference is. The Areopagitan arrangement,<sup>20</sup> however, of the heavenly powers is nowhere found in Macarius' *Homilies*.

Macarius, moreover, being in accordance with the Church tradition and the general trend of late antiquity, pays special attention to the evil powers, i.e. demons, whom he calls also ἀριστεροὶ ἄγγελοι (XXII. 1, p. 262, 33). We have seen that the demons were not evil by nature and how they came to be the way they are. Satan, their leader, and his host, is not viewed by Macarius as an independent power in a dualistic way, but as someone who always acts by God's permission (XXVI. 3, p. 273, 1-15). His abilities are limited (*Ibid.* 9. p. 275, 20 f). and his knowledge concerning man's present state and future development is not in any way supernatural, but it is empirically

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18. N. P. Williams, *The Ideas of the Fall and of Original Sin*, p. 23 f. Justin the Martyr and Athenagoras, however, quote this story and believe that the demons are the offsprings of this union; see Justin, *Apologia*, II. 5, PG. 6, 425C and Athenagoras, *Legatio* XXIV, PG. 6, 948A.

19. J. Bonsirven, *Op. Cit.*, p. 39.

20. Dionysius divides the celestial hierarchy into three triads: i) Cherubim, Seraphim and Thrones. ii) Dominions, Powers and Authorities. iii) Principles, Archangels and Angels; see A. McGiffert, *A. History of Christian Thought*, vol. I, p. 292 f.

based on his information about the individual man and in general on his 6,000 year long experience (*Ibid.*) However, in spite of that, Satan is described by Macarius in Johannine terms (John 12.31), i.e. as the ἀρχὸν τοῦ κόσμου τούτου (V. 2, p. 171,32), who is engaged in an unceasing war with mankind, though he has not any real power over the faithful (XXVI. 10, p. 275, 31 f). He is certainly the father of darkness, man-hating (XV. 18, p. 222, 40) and crafty V, 4, p. 172,14). Trained Christians, however, can distinguish his cunning devices, even when he appears to them as an angel of light; grace brings joy, peace, love and truth, while the forms of sin are disordered and have nothing of love or joy towards God (VII. 3, p. 187,34 f). Moreover, one can even distinguish the different degrees within the realm of grace or what looks like truth from the substance of truth itself (*Ibid.*). This ability is called by Macarius and other Fathers διέκρισις, meaning discernment; concerning this we write later in this study. Macarius' description of the difference between the effects of grace and those of the evil spirits reveals him to be more than familiar with mystical experience.

## II. Cosmology.

In the *Homilies* one finds a surprisingly meagre account of the creation of the physical world; God created the world *ex nihilo* and not out of pre-existent matter; *hyle* is not without a beginning, as the heretics claim (XVI. 1, p. 237, 10f). By the word «heretics» Macarius must be referring to Gnostics rather than to Greek philosophers. The former believed that God used an uncreated matter to create the world.<sup>21</sup> It should be noted that the creation *ex nihilo* idea is a firm Christian conviction inherited from Jewish tradition, as this is found in the inter-Testamental writings.<sup>22</sup> This doctrine expresses the superiority of God over against all the creation. The creator is in no sense dependent on anything else.<sup>23</sup> This excludes from Christian thought the matter-spirit dualism, since everything comes from God. Macarius makes clear

21. Clement of Alexandria, *Excerpta ex Theodoto*, 46 f, VHP, 98, p. 328, 34 f. Among the Greeks, Plato and Aristotle accepted the eternity of matter; see *Timaeus* 29E-30A, *Physica* VII. 1, 250B and *Metaphysica* XII. 7. 1072A.

22. The first Old Testament book where this is expressed explicitly is II Macabees VII. 28; see A. H. Armstrong, *Christian Faith and Greek Philosophy*, p. 5 note 2 and P. Tillich, *History of Christian Thought*, p. 20.

23. In his *Microcosm and Mediator* L. Thunberg discusses the theological implications of this view.

that *hyle* is not the originator of evil, or in any way opposes God: εἰσι γάρ τινες τῶν αἰρετικῶν λέγοντες ὕλην ἀναρχον καὶ ὕλην ρίζαν, καὶ ρίζαν δύναμιν καὶ ἰσοδυναμίαν. Πρὸς τοῦτο οὖν ἔχεις εὐλόγως ἀντιθεῖναι, ὅτι ποία ἐστὶ λοιπὸν ἡ νικῶσα δύναμις; Ἀνάγκη δὲ ὅτι ἡ τοῦ Θεοῦ. Λοιπὸν οὐκέτι ἐστὶν ἰσόχρονος ἢ ἰσοδύναμος ὁ ἡττώμενος (*Ibid.*). Therefore, all material creatures were made entirely by God and for that reason they are precious (XV. 43, p. 232, 40). For an ascetic Macarius has an exceptionally positive attitude towards the physical and tangible world. He makes clear, however, that its value is much inferior to that of man (*Ibid.*).

The world he lives in attracts his attention; he stops and observes nature, many scenes of which remind him of the spiritual realities. Therefore, he often applies them to illustrate his teaching on the life of soul and the spiritual world in general (II. 4, p. 154, 21 f; XXXII. 2, p. 306, 17 f). In a way, Macarius seems to anticipate Ps-Dionysius and other later Christian writers in suggesting the idea that the material creation constitutes a sort of theophany; he writes that Christians come upon new and heavenly sights, and upon glories and mysteries by taking occasion of what meets their senses: Καὶ ὥς περιπατοῦσιν εἰς τὴν κτίσιν ταύτην οἱ Χριστιανοί, εἰς καινότερας θέας οὐρανίους ἐμπέπτουσι καὶ εἰς δόξας καὶ εἰς μυστήρια, ἀπὸ τῶν φαινομένων λαμβάνοντες τὰς ἀφορμὰς (XXXII, 1. p. 305, 28 f). However, though Macarius holds such a positive attitude towards the material world, one may conclude from his ecclesiology and asceticism that he is in line with a general tradition, shared by Christians and Platonists alike, according to which man is an alien in this world.<sup>24</sup> Macarius feels like a member of the heavenly Church rather than a member of this world (cf. XV. 51, p. 236, 3f; IX. 10, p. 194, 30f). This alienation is not radical, as Gnostics wanted it to be; Macarius feels also that in a way man is a part of this world since his physical existence and welfare depends exclusively upon the material world (I. 10, p. 151, 18f). Nature provides not only man's food and clothing, but it also provides remedies for his illness (XLVIII. 5, p. 349, 31f).

The fall of Adam, however, introduced evil into the physical world (XLIII. 7, p. 330, 24), but, nevertheless, God had certainly not deserted it; he rules the world and extends his providence to it (*Neue Hom.* LXX. 2, vol. 42, p. 105, 14 f; *Seven Hom.* LIII. 12, vol. 42, p. 24, 27).

24. For a fuller discussion see A. H. Armstrong, «Man in Cosmos», in *Plotinian and Christian Studies*, XXII pp. from W. Boer, *Romanitas et Christianitas*.

The material universe, moreover, is, according to Macarius, divided into two worlds: the one «above» and the other world «below». The former has been assigned by God to the liturgical spirits, while the second one to man (XLV. 5, p. 337, 28f; XLIX. 4, p. 351, 39). That the spiritual beings dwell above the firmament was a common belief in late antiquity, and it is found in many Christian writers. Origen, for instance, describes the heavenly dwelling places of all rational beings.<sup>25</sup> Therefore, the coming to earth of Christ and angels is always referred to as a descent.

### III. *Anthropology.*

#### i. The Creation of Man.

The cornerstone of Christian anthropology is Genesis 1.26 — ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν — and Genesis 2.7 — καὶ ἔπλασεν ὁ Θεὸς τὸν ἄνθρωπον, χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς, καὶ ἐνεφύσησεν εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον αὐτοῦ πνοὴν ζωῆς, καὶ ἐγένετο ἄνθρωπος εἰς ψυχὴν ζῶσαν—. The first passage, as R. Wilson has rightly pointed out, puts forward three distinct questions:

- a) The significance of the plural ποιήσωμεν
- b) The identity of man thus created
- c) The meaning attached to εἰκὼν and ὁμοίωσις.

It is generally accepted by modern scholars that the plural ποιήσωμεν is a plural of majesty. In Jewish exegesis, however, it was a common opinion that these words were addressed either to God's Wisdom and Logos or to his angels. The Christian Fathers, moreover, understood this in Trinitarian terms, i.e. that the Father was talking to his Son and to the Holy Spirit.<sup>26</sup> Macarius quotes this passage many times (XV. 22, p. 225,7; XVI. 13, p. 242, 19) but he never comments on the significance of the plural. What attracts his attention is the meaning of εἰκὼν and ὁμοίωσις. Most Fathers make a distinction between these two terms and they conceive the latter as a perfection of the former: εἰκὼν can be understood as referring to ὁμοίωσις in a germinal state.<sup>27</sup>

25. G. W. Butteworth, *Origen on the First Principles*, p. 305.

26. R. Wilson, «The Early Exegesis of Gen. 1.26», in *Studia Patristica*, vol. I (1957), p. 420 f. The majority of the Fathers interpret the plural ποιήσωμεν as a dialogue between the Father and the Son; Barnabas was the first to interpret it in a trinitarian direction, which is later found in Irenaeus and the Antiochenes, see *Ibid.*, p. 424.

27. G. B. Ladner, «Anthropology of Gregory of Nyssa», in *Dumbarton Oaks*

Macarius, however, nowhere makes such a distinction, and he seems to have used these two terms as synonymous and, therefore, he quotes either both of them in the usual or reversed order, or just one of them (I, 7, p. 150, 7; Ibid. 10, p. 151.26). G. Ladner notes that Gregory of Nyssa uses these two terms interchangeably, since for him *homoiosis* is fully existent already in the creational *eikon*, and, moreover, he thinks that Gregory is the first of the Fathers to attribute to man full *ὁμοίωσις* Θεῷ not only at the end, but at the beginning of his history.<sup>28</sup> When Macarius uses one of these two terms he always prefers *eikon*, unlike most of the Greek Fathers who, under the influence of Platonism thought of an image as something inferior to its archetype and, therefore, preferred *homoiosis* in order to denote the relationship between God and man.<sup>29</sup>

Another question raised by the early Fathers was how corporeal man could be made after the image and likeness of the incorporeal God. In his *Adver. Haereses* V. 16.1, Irenaeus explains that man was created according to the image of God incarnate, i.e. Christ. Origen also expresses a similar point: what was the image of God that man was modelled on? It could only have been our Saviour. He is the first-born of every creature.<sup>30</sup> In two passages Macarius suggests that man's soul was created according to the image of Christ (XX. 8, p. 260, 12; XXX. 2, p. 299,9) and in another that God created man's soul κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα τῶν ἀρετῶν τοῦ Πνεύματος XLVI. 5, p. 341,6). In all other instances Macarius says that man was created in the image of God, without special reference to a particular person of the Trinity. Both Origen and Macarius suggest that Christ is the archetype of man but not necessarily as he appeared after the incarnation, i.e. in his theanthropic state.

*Papers* (DOP), vol. XII (1958), p. 63. This distinction is thought to have been of Gnostic origin. For a fuller discussion of the views of the Church Fathers on the matter see G. Landner, *The Idea of Reform*, p. 63 f.

28. G. B. Ladner, «Anthropology of Gregory of Nyssa», *DOP*, vol. XII (1958), p. 64.

29. *Loc. Cit.* Athanasius seems to avoid consciously speaking of likeness and prefers the term image because the former reminds us that sin was introduced into God's world when man wanted to be like God, see L. Thumberg, *Op. Cit.*, p. 130. Augustine, however, argues that where there is an image there is also a similitude, but not vice-versa. The image is produced by the prototype and, therefore, it represents a higher rank than that of likeness. In his *Quaestiones in Heptateuchum* V, 4 Augustine criticizes those who hold that *similitudo* is more than *imago*; see G. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, p. 186 f.

30. Quoted by J. Danielou, *Origen*, p. 295.

The view of Irenaeus that man as a psychosomatic entity is an *eikon* of Christ incarnate never became the prevalent patristic interpretation of Gen. I. 26. Most of the Fathers understood the image relation between God and man as referring to man's soul and spirit.<sup>31</sup> Macarius uses at least three times the term κατ' εἰκόνα in reference to the whole human nature: περὶ δὲ τῆς ἀνθρωπίνης φύσεως (εἶπεν ὁ Θεός) τὸ 'ποιήσωμεν κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν' (XVI. 13, p. 242,19 f; XV. 43, p. 232,38 f). In more than four instances, however, he relates the image concept to the soul alone. In one case he is very categorical: ἐν γὰρ τῷ εἰπεῖν 'ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν' παρὰ Θεοῦ ἡ ψυχὴ πεποιήται (*Neue Hom.* LXXXIII. 7, vol. 42, p. 127,21). This later use of the image concept seems to be the prevailing one in Macarius' mind.

The next question which comes naturally is what in particular constitutes God's image in man. This question was not raised in Palestinian Judaism, but it was discussed in the wisdom literature and in Philo's writings. The answer offered by the former was that the image of God consists of immortality (Wisdom II. 23,24), while Philo understood it as a reference to man's reason.<sup>32</sup> Clement of Alexandria, Origen and Cyril of Alexandria agree with Philo. For them the image of God is the rational part of man.<sup>33</sup> Irenaeus on the other hand sees in it man's reason and free will.<sup>34</sup> Gregory of Nyssa thinks that it consists not only of these two properties of man but also lies in his moral status.<sup>35</sup> In this question Macarius stands apart from the Christian Platonists of Alexandria and associates the image concept with man's free will: Σὺ δὲ διὰ τοῦτο εἶ κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν Θεοῦ, ἐπειδὴ ὡς περὶ ὁ Θεὸς αὐτεξούσιος ἐστὶ καὶ ὁ θέλει ποιεῖ... οὕτω καὶ σὺ αὐτεξούσιος εἶ καὶ, ἐὰν θέλῃς, ἀπολέσθαι (XV. 23, p. 225,15 f). Moreover, in another passage Macarius,

31. G. Ladner, «The Image Concept», *DOP*, vol. VII (1953), p. 10 f.

32. R. Wilson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 424.

33. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 5.14, ST. 11. 388, 14 f, Prot. 10, ST. I, p. 71, 24 f; Origen. *De Principiis*. 4.4:10 Butterworth, *Op. Cit.*, p. 327. Concerning Cyril's views see J. Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Christian Thought*, p. 114. J. Meyendorff notes that the image concept implies a participation in the divine nature, *Ibid.*, p. 114. and 230 note 4. Macarius seems to suggest that the image concept implies communion with the divine (cf. XII. 6 and 7, p. 207, 33 f). In other passages he seems to suggest that because of the image relation there exists between God and man the closest possible kinship one may find between the Creator and any of his creations (cf. XV. 42, p. 232, 39 f; XL. 22, p. 225, 6 f; XLV. 5, p. 337, 35).

34. Irenaeus, *Haer.* V. 6:1. V. 16:2.

35. J. Quasten, *Op. Cit.*, p. 292.

like Gregory of Nyssa, seems to relate the image concept with the moral status of man; he argues that in fashioning man's soul, God made it such as to put no evil in its nature, but on the contrary he made it in accordance to the image of the virtues of the Spirit and, therefore, he put in it the laws of virtues, discernment, knowledge, prudence, faith, charity and all the other virtues, after the image of the Spirit (XLVI. 5, p. 341, 5f).

Since Luther and Calvin, modern critics reject the traditional distinction between image and likeness. The latter is seen simply as a clarification of the former. The variable use of the two terms in Genesis shows that they do not refer to two different things.<sup>36</sup>

Finally, there is one more point to discuss in relation to Genesis I. 26. Athanasius<sup>37</sup> makes an interesting observation in the wording of Genesis I. 26 and points out that man is said to have been created according to the image of God and not that he is an image of God; the latter applies to Christ only. Macarius, like all the other Fathers, does not make this distinction and calls man the image of God; Δεσπότης γὰρ ἦν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν κάτω,... εἰκὼν καὶ ὁμοίωμα Θεοῦ (XXVI. 1. p. 272,25 f). This alludes also to another patristic view according to which the «image» consists of man's dominion over the other creatures.<sup>38</sup>

The other Genesis passage mentioned in the beginning is also quoted by Macarius.<sup>39</sup> This passage, argues Macarius, refers mainly to the creation of man's body and in the implantation of the pre-created soul into Adam's; Καὶ ὡς φαίνεται καὶ πρὸ τῆς τοῦ σώματος διαπλάσεως ἐδημιούργησεν αὐτὴν (ψυχὴν). ἐν γὰρ τῷ εἰπεῖν 'ποιήσωμεν ἄνθρωπον κατ' εἰκόνα ἡμετέραν καὶ ὁμοίωσιν' παρὰ Θεοῦ ἡ ψυχὴ πεποιήται καὶ οὕτω λαβὼν 'χοῦν ἀπὸ τῆς γῆς' ἐπλασε τὸ σῶμα. 'καὶ ἐνεφύσησε' διὰ τοῦ Πνεύματος ἦν ἔκτισε ψυχὴν ἐν τῷ σώματι (Neue Hom. LXXXIII. 7, vol. 42, p. 20 f)

The two narrations of the creation story found in Genesis (I.

36. G. C. Berkouwer, *Op. Cit.*, p. 68 f.

37. Athanasius, *C. Arianos* III. 10, PG. 26, 344 -A; I. 20 PG. 26, 53 C. The same comment had also been made by Clement of Alexandria, *Protrepticus* X, VHP, vol. 7, p. 67, 9 f and Origen, *In John* 11.3; *C. Celsum* IV. 85 and VI. 63.

38. Basil, *Hom. in Psalm.* XLVIII. 7, PG. 29, 449C; Chrysostom, *Hom. in Gen.* II, PG. 54, 589.

39. This is not found in the fifty *Homilies* but only in *Neue Hom.* XXVI. 7, vol. 42, p. 127, 23 f. the last of which is a compilation of XLVI. 4 and XLIX. 4 partly enlarged.



26; 2.7) proved to be useful for some Fathers, especially to those of Platonic affiliations. Philo was among the first to interpret these two narrations as references to two creations; the creation of the ideal man who is an *idea* or *genos* of man in Genesis 1.26, and the creation of the actual man in Genesis 2.7. The former is intelligible, incorporeal, sexless and incorruptible by nature; this man forms an ἀπεικόνισμα καὶ μίμμημα of the Logos of God.<sup>40</sup> The other man, however, consists of soul and body, has a sex and is mortal by nature.<sup>41</sup> Origen also distinguishes the man of Genesis I. 26 from that of Genesis 2.7.<sup>42</sup> Finally, Gregory of Nyssa speaks of two stages of creation which he reads in Genesis I.26 and I. 27. In the first case τὸ ὅλον τῆς ἀνθρωπότητος πλήρωμα was created,<sup>43</sup> which unfolds itself in time. God then created man as a composite being, spiritual and corporeal, and bisexual in view of man's fall. Through his sexual propagation mankind obtained the opportunity of reform in its individuals in a long chain of generations whose end only God knows.<sup>44</sup>

Macarius' presentation is much simpler than that of Gregory's, but he shares with him the view that in Adam the actual union between his soul and his body took place when God breathed into Adam's nostrils the breath of life (Gen. 2.7).<sup>45</sup> Moreover, Macarius occasionally sees Adam as corresponding to what Gregory would call πλήρωμα ἀνθρωπότητος; Adam recapitulates the entire humanity (XV 36, p. 230, 18 f).

Finally, it should be noted that the notion according to which Adam was originally androgynous, common in the Syrian Fathers, is not found in Macarius, although he seems to have many common views with the Syrian tradition. R. Murray gives a detailed account of this view and notes that the idea occurs in Plato's *Symposium* 189d, in a

40. Philo, *De Op. Mundi* XLVI (134 f); cf. R. Wilson. *Op. Cit.*, p. 424.

41. *Ibid.*; ἐκ σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς συνεστὼς ἀνὴρ ἢ γυνή, φύσει θνητός.

42. Origen, *In Jerem. Hom.* I. 10; *In Gen. Hom.* II. 13.

43. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Hominis Opificio* XVI, PG. 44, 185C; Gregory expresses his theories hypothetically: Ἡμεῖς δέ, καθ' ὅσον χωροῦμεν, στοχασμοῖς τισι καὶ ὑπονοίαις τὸ ἀληθές ἀνιχνεύοντες ταῦτα περὶ τῶν ζητούμενων ὑπολαμβάνομεν, quoted in G. Ladner, «Anthropology of Gregory of Nyssa», in *DOP*, vol. XII, p. 93.

44. G. Ladner, *Op. Cit.*, p. 86; this article offers a complete treatment of Gregory's anthropology.

45. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Hom. Op.* XXVIII and XXIX, PG. 44, 229 and 233 D; cf. Macarius, *Neue Hom.* XXVI. 7, vol. 42, p. 127, 23 f.



comic myth narrated by Aristophanes, as well as in a Jewish midrashic tradition.<sup>46</sup>

#### IV. *The Structure of Man.*

Both Greek philosophy and Christian theology agreed that man is a composition of spiritual and material elements, but they held different views on the question of the kind of union these elements form. Greek philosophy and in particular Platonism believes that the spiritual element is prevailing in this union, and thus it sees man as a basically spiritual creature entombed in a body. Plato<sup>47</sup> argues that man is as an oyster in its shell, and Plotinus asks whether the body is really a part of man, or whether it is just an instrument of man, and concludes that the soul alone is the real «self» of man.<sup>48</sup> Such ideas were transmitted into Christianity by Origen, Augustine and other Platonist Christian thinkers. In his early writings Augustine remarks that the soul is the man, the authentic «I».<sup>49</sup>

Other Christian writers, however, who felt the influence of Hebrew anthropology and/or Aristotelian philosophy see man as a psychosomatic entity. According to them man is not an aggregation of heterogeneous elements, but an organic unity derived from two principles, which, however, by themselves are incomplete.<sup>50</sup>

Related to this is also the question of whether man is a dual or a tripartite being. The idea of dichotomy has heavy scriptural support<sup>51</sup> while the idea of trichotomy was originated in those philosophical schools<sup>52</sup> which held a dualistic view of reality. The role of the third element, i.e. soul serves to link body and spirit, which represent the material and intelligible worlds in man.<sup>53</sup> It has often been argued that

46. R. Murray, *Op. Cit.*, p. 301 f.

47. J. A. Mann, *Reflections on Man*, p. 25.

48. Plotinus, *Enn.* IV. 7:1. Plotinus understands man as ψυχὴ... χρωμένη σώματι, see *Enn.* I. 1:3. This is in accordance with the Platonic understanding of man; see *Alcibiades* 129C-E. The combination of these two elements, however, constitutes what we call man, see *Phaedrus* 246C5 and *Enn.* I.1:3.

49. R. J. O'Connell, *St. Augustine's Early Theory of Man*, p. 185 f. It seems that later Augustine accepted more Biblical formulas, see E. Portalie, *A Guide to the Thought of Saint Augustine*, p. 147.

50. J. A. Mann, *Op. Cit.*, p. 26.

51. Gregory of Nyssa and other Fathers favored dichotomy over trichotomy and supported their thesis by Scriptural references; see J. Quasten, *Op. Cit.*, p. 379.

52. J. Quasten, *Op. Cit.*, p. 379.

53. G. W. Butterworth, *Op. Cit.*, p. 233.

Paul's distinction between σάρξ, ψυχὴ and Πνεῦμα and, moreover, his πνεῦμα-σάρξ contrast has introduced dualism in Christianity,<sup>54</sup> and, therefore, provided the scriptural support for trichotomy.<sup>55</sup> The view expressed above is disputed; scholars who believe that Paul remained within the Judaic framework argue that σάρξ represents the lower level of inner life, with which Paul connects ψυχὴ, while πνεῦμα is connected with the higher level of inner life.<sup>56</sup>

The Church has always been suspicious of trichotomy and it condemned it in the person of Apollinaris at the 2nd Ecumenical Synod in 381 A.D. Thus, the Church ruled out any suggestion of dualistic tension in the creation. Some writers, however, who lived in the first three centuries, have followed the tripartite division of man. Clement of Alexandria is regarded as the founder of a Christian trichotomist school.<sup>57</sup> He is followed by Origen<sup>58</sup> and Didymus the Blind, Origen's successor in the School of Alexandria, who made a real distinction between νοῦς, ψυχὴ and φύσις, i.e. body.<sup>59</sup> Macarius excludes the Platonic dualism<sup>60</sup> and its consequences, namely trichotomy, from his writings. Man, according to him, consists of both body and soul (XI. 6, p. 200, 28). Macarius sees man as a psychosomatic entity (II. 2, p. 153, 23; *Neue Hom.* LXXV. 1, vol. 42, p. 93, 8), though he often overemphasizes the importance of the soul and makes the body to appear as a mere garment of the soul, which thus appears to be the real «self» of man (IV. 3, p. 159, 11). In spite of that there is not any tension or opposition between body and soul, though the soul is τιμιωτέρα τοῦ σώματος (XLVIII. 3, p. 349, 11); but nevertheless, both were created by God to be his dwelling (XLIX, 4, p. 352, 1). When Macarius wants to refer to the corporeal and spiritual aspects of man he uses the Pauline terms ἕσω ἄνθρωπος and ἔξω ἄνθρωπος respectively. These terms are believed to have been of Gnostic origin;<sup>61</sup> Paul uses them only three times: in Rom. 7, 21, in II Cor.

54. W. D. Stacey, *Pauline View of Man*, p. 228.

55. The only passage which can be regarded as such is I. Thess. V. 23; H. W. Robinson notes that this is not a systematic dissection of the distinct elements of personality; see his *Op. Cit.*, p. 108.

56. H. W. Robinson, *Op. Cit.*, p. 105.

57. L. Thunberg, *Op. Cit.*, p. 113. For the Christian history of trichotomy see *Ibid.* pp. 196-206.

58. G. M. Butterworth, *Op. Cit.*, p. 233.

59. Didymus the Blind, *De Spir. S.* LIV, LV, LIX; see also J. Quasten, *Op. Cit.*, vol. III, p. 99.

60. J. Meyendorff, *Christ in Eastern Chr. Thought*, p. 122 f.

61. R. Jewett, *Paul's Anthropological Terms*, p. 460.

4,6 and in Eph. 3.16. Macarius uses them over twenty times, but never in a dualistic sense, which E. Jewett believes that the terms embody.<sup>62</sup> The outer man of Macarius should be identified with the material aspect of man and not the sinful state of man, since the outer man can work deeds of justice, though the latter is of limited value; 'πᾶσα' ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου 'δικαιοσύνη' ὡς ράκος ἀποκαθημένης ἐλογίσθη παρὰ τῷ προφήτῃ, παρὰ τῷ ἀποστόλῳ δὲ 'σκύβαλα' (*Neue Hom.* XXVIII. 7, vol. 42, p. 141,29 f).<sup>63</sup> The sinful self of man is referred to by Macarius as the παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος, another Pauline term. For Macarius the παλαιὸς ἄνθρωπος is nothing else but τὸ πνεῦμα τοῦ κόσμου ὅπερ ἐστὶ ὁ νόμος τῆς ἁμαρτίας (*Neue Hom.* XVI. 3, vol. 42, p. 85,2 f).

The term ἔσω ἄνθρωπος is used by Macarius in various contexts. In one case it is identified with the ἡγεμὼν νοῦς<sup>64</sup> of man (XX.,4, p. 258, 37), though in two other passages both mind and inner man are placed side by side, probably for clarification of their meaning and extra emphasis (XVII, 4, p. 22,13; *Neue Hom.* X. 4, vol. 42, 70,26). In another passage Macarius argues that the inner man is a νοερὰ οὐσία (XV. 32, p. 228,30); furthermore, he is capable of spiritual renovation (XLIX. 2, p. 351,10), can serve the spirit of God (XV. 5, p. 248,39), and become the place where τὸ τοῦ Χριστοῦ βῆμα ἅμα τῷ ἀχράντῳ ἁγιαστηρίῳ ἔστηκεν (*Neue Hom.* XXVIII. 9, vol. 42, p. 141,33 f). It has been suggested that Paul introduced the term inner man into Christian anthropology in order to refer to the essential self of man, the redeemed or redeemable being.<sup>65</sup> Macarius, however, seems to employ this term to refer to the redeemable part of man rather than to the redeemed, for which he prefers to use καινὸς ἄνθρωπος (XXV. 4, p. 268,36).

In summing up, one may say that in Macarius the term *inner man* is equivalent to the higher self of man and it includes the soul with all her powers and faculties. The inner man is something alive with image and shape; its form ὁμοίωμα ἐστὶ τοῦ ἔξω ἀνθρώπου (XVI. 7, p. 239, 39), but, nevertheless, the former is of a much higher value, since

62. R. Jewett, *Op. Cit.*, p. 395. For a discussion of different views on these terms expressed by scholars see *Ibid.* pp. 390-95.

63. This *Homily* has been preserved in two versions which are included in the new *Homilies* published by E. Klostermann. It seems, however, that the passage quoted is close to Macarian thinking, cf. XVI. 7, p. 239, 39.

64. It has been suggested that in Rom. VII. 22 the inner man is identical with the mind; see R. Bultmann, *Theology of the New Testament*, vol. I, p. 203.

65. W. D. Stacey, *Op. Cit.*, p. 228.

it is of another nature (XV. 32, p. 228,30). In his *Epistula Magna* Macarius identifies the outer man with the body and the inner man with the soul (*Epistula* 9, vol. 42, p. 149, 29f). This is an oversimplified usage of the Pauline terms  $\xi\sigma\omega/\xi\zeta\omega$   $\psi\chi\omicron\rho\omega\pi\omicron\varsigma$ . Finally, in another *Homily* the inner man is identified with the totality of the soul's members (VII. 8, p. 189,5f).

#### V) *The Nature of Body and Soul.*

Macarius' views on the nature and function of the body are very much Biblical and free of any Neoplatonic influence. In spite of the fact that Macarius is an ascetic, he never uses deprecatory language for the body. He does not speak about it in terms of a «prison» or a «shackle» of the soul, as Origen,<sup>66</sup> Basil<sup>67</sup> and others do. Macarius stresses the divine origin of it (XLVIII. 4, p. 349, 27) and its vocation to become God's dwelling (XLIX. 4, p. 352, 1 f). The body is also described as the dwelling of the soul (V. 7, p. 180,29 f), and as a fair garment for it (IV. 3, p. 159,11).

The body has been created out of earth (*Neue Hom.* XXVI. 7, vol. 42, p. 127,23), but, nevertheless, in its prefallen state it was free from passions and illness (XLVII. 5, p. 350,2). For Macarius the body *per se* is not a source of evil even in its fallen state. The passions come from the body animated by the soul. The former without the latter νεκρόν ἐστι, μηδὲν δυνάμενον διαπράξασθαι (XXXI. 3, p. 299,26). In spite of its material nature the body is capable of partaking in God's kingdom (V. 11, p. 182,29). In its sinful state it is called σὰρξ (V. 6, p. 176,17; *Seven Hom.* V (LV). 3. vol. 42, p. 30,27), though Macarius, like Paul,<sup>68</sup> uses occasionally the word σὰρξ to denote what is normally signified by the word σῶμα (XXIX. 4, p. 296, 32; *Neue Hom* XXII. 3, vol. 42, p. 103, 25).

The soul is the second and most important part of human nature (XLVIII. 3, p. 349,11; *Neue Hom.* XVIII. 1, vol 42, p. 93,8). Macarius is very interested in questions related to the soul's nature, structure and functions, and he talks about them over and over again. Even in his first *Homily* he gives a description of the soul, which can

66. G. M. Butterworth, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 65 and 165.

67. Basil, *Hom. in Ps.* 29.6, PG. 29. 320B; for Eastern views on the body see P. Fouyas, «Peri Somatos», *Ekkh. Phar.* LX. 150.

68. I Cor. VI. 16; 15.39; II Cor. VII. 1, The matter is discussed by R. Jewett, *Op. Cit.*, p. 454.

be taken as his definition of it: οὔτε γὰρ φύσεως τῆς θεότητος ἐστὶ ἡ ψυχὴ, οὔτε φύσεως τοῦ σκοτίους τῆς πονηρίας, ἀλλ' ἔστι κτίσμα τι νοερόν, καὶ ὠραῖον, καὶ μέγα, καὶ θαυμαστόν, καὶ καλόν, ὁμοίωμα καὶ εἰκὼν Θεοῦ (I. 7. p. 150, 7f). The first interesting point which Macarius makes clear is that the soul of man is not a fragment of the divine essence, but it is one of God's creations. This is very important for Macarius and becomes a point of departure for his understanding of man's history and destiny. For this reason this point comes up again in other *Homilies* too. The soul is not god, but a servant of God and one of his creations; οὐδὲν κοινὸν τῆς αὐτοῦ φύσεως καὶ αὐτῆς τυγχάνει (XLIX. 4, p. 352, 14 f). Thus, Macarius is in agreement with the main stream of Patristic thought, which stood in opposition to Stoics,<sup>69</sup> Platonists<sup>70</sup> and Gnostics<sup>71</sup> and declared the soul to be of non-divine nature. In doing that the Fathers could perceive God as an unchangeable being and at the same time accept that the soul is changeable by nature.

On the other hand the soul, being a νοερὰ οὐσία is, together with the angels, closer to God than anything else in the created world. There is a συγγένεια Θεοῦ πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καὶ ἀνθρώπου πρὸς Θεόν (XLV. 5. p. 337, 35). Macarius goes on to say in another *Homily* that man's soul is closer to God than angels are: τιμιώτερος οὖν ἐστὶν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ δημιουργήματα, τάχα δὲ τολμήσω λέγειν, ὅτι μὴ μόνον τῶν ὁρατῶν δημιουργημάτων, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν ἀόρατων ἡγουν τῶν λειτουργικῶν πνευμάτων. Οὐ γὰρ περὶ Μιχαὴλ καὶ Γαβριὴλ τῶν ἀρχαγγέλων εἶπεν ὅτι 'ποιήσωμεν κατ' εἰκόνα καὶ ὁμοίωσιν ἡμετέραν', ἀλλὰ περὶ τῆς νοερᾶς οὐσίας τοῦ ἀνθρώπου, τῆς ἀθανάτου λέγω ψυχῆς (XV. 22, p. 225, 4 f). This accounts for the high esteem Macarius holds for the soul and man in general and, moreover, for his rather optimistic view of man's future: ὁ δὲ ἄνθρωπος ὑπὲρ πάντα τὰ σκευὴ τίμιός ἐστιν... ὑπὲρ ἀγγέλους ἐποίησε (τὸν ἄνθρωπον) ὁ Θεός (XV. 43, p. 233, 1-25). Regarding man's potentials Macarius writes in an anti-Pelagian manner: διὰ τῆς δυνάμεως τοῦ Πνεύματος καὶ τῆς ἀναγεννήσεως τῆς πνευματικῆς ἔρχεται (ὁ ἄνθρωπος) εἰς τὰ μέτρα τοῦ πρώτου Ἀδάμ καὶ μείζων αὐτοῦ γίγνεται. Ἀποθεοῦται γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος (XXVI. 2, p. 272, 36 f). In that capacity the soul is called by

69. J. Kelly, *Op. Cit.*, p. 18.

70. Numenius believes that man's soul is a fragment of God (*Fragm.* 22) and that the soul has ἔνωσιν μὲν οὖν καὶ ταυτότητα ἀδιάκριτον πρὸς τὰς αὐτῆς ἀρχάς (*Testimonia* 34); cf. Albinus, *Didascalicus* 23.32. See also Armstrong, *St. Augustine and Christian Platonism*, p. 3 f.

71. H. Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*, p. 44.

Macarius κοινωνική θεότητος (XXVI. 18, p. 279,9; *Neue Hom.* XXII. 3, vol. 42, p. 103,9). The implications of the latter are discussed below in chapter III. It will suffice to say here that Macarius does not understand the soul's capacity to communicate with God in Origen's way, who is said to have written: «all rational natures, that is, the Father, the Son and the Holy Spirit, all angels, authorities, dominions and other powers, and even man himself in virtue of his soul's dignity, are of one substance».<sup>72</sup>

Macarius, moreover, calls the soul νοερά οὐσία (XVI. 13, p. 242, 18; XXVI. 1, p. 272,19) and πνεῦμα<sup>73</sup> (XVI. 2, p. 237,24). In another passage he mentions all the spiritual beings in an Origenistic<sup>74</sup> order — angels, souls, demons — and, furthermore, he expresses the view that man's soul stands in between the other two (XXVI. 24, p. 281,20). This view appears to be in opposition to his belief in man's close kinship to God, mentioned above. A possible explanation for this is that in the one case Macarius refers to the soul's status prior to the fall and in the other after the fall.

In accordance with his basic view that the soul is not of divine essence, Macarius states that the soul is mortal by nature and immortal by God's grace (I.10, p. 151,27 f), since God made the soul, and man in general, capable of immortality (XVI. 13, p. 242,21). In this respect the soul can be called ἀθάνατος and ἀφθαρτος (IV. 26, p. 169,22). The soul's nature, moreover, was created by God free of evil (II.2, p. 153, 37f). and with moral properties: ἐθηκεν εἰς αὐτὴν νόμους ἀρετῶν, διακρίσιν, γνῶσιν, φρόνησιν, πίστιν, ἀγάπην καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς ἀρετάς, κατὰ τὴν εἰκόνα τοῦ Πνεύματος (XLVI. 5, p. 341,7f). Therefore, man's soul has immanent moral and intellectual powers which make moral and intellectual progress possible. This is a point which some psychologists claim modern research to have proven to be true.<sup>75</sup>

Moreover, the soul, being a spiritual entity, is subtle, mobile, volatile and unwearying (XLVI. 6, p. 341, 13f). Though the body is assigned to the soul as its dwelling, the soul often ἔξω τοῦ σώματος ἐστίν,

72. Jerome, *Ep. ad. Avitum*, 14, quoted by G. Butterworth, *Op. Cit.*, p. 326.

73. Macarius uses the term *Pneuma* in reference to God's grace and the spiritual beings. He does not interchange it with mind or with any other terms denoting parts of man's make-up.

74. Origen, *De Principiis*, I. 8, VHP. vol. 16, p. 306, 17 f.

75. L. Kohlberg, «Moral and Religious Education at the Public Schools», in T. R. Sizer, *Religion and Public Education*, p. 180.

νοεῖ τὰ μέλλοντα, περὶ τῶν ἐρχομένων διαλογίζεται, ἐπὶ γῆς ἐστὶ τῷ σώματι καὶ τῇ διανοίᾳ ἐν οὐρανοῖς ἐστὶ ἡ ἀξία καὶ πιστὴ (ψυχὴ) (XVIII. 2, vol. 42, p. 93,37 f). The soul gives life to the body, as we have seen, and itself receives life from God's Spirit (I. 10, p. 151,27f), which nurses and clothes it (*Ibid.*). Without the Holy Spirit the soul becomes spiritually dead (I. 11, p. 152,6). Thus, the Holy Spirit is the source of both physical and spiritual life in man. The soul is not only vivifying the body, but it has also the power of controlling the members of the body IV. 3, p. 159,23 f) and uses them as instruments; their relation becomes so close that it can be said that the soul is blended with the members of the body (IV. 9, p. 162,10).

Macarius, like Origen, groups the souls together with the angels and, therefore, whatever we have said concerning the nature and the form of the angels applies to the souls as well. Thus, Macarius argues that the souls are by their nature some sort of corporeal beings of fine texture, as we have seen (IV. 9, p. 162,5 f). The materiality of the soul was an issue raised and much discussed by the Greek philosophers. The Platonists' view was that the soul, divine and transcendent by nature,<sup>76</sup> has an ethereal body,<sup>77</sup> and not, as Macarius claims, that soul is a body (cf. IV. 9, p. 162,5 f). The Stoics on the other hand argue that everything that exists is a body which extends in space.<sup>78</sup> In this rule the Stoics include God, whom they also call Nature, and the soul. Regarding the nature of the latter the Stoics argue that it is a subtle fiery breath, part of the all-pervading divine principle.<sup>79</sup> Among the Christians Tertullian preserves this doctrine.<sup>80</sup> Macarius' view cannot be

76. A. H. Armstrong, *Introduction to Ancient Philosophy*, p. 40 f.

77. Plotinus, *Enn.* IV. 3:15; see also E. R. Dodds, *Proclus: The Elements of Theology*. Appendix II. In his *Enn.* IV. 7:2-8 Plotinus argues against the corporeality of the soul.

78. Concerning the Stoic view on the matter see A. H. Armstrong, «Plotinus» in his *The Cambridge Hist. of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy*, p. 226 and J. Kelly, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 18 and 175; see also A. H. Armstrong «The Theory of Non-Existence of Matter», in *Studia Patristica*, vol. V (1962), p. 428. Plato seems to identify the «receptacle» with space, a view which Aristotle rejected and spoke of a dimensionless matter; *Ibid.*, p. 427 (=Plotinian and Christian Studies, VIII).

79. A. H. Armstrong, *Introduction to Ancient Philosophy*, p. pp. 121 and 123-25.

80. Tertullian, *Adv. Praxeas* VII; *C. Marcion.* II. 5-7. It is obvious that the incorporeality of the soul and the angels, as understood by the general patristic tradition, judged by the Greek philosophical standards is a type of a very refined corporeality.



classified as a clear Stoic doctrine, but it should be rather regarded as a combination of Stoicism and Platonism.

Macarius, moreover, argues that the soul has an image which, as we have seen, is like the angels' image (VII. 7, p. 188, 41f; *Neue Hom.* XXVI. 4, vol. 42, p. 125, 16f); this form, according to Macarius can be seen only by the few who have received enlightenment (φωτισμός) (VII. 7, p. 188, 37).<sup>81</sup> In spite of the fact that the soul is in itself a subtle body, it has gathered to itself all the members of man's body by the means of which it accomplishes all the offices of life (*Ibid.*).

Macarius' doctrine of the soul differs from the views of Origen and the Neoplatonists, who argue that the soul, incorporeal by nature, descending from the heavenly regions, takes on various types of bodies until it finally takes on an earthly body.<sup>82</sup> Unlike Plotinus who argues that the soul, when completely purified discards its ethereal body, Origen believes that it keeps it permanently, and takes it to be eternal and perceptible only to the mind.<sup>83</sup>

Concerning the structure of the soul Macarius argues that the soul is a complicated being: ἡ ψυχὴ πολλοὺς ἔχει κλάδους καὶ πολλὰ μέλη (XXVI. 7, p. 275, 23) and βάθος πολὺ (L. 4, p. 354, 30). Macarius, moreover, wishing to prevent any possible misunderstandings, states clearly that in spite of its complexity the soul is a single being (VII. 8, p. 189, 8f). Throughout his *Homilies* Macarius names the different parts of the soul, but nowhere attempts to work out a precise theory concerning their exact number, their functions and, finally, their relation to each other. His statements are often ambiguous and inconsistent. This, however, is not peculiar to Macarius only, but it is true of Origen and many other Fathers.

The practice of dividing the soul into parts is of Greek rather than Biblical background; it is not found in the early works of Plato, but it first appears in his *Republic* IX (586e-587a) where the three parts of the soul (λογιστικὸν-θυμοειδὲς-ἐπιθυμητικὸν) are recognized to have a worthwhile status. The tripartition appears again in the *Timaeus* and

81. Macarius makes a distinction between vision (ὄρασις), sense (αἰσθησις) and enlightenment (φωτισμός). The latter is greater than the first two, but lesser than revelation, which brings about knowledge of the great mysteries. Those who see the form of the soul have received enlightenment (VII. 5-6, p. 188, 28 f).

82. Numenius, *Testimonia* 47, Plotinus, *Enn.*, IV, 3: 9; Origen, *De Principiis* I. 4:1, 8:1 f; cf. E. R. Dodds, *Op. Cit.*, Appendix II.

83. *Enn.* III. 6:5; IV. 3:24, Origen *De Principiis*, pref. 8; I. 6:4; II. 2:2; IV. 3:15; see also A. Tripolitis, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 129-133.



the *Phaedrus*; in all three dialogues the doctrine is expressed with some reservations. The same doctrine, moreover, is also found in Numenius, Albinus, Plotinus and others.<sup>84</sup>

The division of man's soul into parts is an attempt on the part of philosophy to explain the affinity of the soul with both the world of intellect and the world of matter. In Macarius and other Christian writers, however, this division serves to explain how the immaterial soul, which, as we have already seen, was originally created by God free of evil (IV. 1, p. 158,20), relates to God and to the evil powers and, moreover, how the soul participates in the life of the body and the material world in general. Thus, one may say that the practice of dividing the soul into parts is accepted by the Greek philosophers as a result of their metaphysical dualism of matter and spirit, body and soul, and by Christians as a result of their ethical and religious dualism of sin and grace.<sup>85</sup>

The most extensive list of the parts of soul is given by Macarius in *Homily* VII.8: "Ὡςπερ τὰ μέλη τοῦ σώματος πολλά ὄντα εἰς ἄνθρωπος λέγεται, οὕτω καὶ μέλη ψυχῆς εἰσι πολλά, νοῦς, συνείδησις, θέλημα, λογισμοὶ κατηγοροῦντες καὶ ἀπολογούμενοι, ἀλλὰ ταῦτα πάντα εἰς ἓνα λογισμὸν εἰσὶν ἀποδεδυμένα: μέλη δὲ ἐστὶ ψυχῆς, μία δὲ ἐστὶ ψυχὴ ὁ ἕως ἄνθρωπος (p. 189,5f). Concerning most of these parts we write elsewhere in this study. Of all these, free will, to which Macarius ascribes virtue and sin, as we have seen, and reason have an eminent position among the members of the soul. The importance of the latter is underlined in another passage: Οἱ τὸν βίον τοῦ Χριστιανισμοῦ ἐν πολλῇ ἀκριβείᾳ κατορθῶσαι βουλόμενοι, πρὸ πάντων τοῦ διανοητικοῦ καὶ διακριτικοῦ μέλους τῆς ψυχῆς ἐν πάσῃ δυνάμει ἐπιμελεῖσθαι ὀφείλουσιν (IV. 1, p. 16f). From these quotations it is clear that Macarius regards reason as a part of man's soul and relates it to his moral development; the implications of this relation are discussed in chapter. V. Thus, the terms διανοητικὸν and διακριτικὸν do not refer to two different parts of the soul, but to two functions of the same part, i.e. reason. The function of discernment is also

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84. Concerning Plato's views see T. M. Robinson, *Plato's Psychology*, pp. 39-46 and 119-131; see also L. Thunberg, *Op. Cit.*, p. 187 f; Numenius, *Testimonia*, 36 and 39; *Fragments*, 16; Albinus, *Didascalicus* 23.32, 24.32. and Plotinus, *Enn.* II. 6:2 f; IV. 4:2; 9:3.

85. H. W. Robinson quotes Secebeck writing that Augustine replaces the matter - spirit dualism with the religious dualism of sin and grace; see his *Op. Cit.*, p. 161.

attributed by Macarius to *συνείδησις*, which together with reason is said to direct man's volitional powers (XV. 34, p. 229,20f). From the two terms, i.e. *διακριτικὸν* and *συνείδησις*, Macarius finds that the latter expresses his thought better and he uses it more often. In his writings this term has all the force the word has in modern use; it has the power of sifting carefully man's thoughts and reproaching the sinful ones. Thus, *συνείδησις* provides a sufficient criterion for a moral life.<sup>86</sup> The authority, however, in moral life is not man's conscience but God's will. The function of the former is to relate the divine will to the life of the individual (XV. 34, p. 229,13f). In Macarius' thought man's conscience does not appear to be weak or ill. It always has the power to pass right judgments.

Concerning *νοῦς*, the Macarian writings do not seem to attribute to it the same function *νοῦς* has in Greek philosophy. In Macarius *νοῦς* is more of an agent of moral and rational discernment, as it is in Paul.<sup>87</sup> Macarius makes clear that *νοῦς* by itself is morally neutral. Thus, it can be influenced by the Spirit and become its dwelling, as it can also be dominated by the evil powers (XV. 47, p. 234, 26f). In its capacity as a discerning board *νοῦς* is called by Macarius *ἡγεμὼν νοῦς* (XLVI. 6, p. 341,12) and also *ἡνίοχος* of the soul *κατέχων τὰς ἡνίας τῶν λογισμῶν* (XL. 5, p. 324, 12f). The center and source of thoughts, however, is not *νοῦς*, but *καρδία* (XV. 33, p. 229,20-24). The latter is also the center of desires, as we shall see below. Thus, Macarius does not divide man into his rational and sensual capacities according to Hellenistic anthropology; he follows the Judaic tradition, which he probably received via Paul, who «maintains the unity of the person by viewing him in terms of his intentionality».<sup>88</sup>

*Καρδία* appears also not to have a moral quality in Macarius.<sup>89</sup> It can be the source of both good and sinful thoughts, and, moreover, be influenced by both God's grace and the powers of evil. (XLIII. 6, p. 330,4f). Macarius writes on that: *ἡ οὖν καρδία βάθος τι ἔχει ἀπέραντον, ἐκεῖ εἰσὶ τρίκλινοι καὶ κοιτῶνες, θύραι καὶ πρόθυρα, καὶ διακονίαι πολλαὶ καὶ διέξοδοι. Ἐκεῖ ἐστὶ τὸ ἐργαστήριον τῆς δικαιοσύνης καὶ ἀδικίας, ἐκεῖ ἐστὶν ὁ θάνατος, ἐκεῖ ἡ ζωὴ* (XV, 32, p. 228,28f).

86. Concerning the meaning of *συνείδησις* in Greek and Christian writers see R. Jewett, *Op. Cit.*, pp. 79 and 227.

87. R. Jewett, *Op. Cit.*, p. 450.

88. R. Jewett, *Op. Cit.*, p. 332.

89. The same is true for Paul; see W. D. Stacey, *Op. Cit.*, p. 196.

Another part of the soul often mentioned by Macarius is the λογισμοί (XLVI 6, p. 341,12; VII. 8, p. 189,7). which appear to be volitional activities rather than mental. Therefore, they are connected to καρδιά rather than to νοῦς, with which they can be at war (XXXII. 9, p. 309, 15f). The λογισμοί can be either good or evil, depending on who supplies the heart (XXXI. 6, p. 304,39f; XXVI. 10, p. 275,28). Those coming from God and the φυσικοὶ λογισμοί of the heart are the good ones (XV. 34, p. 229,23; XLVII. 10, p. 344,37), while those which are motivated by the evil powers are ἁτακτοὶ (XXXI, 3, p. 303, 28) and ἀκάθαρτοι (XV. 34, p. 229,32). The main vocation of an ascetic is to watch carefully his thoughts and engage himself in an endless struggle against the evil ones (III.3, p. 157,1; XLII. 3, p. 327,20). Man's conscience and reason provides the means for the discernment of the thoughts.

Macarius employs the term λογισμοί very often; in his writings the term finds a double usage: it signifies the volitional activities of the heart, as we have already seen, and, moreover, the faculties of the soul: "Ὡσπερ γὰρ ὁ ἅετος βασιλεύει τῶν ὀρνέων... οὕτως εἰσὶ καὶ οἱ βασιλικώτατοι λογισμοὶ τῆς ψυχῆς, λέγω δὲ θέλημα, ἡ συνείδησις, ὁ νοῦς, ἡ ἀγαπητικὴ δύναμις: δι' αὐτῶν τὸ ἄρμα τῆς ψυχῆς κυβερνᾶται, καὶ εἰς αὐτοὺς ἐπαναπαύεται ὁ Θεός (I. 3, p. 146,30f). In this passage θέλημα, συνείδησις, νοῦς and ἀγαπητικὴ δύναμις appear to be the good powers of the soul leading it in the right direction, and therefore, they are called the βασιλικώτατοι λογισμοί.

Besides the parts and the powers of the soul mentioned above, it, according to Macarius, has also πέντε αἰσθήσεις (IV. 7, p. 161,8), which are capable of receiving God's grace. This reminds one of the Stoic view according to which the five senses constitute a part of the soul.<sup>90</sup>

Macarius' view that the soul is the center of both rational and volitional activities and, moreover, his assumption that the φυσικοὶ λογισμοί are good (XXVI. 10, p. 275,33), are points which sound very Stoic. It is difficult, however, to say whether this a direct Stoic influence. or whether Macarius received what appears to be Stoic from Paul and the popular philosophy of his day, which had many Stoic elements. It seems, however, that the latter sounds more probable.

There is one more passage which should be discussed in relation to Macarius' doctrine on the soul. This passage reads: Καὶ ὅταν ἡ ψυχὴ

90. J. Kelly, *Op. Cit.*, p. 18.

σου κοινωνήσῃ τῷ Πνεύματι καὶ εἰσέλθῃ ψυχὴ ἐπουράνιος εἰς τὴν ψυχὴν σου, τότε εἴ τέλειος ἄνθρωπος ἐν Θεῷ καὶ κληρονόμος καὶ υἱὸς (XXXII. 6, p. 308, 5f). The first impression this passage gives is that Macarius holds a view similar to that of Numerius<sup>91</sup> and Origen.<sup>92</sup> The former was convinced that man has two souls, while the latter regards it as possible. To harmonize Macarius with them, however, would be outside the stream of his thought. Macarius himself, as we have seen, makes clear that man has only one soul and not two (VII. 8, p. 189, 5f). The passage under discussion can be better understood in the light of another one found in his writings: 'Αφ' οὗ γὰρ παρέβη ὁ Ἀδάμ τὴν ἐντολήν, ἐπεισελθὼν ὁ ὄφις δεσπότης γέγονε τοῦ οἴκου καὶ ὡς ψυχὴ ἑτέρα μετὰ ψυχῆς ἐστὶ (XV. 35, p. 229, 25f). In this case Macarius speaks figuratively about the serpent as being a «second» soul. We should understand in the same way his statement about God's Spirit forming a «second» soul within man. Moreover, it should also be remembered that in Macarius' view God's Spirit is the «life of the soul», just as the soul is the life of the body (XXX. 6, p. 300, 26f). The second important point included in the passage quoted above is Macarius' argument that only in God man becomes perfect (XXXII. 6, p. 308, 6); this is a very important element of Christian anthropology, which differentiates the latter from other anthropologies.<sup>93</sup>

Another question raised indirectly by the Homilies concerns the time and the way the souls of the individual persons are created. The Scriptures answer these questions only as far as Adam's soul is concerned. Thus, the early Church Fathers put forward three different theories in order to answer them.

91. Numerius, *Testimonia* 36: "Ἄλλοι δὲ ὡν Νουμήνιος... δύο ψυχὰς ἔχειν ἡμᾶς οἴονται, τὴν μὲν λογικὴν τὴν δὲ ἄλογον.

92. Origen writes that two views are found in the Scriptures. The one holds that man has a rational and an irrational soul and the other that man has one soul which has two parts, one rational and one irrational. Origen however, does not express a preference but leaves it to the reader; see *De Principiis*. 3.4:1-2, BT, 230 f.

93. Irenaeus, who distinguishes image from likeness, argues that resemblance to God comes only through the spirit in the soul; see *Adv. Haer.* V. 6:1 and G. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, p. 84. The Soul, according to Augustine, must turn toward God in order to become aware of its character as divine image and, moreover, to realize fully this image relation; see G. Ladner, *Op. Cit.*, p. 200. Some non-Christian and some non-orthodox Christian anthropologies, such as that of Pelagius, claim that man can reform himself and the world on his own. Concerning Pelagian anthropology see G. Ladner, *Op. cit.*, pp. 162-65.

The first theory is Origen's theory of the pre-existence of the souls, which was also held by Didymus the Blind and by Victorinus to some extent.<sup>94</sup> This theory, however, was rejected by the majority of the Fathers and was finally condemned at Constantinople by the Fifth General Council (553).

The second theory is known as creationism and holds that each soul is created by God at the moment of its infusion into the body. This theory found many supporters in both the Eastern and the Western Churches. One implication of this theory is that each individual soul appears to have its own origin and, therefore, its independence from Adam. This does not fit very well the Western view of original sin; this is so because this theory does not provide an immediate link between Adam and the individual soul.

The third theory is known as the traducian theory and is associated with Tertullian.<sup>95</sup> This theory holds that the soul is generated from the parents' soul the same way the body is generated. Gregory of Nyssa is one of the followers of this theory and argues that both the body and the soul come out from the human sperm simultaneously, after the power of God has worked on it.<sup>96</sup> Macarius touches the subject only once in a passage where he compares human parenthood to divine parenthood and notes that fathers upon earth beget children out of their own nature, their own body and soul (XXX.1, p. 298,31f). This passage suggests that both the body and the soul come out of the parents' nature without any special interference on the part of God. Macarius does not reveal his complete belief on the subject, but the passage above can be taken as an indication that he is in favour of the traducian theory. The problem with traducianism is that there is a materialistic strain in it; however, it fits very well with the theory of the hereditary transmission of original sin. This explains why this theory has attracted the notice of Augustine in spite of its materialistic implications, which he had criticized in the person of Tertullian.<sup>97</sup>

Finally, it should be pointed out that  $\psi\upsilon\chi\eta$  does not always mean «soul» in Macarius. It is used to denote life, person, personality, the individual person and similar concepts. In the following passage, for

94. G. Kelly, *Op. Cit.*, p. 345.

95. *Loc. Cit.*

96. Gregory of Nyssa, *De Hominis Op.* 27, 28, PG. 44, 229Af; see also G. Ladner, «The Anthropology of Gregory of Nyssa», in *DOP*, vol. XII (1958), p. 74f.

97. J. Kelly, *Op. Cit.*, p. 345 f.

instance, *ψυχή* means life: ὑπόθου μοι οἶκον τινα ἐμπίπρασθαι πυρί, καὶ δε μὲν σῶσαι ἑαυτὸν βουλόμενος, αἰσθηθεὶς τοῦ ἐμπρισμοῦ γυμνὸς ἔφυγε καταλυπὼν πάντα, καὶ ἑαυτοῦ τὴν ψυχὴν μόνον περιποιήσασθαι βουληθεὶς διεσώθη (V. 6, p. 177,17f). When Macarius chooses to use *ψυχή* instead of person he seems to intend to underline the spiritual status of the person (IV. 23, p. 170,17f).<sup>98</sup>

In conclusion one may say that Macarius' anthropology is more Biblical than Hellenic. He follows the synthetic rather than the analytic approach to man. His views on the nature and the structure of both the body and the soul are very Pauline.

### VI. The Original State of Adam.

Concerning Adam's original state one finds a variation of opinions, ranging from one to the other extreme, expressed by the early Church Fathers. In the West Augustine argues that in his pre-fallen state Adam was almost perfect. He was endowed with the gift of original righteousness, i.e. the ability not to sin — *posse non peccare* — and to know and practice what is good; moreover, Adam, according to Augustine, was free from all physical illness and deficiencies, living in a state of illumination and beatitude.<sup>99</sup> However, even this bright description of Adam's original state allows a degree of spiritual growth since Adam could avoid sinning, but nevertheless, he was not unable to sin;<sup>100</sup> the latter belongs only to the blessed ones in heaven.

In the East Theophilus of Antioch had a different opinion concerning Adam's original state; τῇ δὲ οὐσῃ ἡλικίᾳ Ἀδὰμ ἔτι νήπιος ἦν διὸ οὕτω ἡδύνατο τὴν γνῶσιν κατ' ἀξίαν χωρεῖν.<sup>101</sup> Similar views with these are also found in Irenaeus' writings,<sup>102</sup> who generally adheres to the tradition of Asia Minor.<sup>103</sup>

The first position expressed by Augustine increases the gravity of Adam's sin while Theophilus' thesis is unable to explain how

98. Concerning the various senses of the term *psyche* found in the Fathers see J. Meyendorff, *Introduction à l'étude de Grégoire Palamas*, p. 198 f and E. L. Mascall, *The Recovery of Unity*, p. 30 f.

99. Augustine, *Opus Imperfectum c. Julianum*, V. 1; *De Genesi ad Litteram Liber Imperfectus* 8. 25; cf. J. Kelly, *Op. Cit.*, p. 362.

100. E. Mortalier, *Op. Cit.*, p. 205.

101. Theophilus, *Ad Autol.* II. 25.

102. Irenaeus, *Dem.* XII; *Adv. Haer.* IV. 38:1. In his theology he is more Eastern than Western.

103. J. Kelly, *Op. Cit.*, p. 170.

Adam could make proper use of his free will and follow the way to perfection, since he was spiritually an infant.

Macarius belongs to the majority of the Eastern Fathers who avoided the extremes presented above and their implications, and developed the theory that Adam was gifted with free will and could easily follow either way. Thus, in this matter Macarius stands apart from the Syrian tradition as this appears in the writings of Ephraem Syrus, the Messalian book *Liber Graduum* and other writings of that region, which hold views similar with those of Theophilus.<sup>104</sup>

The capacity to exercise his free will implies that Adam should have been spiritually and intellectually mature enough to handle it. Macarius recognizes this maturity of Adam since he attributes to Adam ruling functions and the ability to discern the passions: δεσπότης γάρ ἦν ὁ ἄνθρωπος ἀπὸ τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν κάτω, διακριτικὸς παθῶν καὶ δαιμόνων ἀλλότριος, καθαρὸς ἀπὸ ἁμαρτίας, εἰκὼν καὶ ὁμοίωμα Θεοῦ (XXX. 1, p. 272, 25f). Macarius states repeatedly that Adam's nature was ἐν τιμῇ καὶ καθαρότητι (XI. 5, p. 200,13; XII. I and 10, pp. 206,3 and 209,4). While in paradise Adam was close to God (XII. 8, p. 208,19) and was willingly directed by the Logos and, like the prophets, he was inspired by God's spirit (*Ibid.*) 6, pp. 207, 37 and 208,17). The Spirit did not act like a forcing agent but it left Adam free to take either the way of moral progress or the way of disobedience (XII. 7, p. 208,30f). Thus, as Clement of Alexandria puts it, Adam was not created perfect but was πρὸς τὸ ἀναδέξασθαι τὴν ἀρετὴν ἐπιτήδειος.<sup>105</sup> Thus, though Macarius does not seem to make a distinction between «image» and «likeness» he does not attribute to prefallen Adam all the heavenly blessings promised to saved Christians, since he does not identify deification with restoration to the original human state. In his opinion Christians can reach higher spiritual levels than that of pre-fallen Adam (XVI. 4, p. 238,29 f). Nevertheless, it was within his capacity to see the glory of God (XLV, 1, p. 335,36 f) and pass moral judgments (XXVI. 1, p. 272, 26). Before the fall Adam had «knowledge» which, according to Chrysostom and Severian of Gabala, he showed in naming the animals.<sup>106</sup> Macarius explains that the source of this knowledge was the Logos himself (XII. 6, and 7, pp. 207,37 f) and 208,6f). This knowledge was

104. R. Murray, *Op. Cit.*, p. 305.

105. Clement of Alexandria, *Strom.* 6. 12, ST II, p. 480, 10 f.

106. Severian of Gabala, *Orationes.* VI. 2, PG. 56, 486; see also Chrysostom, *Hom. XV.* 3 in *Gen.*

not lost after the fall: πλὴν καὶ μετὰ τὴν παράβασιν ἔσχε γνῶσιν (*Ibid.* 8, p. 208,24). In the following section Macarius attempts to explain what kind of knowledge Adam had after the fall by a number of examples. His argument is not clear, but it seems that what he wants to say is summarized in these lines: παραβάς τὴν ἐντολὴν ἐξεβλήθη τοῦ παραδείσου καὶ ὠργίσθη αὐτῷ ὁ Θεός. Λοιπὸν καὶ τὰ καλὰ αὐτοῦ μανθάνει καὶ τὰ κακὰ μαθὼν ἀσφαλίζεται ἑαυτόν, ἵνα μηκέτι ἀμαρτήσας ἐμπέσῃ εἰς κρῖμα θανάτου (XII. 10, p. 299,4f). In other words Adam learned from his own experience. As Chrysostom puts it, Adam had originally theoretical knowledge but after the fall his knowledge was based on his personal experience: ἥδει γὰρ καὶ πρὸ τούτου ὁ Ἀδάμ ὅτι καλὸν μὲν ἡ ὑπακοή, πονηρὸν δὲ ἡ παρακοή. Ἐμαθε δὲ ὕστερον διὰ τῆς τῶν πραγμάτων πείρας.<sup>107</sup> Many Fathers understood the punishment which followed Adam's fall in educational rather than in legalistic terms. Thus, one may say that the paedagogical effect of the fall is the only positive side of this catastrophic act.

The meaning attached to the word *gnosis* by Macarius in the passage given above and throughout his writings differs from that of the Gnostics. To the latter the term meant pre-eminently knowledge of God which is closely bound up with revelatory experience. This knowledge transforms the Gnostic himself by making him a partaker in the divine existence.<sup>108</sup> For Macarius, however, knowledge is the result of speculation and mental activity. The search for this knowledge is very dangerous and useless, since the human mind cannot comprehend all the depth of reality; therefore, Macarius recommends faith to search for knowledge (XII.10-13 p. 209,1-210,10). In this point he is far away from the Alexandrian tradition of Clement and Origen which placed knowledge attained through philosophy above faith, since, according to it, knowledge only could lead a Christian to a full understanding of his religion.<sup>109</sup>

107. Chrysostom, *Sermon VII. 2 in Gen.*, Diadochus of Photice argues that after the fall man has two kinds of knowledge, the knowledge of good and the knowledge of evil. Therefore, he retains both kinds in his memory and thinks of both in every case; see his *Capita Gnostica*. 88, ed. Sources Chrétiennes, no 5, p. 148, 12 f.

108. To Gnostics *gnosis* meant preeminently knowledge of God, which is closely bound up with revelatory experience. This *gnosis* transforms the Gnostic himself by making him a partaker in the divine existence, see H. Jonas, *The Gnostic Religion*, p. 34 f, where a full treatment of the question is presented.

109. A. C. McGiffert, *Op. Cit.*, p. 211.



In comparison to the created world Adam was far superior to all the other creatures, which he was ruling and using for his own benefit (XI. 6, p. 200,31; XXVI. 1, p. 227,25). Macarius, as we have seen above, places Adam and man in general even above the angelic powers.<sup>110</sup>

Man, moreover, being a creature, could not have been immortal by nature. The Eastern Fathers argue that man was created φύσει θνητός and χάριτι ἀθάνατος.<sup>111</sup> Theophilus of Antioch, however, approaches this question from a slightly different angle: Man, argues Theophilus, was created neither mortal, nor immortal; God made him δεκτικὸν ἀμφοτέρων, ἵνα ρέψῃ ἐπὶ τὰ τῆς ἀθανασίας τηρήσας τὴν ἐντολὴν τοῦ Θεοῦ, μισθὸν κομισῆται παρ' αὐτοῦ τὴν ἀθανασίαν καὶ γένηται Θεός, εἰδ' αὖ μένει ἐπὶ τὰ τοῦ θανάτου πράγματα, παρακούσας τοῦ Θεοῦ, αὐτὸς ἑαυτῷ αἷτιος ἢ τοῦ θανάτου.<sup>112</sup> Macarius does not discuss the question in detail, but it is clear from his writings that he accepts the traditional view and sees both moral perfection and immortality not as a natural property of Adam, but as *telos*: οὐ συνεῖς ὅτι ὁ οὐρανὸς καὶ ἡ γῆ παρέρχεται, σὺ δὲ εἰς ἀθανασίαν ἐκλήθης, εἰς υἱοθεσίαν, εἰς ἀδελφότητα, εἰς νύμφην βασιλέως (XVI. 13, p. 242, 18f). God had equipped man with a nature susceptible to this and also with αὐτεξούσιον, the right exercise of which could lead to the state of perfection.

The style of Adam's life in paradise is not described by Macarius; he simply calls it ζωὴ τρυφῆς (XLVIII. 5, p. 349,40) and makes a contrast between it and the life outside the paradise (XXI. 2, p. 261, 1-15). What made the former especially delightful and sufficient was the presence of Logos with whom Adam was in full communion (XXII. 6, p. 207,37 f).

It has already been pointed out that, in spite of his supposed Syrian background, Macarius departs from the general Syrian tradition as far as his views on the question of Adam's original state are con-

110. This is not accepted by all Fathers. Augustine for instance places the angels above man; see G. Ladner, *The Idea of Reform*, p. 196; Basil, moreover, argues that on the account of the spiritual side of his nature man possesses the ability to attain to the status of angels; M. A. Orphanos, *Creation and Salvation according to St. Basil of Caesarea*, p. 75.

111. J. Romanides, *To Propatorikon Hamartema*, p. 116 f. Methodius of Olympus, Athenagoras and some other writers of Platonic background hold that the first man was created immortal; see Athenagoras, *On Resurrection*, 15 and 16 and J. Kelly, *Op. Cit.*, p. 183. Tatian, Justin and Irenaeus on the other hand were strongly against this view; see J. Romanides, *Loc. Cit.*

112. Theophilus, *Ad. Autol.* II. 27.

cerned. This departure, however, fits very well in his whole system of thought. As it is said elsewhere, Macarius puts a great emphasis on the importance of the role free will plays in man's development; he associates moral evil, and to a large extent, moral virtue with man's free will. Needless to say such views require that Adam should have been mature enough to exercise his freedom.

Moreover, it should be pointed out that in general Macarius proves to be an extremely sensible and careful person who managed to maintain well balanced views on disputed matters, though he lived in an era, and probably in an area, which has known a number of extremist movements.

*(to be continued)*