The Ontological Problem
in the Patristic Tradition*

By Georgios D. Martzelos**

5. The ontology of man

a. The ontological composition of man

Going back to the patristic tradition, someone finds out at first sight that there are two trends in relation to the ontological composition of man: the first one is represented by the vast majority of the Fathers, who accept the twofold composition of man of a material body and a spiritual soul[1], whereas the second is represented by a small minority who accept

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** Georgios D. Martzelos is Professor Emeritus of the School of Theology of the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki.

1. See indicatively Athenagoras, *Περὶ ἀναστάσεως τῶν νεκρῶν* 13, PG 6, 1000B; 15, PG 6, 1004A; Justin the philosopher and martyr, *Περὶ ἀναστάσεως* 8, PG 6, 1585B; Cyril of Jerusalem, *Κατήχησις* 3, 4, PG 33, 429A; Epiphanius of Cyprus, *Πανάριον* 2, 1, 64, 18, PG 41, 1097D: «*ἄνθρωπος δ' ἀληθέστατα λέγεται κατὰ φύσιν οὔτε ψυχὴ χωρὶς σώματος οὔτ' αὖ σῶμα χωρὶς ψυχῆς, ἀλλὰ τὸ ἐκ συστάσεως ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος εἰς μίαν τὴν τοῦ καλοῦ μορφὴν συντεθέν*»; Basil the Great, *Ὁμιλία «Εἰς τὸ Πρόσεχε σεαυτῷ»* 3, PG 31, 204B; 7, PG 31, 216AB; *Ὁμιλία 21, Περὶ τοῦ μὴ προσηλῶσθαι τοῖς βιωτικοῖς, καὶ περὶ τοῦ γενομένου ἐμπρησμοῦ ἔξωθεν τῆς Ἐκκλησίας*, 5, PG 31, 549A; Gregory the Theologian, *Λόγος 38, Εἰς τὰ Θεοφάνια, εἴτουν Γενέθλια τοῦ Σωτῆρος*, 11, PG 36, 321CD; 12, PG 36, 325B; *Λόγος 45, Εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Πάσχα* 9, PG 36, 633C; Gregory of Nyssa, *Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου* 29, PG 44, 233D-236B; *Ἀντιρρητικὸς πρὸς τὰ Ἀπολιναρίου* 2, PG 45, 1128B: «*Ὁ (γὰρ) ἐκ ψυχῆς νοερᾶς καὶ σώματος συνεστηκὼς ἄνθρωπος λέγεται· ᾧ δὲ μὴ συνεπινοεῖται τὰ δύο, πῶς ἡ τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κλῆσις ἐφαρμοσθήσεται; ἀνθρώπου γὰρ σῶμα λέγομεν καὶ ψυχὴν ἀνθρώπου, ἕως ἂν ἐφ' ἑαυτοῦ ἑκάτερον τούτων θεωρῆται· ἡ δὲ συνδρομὴ τούτων τῶν δύο ἄνθρωπος καὶ ἔστι καὶ λέγεται*»; Pamphilus of Jerusalem, *Πανοπλία δογματικὴ* 6, 1, in: A. Mai, *Patrum Nova Biblitheca*, vol. 2, Romae 1844, p. 614: «*ἄνθρωπος σύνθετόν ἐστι πρᾶγμα, ἐκ ψυχῆς νοερᾶς καὶ σώματος συνεστώς. κατ' οὐσίαν τούτων ἑνωθέντων, καὶ οὐχ*

the threefold composition of man of body, soul and spirit[2]. In essence however, we must have in mind that there is nothing to choose between them, since the spirit to which they refer, these that accept the threefold composition of man, is not a separate element, but the intellectual power of the soul, with which man is already endowed from the beginning of his creation. That's exactly why Gregory of Nyssa, who clearly accepts the twofold composition of man, does not hesitate, based on apostle Paul[3], to refer to a threefold composition of man of body, soul and spirit, underlining at the same time that the differentiation between soul and spirit does not mean division of soul in two constituent elements, for soul with regard to its nature is one, adorned with sentient as also with intellectual living ability[4]. In this respect then there is unanimity in the orthodox tradition with reference to the ontological composition of man.

In fact at this point we must point out that the Cappadocian Fathers, and mainly Gregory of Nyssa, as also and the 5th century's Fathers were obliged to put a special emphasis on the twofold composition of man, in order to confront Apollinaris, who –as it is known– tried to found his Christological erroneous belief on the threefold composition of man[5]. For that reason, besides the Fathers in their Christological formulations, underline that man consists of flesh (body) animated by a rational and intellectual soul and exactly this human nature which is ontologically perfect assumed God the Word[6]. As Theodoret notices in this regard,

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ἕν ἐστι τῇ οὐσίᾳ. οὐδὲ γὰρ ταὐτὸν ἡ ψυχὴ τῷ σώματι κατ᾽ οὐσίαν. τοῦτο γὰρ ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ψυχὴ λογικὴ σώματι ὀργανικῶς συνημμένῳ κεχρημένη».

2. See Irenaeus of Lyons, Ἔλεγχος καὶ ἀνατροπὴ τῆς ψευδωνύμου γνώσεως 2, 33, 5, PG 7, 834A; 5, 9, 1, PG 7, 1144A. Cf. and Origen, Περὶ ἀρχῶν 4, 11 PG 11, 365A.

3. See *1 Thess*. 5, 23.

4. See Gregory of Nyssa, Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου 8, PG 44, 145C-148B; 14, PG 44, 176AB; see and Procopius of Gaza, Εἰς τὴν Γένεσιν Ἑρμηνεία, PG 87, 117D.

5. For the erroneous belief of Apollinaris founded on the threefold composition of man see Gregory of Nyssa, Ἀντιῤῥητικὸς πρὸς τὰ Ἀπολιναρίου 2, 46, PG 45, 1233C-1237B.

6. See indicatively Gregory the Theologian, Ἐπιστολὴ 101, Πρὸς Κληδόνιον Πρεσβύτερον, PG 37, 180A; 184B 188B; Gregory of Nyssa, *ibid*., 2, PG 45, 1128B; 8, PG 45, 1140B; 35, PG 45, 1200C; 1201A; 54, PG 45 1256A; Cyril of Alexandria, Ἐπιστολὴ 4, Πρὸς Νεστόριον ἐπιστολὴ Β΄, PG 77, 45B; Leontius of Byzantium, Τριάκοντα κεφάλαια κατὰ Σεβήρου 18, PG 86, 1908A; Eulogius of Alexandria, Συνηγορίαι περὶ τοῦ αὐτοῦ κεφαλαίου *(fragmenta dogmatica)*, PG 86, 2953D.

turning against the above-mentioned anthropological conception of Apollinaris, «τούτου δὴ χάριν καὶ σῶμα καὶ ψυχὴν ἀνέλαβε [means God the Word] λογικήν. Οὐ γὰρ τριχῇ διαιρεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἡ θεία Γραφή, ἀλλ᾿ ἐκ ψυχῆς καί σώματος τόδε τὸ ζῷον συνεστάναι φησίν. Ὁ γὰρ Θεὸς ἐκ τοῦ χοὸς τὸ σῶμα διαπλάσας ἐνεφύσησε τὴν ψυχήν, καὶ δύο φύσεις ἔδειξεν οὐ τρεῖς»[7].

However, despite the fact that the Fathers emphasize that man is double-natured and compound, consisting of a material body and of an intellectual or rational soul, it does not concern two elements which can exist autonomous in human and independent of each other[8]. On the contrary there is an indissoluble unity between the two which is apparent from the functional relationship that exists between them. The body as material is, without the soul, inactive, lacking of life and insensible. Whereas the soul as disembodied, alive and intellectual essence is the one which gives living power to the body and makes man capable of perceiving through senses whatever comes under his notice[9]. For that reason exactly, when the Fathers characterize not only the persons of the Holy Trinity, but also man as "hypostasis" or "person" with his fundamental ontological features, such as his unprecedented existential individuality, and his loving sociability, of which we will make special reference afterwards, they refer to the whole individual essence or nature of man as a psychosomatic entity and not only in his psycho-spiritual hypostasis[10].

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7. Theodoret of Cyrus, Αἱρετικῆς κακομυθίας ἐπιτομὴ 5, 11, PG 83, 492A.

8. See Justin Martyr and Philosopher, Περὶ ἀναστάσεως 8, PG 6 1585B: «Τί γάρ ἐστιν ὁ ἄνθρωπος, ἀλλ᾿ ἢ τὸ ἐκ ψυχῆς καὶ σώματος συνεστὸς ζῶον λογικόν; Μὴ οὖν καθ᾿ ἑαυτὴν ψυχὴ ἄνθρωπος; Οὔκ· ἀλλ᾿ ἀνθρώπου ψυχή. Μὴ οὖν καλοῖτο σῶμα ἄνθρωπος; Οὔκ· ἀλλ᾿ ἀνθρώπου σῶμα καλεῖται. Εἴπερ οὖν κατ᾿ ἰδίαν μὲν τούτων οὐδέτερον ἄνθρωπός ἐστι, τὸ δὲ ἐκ τῆς ἀμφοτέρων συμπλοκῆς καλεῖται ἄνθρωπος».

9. See Basil the Great, Ὁμιλία εἰς τό «Εἰς τὸ Πρόσεχε σεαυτῷ» 7, PG 31, 216B; Gregory of Nyssa, Περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ἀναστάσεως, PG 46, 29AB.

10. See Basil the Great, Ἐπιστολὴ 38, Γρηγορίῳ ἀδελφῷ περὶ διαφορᾶς οὐσίας καὶ ὑποστάσεως, 2-3, PG 32, 325B-329A; Ἐπιστολὴ 214, Τερεντίῳ Κόμητι, 4, PG 32, 789A; Gregory of Nyssa, Πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν, PG 45, 177CD; 181CD; 185AB. See and John Damascene, Κεφάλαια φιλοσοφικὰ 30, PG 94, 593A-596A; 41, PG 94, 612 A; 66, PG 94, 665A-668A.

The body however, is not understood by the Fathers, as in platonic or neo-platonic philosophy, as being the grave and the prison of the soul, in which the soul is imprisoned, so as to serve its sentence because of its fall into the material world[11]. On the contrary it is God's "very good" creature, which is also in need, as an integral part of man's nature, of salvation and of theosis. Because of this according to biblical and patristic tradition not only the soul of human is redeemed or condemned, but the whole human as a psychosomatic entity – and this is exactly the aim that the resurrection of the dead serves.

However, although the above mentioned individual aspects of the ontological problem are answered, as we have seen, by the Fathers of the 4th century when they tried to face the Trinitarian heretical challenges of their time and to formulate explicitly the trinitarian creed, the answers that were given by the Fathers to the problem of the ontological composition of man are closely connected for the most part with their attempt to overturn the Christological heretical challenges of their time, indeed not only Apollinarianism, as we have already mentioned, but also Nestorianism. Particularly, against Nestorius, who separated the two natures in Christ, accepting only one moral («*κατὰ θέλησιν μόνην ἢ εὐδοκίαν*») union between them, the Fathers with Cyril of Alexandria as the leading figure stressed the real or «*καθ' ὑπόστασιν*» ("hypostatic union") of the two natures in the person of Logos, comparing it to body's union with soul. That is, according to them the union and the relationship between body and soul is so indissoluble, that is presented as an example within the frame of their Christological doctrine for the understanding of the «*καθ' ὑπόστασιν*» ("hypostatic union") of the two natures of Christ in the person of God the Word. In other words, just as the union of the two natures in Christ, so too the union between body and soul is considered by the Fathers as «*καθ' ὑπόστασιν*» ("hypostatic union") therefore soul and body are inseparable and undivided from each other in human nature. Only «*κατ' ἐπίνοιαν*» ("as thought") there

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11. See Plato, *Κρατύλος* 400c; *Πολιτεία* 517b; Plotinus *Ἐννεάδες* IV, 8, 3. For that reason actually Plotinus, as Porphyry mentions, was ashamed of saying that he had a body and avoided mentioning his genre, his parents and his country! (See *Περὶ τοῦ Πλωτίνου βίου καὶ τῆς τάξεως τῶν βιβλίων αὐτοῦ* 1).

can be a distinction between these elements and not empirically and in practice[12].

In fact, Basil of Seleucia uses the example of the union between body and soul, not only as to give a parallel pattern, according to which the union of the divine and human nature in Christ could be understood, but also to declare the way of this union, underlining its transcendent and apophatic character. He supports that, if we are unable to know the way of the union between body and soul, or even the way of the indwelling of the disembodied soul in the material body, all the more reason is impossible to understand the way of the union of the two natures in Christ[13].

Thus, as we have seen, the Fathers in their attempt to face Apollinarism as well as Nestorianism and to formulate explicitly the orthodox Christological creed, are obliged to develop their anthropological doctrine not only in regards to the ontological composition of man, but also to the way of the union between body and soul.

b. The ontology of soul

We must underline when referring to the ontology of soul in particular, that soul according to the Fathers is a non-material and disembodied essence created at the same time with body and thus created in relation to its nature. If our body as material is characterized by a nourishing and growth power, soul as non-material and disembodied is characterized by a living and moving power, which is expressed with the giving of life and motion to the body, as well as by the sensible and rational power

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12. See Cyril of Alexandria, Ἐπιστολὴ 17, Πρὸς Νεστόριον ἐπιστολὴ Γ΄, PG 77, 116A; Ἐπιστολὴ 44, Πρὸς Εὐλόγιον πρεσβύτερον Κωνσταντινουπόλεως, PG 77, 225Β; Ἐπιστολὴ 45, Πρὸς Σούκκενσον ἐπίσκοπον Διοκαισαρείας ἐπιστολὴ Α΄, PG 77, 233A; Ἐπιστολὴ 46, Πρὸς Σούκκενσον ἐπίσκοπον Διοκαισαρείας ἐπιστολὴ Β΄, PG 77, 245 AB: «Ἔστω δὲ ἡμῖν εἰς παράδειγμα πάλιν ὁ καθ᾽ ἡμᾶς ἄνθρωπος. Δύο μὲν γὰρ ἐπ᾽ αὐτοῦ νοοῦμεν τὰς φύσεις, μίαν μέν, τῆς ψυχῆς, ἑτέραν δέ, τοῦ σώματος. Ἀλλ᾽ ἐν ψιλαῖς διελόντες ἐννοίαις, καὶ ὡς ἐν ἰσχναῖς θεωρίαις, ἤτοι νοῦ φαντασίαις τὴν διαφορὰν δεξάμενοι, οὐκ ἀνὰ μέρος τίθεμεν τὰς φύσεις· οὔτε μὴν διαμπὰξ διὰ τῆς τομῆς ἐφίεμεν τὴν δύναμιν αὐταῖς, ἀλλ᾽ ἑνὸς εἶναι νοοῦμεν· ὥστε τὰς δύο, μηκέτι μὲν εἶναι δύο, δι᾽ ἀμφοῖν δὲ τὸ ἓν ἀποτελεῖσθαι ζῷον».
13. See Basil of Seleucia, Εἰς τὸν Εὐαγγελισμὸν τῆς Παναγίας Θεοτόκου 4, PG 85, 436B-437A.

that itself possesses, thus man as a result becomes able to feel and sense through his senses and his mind the world that surrounds him[14].

The Fathers turning mainly against Apollinaris, who under the influence of the neo-platonic anthropology was separating soul to a rational (mind-spirit) and to an irrational (soul) part so as to establish his erroneous Christological belief, emphasize, as we have seen, the unity of the soul. However, influenced by the platonic psychology, which was widely spread in the prevailing atmosphere of their time, they refer to the threefold division of soul to reason, spirit, and appetite[15] or to the rational part, which is principal and sovereign, as also to the irrational or passive part, to which belong spirit and appetite, however, without affecting in the least its unity[16].

At this point we must make clear that, although the Fathers were influenced by the platonic psychology in terms of the threefold division of soul, however, they were differentiated radically from Plato as it refers to the immortality of soul. For them soul is immortal not by "nature" («φύσει»), as Plato accepts but "by grace" («κατὰ χάριν»). According to them soul is by nature mortal, as it happens with all the created beings.

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14. See Basil the Great, *ibid.*, PG 31, 216AB; Gregory of Nyssa, *Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου* 8, PG 44, 145C-148B; 14, PG 44, 176AB; 29, PG 44, 233D; 236B; *Περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ἀναστάσεως*, PG 46, 29AB; 48C; Procopius of Gaza, *Εἰς τὴν Γένεσιν Ἑρμηνεία*, PG 87, 117D; John Damascene, *Ἔκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως* 2, 12, PG 94, 924B: «Ψυχὴ τοίνυν ἐστὶν οὐσία ζῶσα, ἁπλῆ, ἀσώματος, σωματικοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς κατ᾿ οἰκείαν φύσιν ἀόρατος, λογική τε καὶ νοερά, ἀσχημάτιστος, ὀργανικῷ κεχρημένη σώματι καὶ τούτῳ ζωῆς, αὐξήσεώς τε καὶ αἰσθήσεως καὶ γεννήσεως παρεκτική, οὐχ ἕτερον ἔχουσα παρ᾿ ἑαυτὴν τὸν νοῦν, ἀλλὰ μέρος αὐτῆς τὸ καθαρώτατον· ὥσπερ γὰρ ὀφθαλμὸς ἐν σώματι, οὕτως ἐν ψυχῇ νοῦς· αὐτεξούσιος, θελητική τε καὶ ἐνεργητική, τρεπτή, ἤτοι ἐθελότρεπτος, ὅτι καὶ κτιστή».
15. See Athanasius the Great, *Πρὸς Μαρκελλῖνον, Εἰς τὴν ἑρμηνείαν τῶν ψαλμῶν* 27, PG 40A; Basil the Great, *Ἑρμηνεία εἰς τὸν Προφήτην Ἡσαΐαν* 26, PG 168C-169A; Gregory of Nyssa, *Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου* 29, PG 44, 237B; *Περὶ τοῦ βίου Μωυσέως*, PG 44 353C; 361D; *Ἐπιστολὴ Κανονική, Πρὸς τὸν ἐν ἁγίοις Λητόϊον, ἐπίσκοπον Μελιτινῆς*, PG 45, 224ABC; *Ἀντιρρητικὸς πρὸς τὰ Ἀπολιναρίου* 7, PG 45, 1137B; *Περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ἀναστάσεως*, PG 46, 48C-49B; 53A; Maximus Confessor, *Κεφάλαια περὶ ἀγάπης* 3, 3, PG 90, 1017C.
16. See indicatively Basil the Great, *Ὁμιλία εἰς τό "Εἰς τὸ Πρόσεχε σεαυτῷ"* 7, PG 31, 213C; Gregory of Nyssa, *Ἀντιρρητικὸς πρὸς τὰ Ἀπολιναρίου* 45, PG 45, 1233B; *Περὶ ψυχῆς καὶ ἀναστάσεως*, PG 46, 53A.

If it remains after death into being, it owes that not to some independent natural ability of its, but to the will and the grace of its creator[17]. If God had wanted, it would have also stopped existing[18]. However, God is according to apostle Paul the only one who is immortal («μόνος ἔχων ἀθανασίαν»)[19]. Therefore, anything that is created is according to the Fathers by nature mortal. As quite characteristically Athanasius the Great stresses, «Τῶν μὲν γὰρ γενητῶν ἡ φύσις, ἅτε δὴ ἐξ οὐκ ὄντων ὑποστᾶσα, ῥευστή τις καὶ ἀσθενὴς καὶ θνητὴ καθ᾽ ἑαυτὴν συγκρινομένη τυγχάνει»[20]. Consequently, the subject of the immortality of soul in the orthodox tradition should not be understood with the platonic sense but with the biblical and on the basis of the consequences of the ontological distinction between created and non-created.

Although the Fathers refer to the unity and the threefold division of soul, they are obviously particularly interested in the rational part and in the part of free will which constitutes not only the specific distinction of man and the irrational beasts, but mainly and predominately the «κατ᾽ εἰκόνα» ("in the image") of God in man. John Damascene[21] while summarizing hereupon the earlier patristic tradition emphasizes epigrammatically: «Τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατ᾽ εἰκόνα τὸ νοερὸν δηλοῖ καὶ αὐτεξούσιον». The «νοερόν», namely the intellect, is the organ with which God has endowed man so as to think and decide, before acting[22], whereas the «αὐτεξούσιον» ("free will"), which as term derives from the stoic and neo-platonic philosophy[23], is the natural motion of the

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17. See John Damascene, Ἔκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως 2, 12, PG 94, 924B-925A: «Πάντα ταῦτα κατὰ φύσιν ἐκ τῆς τοῦ δημιουργήσαντος αὐτήν [means soul] χάριτος εἰληφυῖα, ἐξ ἧς καὶ τὸ φύσει οὕτως εἶναι εἴληφεν».

18. Cf. Athanasius the Great, Κατὰ Ἀρειανῶν 1, 20, PG 26, 53A: «Τὰ μὲν γὰρ ἄλλα οἷά ἐστι τὰ γενητὰ οὐδὲν ὅμοιον κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ἔχει πρὸς τὸν πεποιηκότα· ἀλλ᾽ ἔξωθεν αὐτοῦ ἐστι χάριτι καὶ βουλήσει αὐτοῦ τῷ Λόγῳ γινόμενα, ὥστε πάλιν δύνασθαι καὶ παύεσθαί ποτε, εἰ θελήσειεν ὁ ποιήσας· ταύτης γάρ ἐστι φύσεως τὰ γενητά».

19. 1 Tim. 6, 16.

20. Κατὰ Ἑλλήνων 41, PG 25, 81C.

21. See Ἔκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως 2, 12, PG 94, 920B.

22. See Nemesius of Emesa, Περὶ φύσεως ἀνθρώπου 39, PG 40, 764BC; John Damascene, ibid. PG 94, 920B; 25, PG 94, 957C.

23. See I. Ab Arnim, Stoicorum veterum fragmenta, Vol. 2, Stuttgart 1968, p. 284 abstr. 975; p. 290, abtr. 990; Epictetus, Διατριβαὶ 4, 1, 56; 62; 68; 100; Plotinus, Ἐννεάδες I, 4, 8;

intellect, with which man expresses his will rationally and freely[24]. It's characteristic that for the Fathers the freedom of man is not understood irrespective of the rational attribute which is distinctive of his will, since there is not freedom without rationale. Nemesius of Emesa[25] notices characteristically: «Ἐλεύθερον γάρ τι καὶ αὐτεξούσιον τὸ λογικόν». That means that for them not only intellect is indissolubly connected with the free will of man but also that free will cannot be understood independent of intellect. Only as rational inclination can have a hypostasis. In other words, for them there is not intellect without freewill and freewill without intellect. Intellect is will and will is rational. There is between them an indissoluble ontological unity which corresponds to human nature[26].

We must notice here that this ontological union of intellect and will, rational and freewill, is not an invention of the Fathers, but derives from the ancient Greek philosophy. For the ancient Greek thought, and particularly for the stoic, the rational does not accomplish just an inner intellectual function, as internal logos, but constitutes the capable of willing determinative cause of the created things, when it is expressed outwards as an act, as practical or poetic logos[27]. And for the Greek philosophy the rational is aways capable of will and the free will rational. As quite characteristically the neo-platonic philosopher Plotinus emphasizes based on his own philosophical presuppositions «ἐν νῷ μόνῳ νοοῦντι τὸ αὐτεξούσιον»[28].

III, 2, 4; 10; IV, 3, 16; VI, 8, 3-8; 10; 15; 20.

24. See John Damascene, *ibid*., 22, PG 94, 944C; *Εἰσαγωγὴ δογμάτων στοιχειώδης* 10, PG 95, 109D.

25. See *ibid*., 2, PG 40, 588A. Cf. John Damascene, *Ἔκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως* 2, 3, PG 94, 868A; 3, 14, PG 94, 1036C; 1041B; *Εἰσαγωγὴ δογμάτων στοιχειώδης* 10, PG 95, 112A; *Κατὰ Μανιχαίων Διάλογος* 69, PG 95, 1568B.

26. See G. D. Martzelos, *Ὀρθόδοξο δόγμα καὶ θεολογικὸς προβληματισμός. Μελετήματα δογματικῆς θεολογίας* Β΄, P. Pournaras Publications, Thessaloniki 2000, p. 113.

27. See Aristotle, *Μετὰ τὰ Φυσικὰ* Ε, 1, 1025b, 20-25; Diogenes Laertius, *Βίοι Φιλοσόφων* VII, 1, 130; I. ab Arnim, *ibid*., Vol I, p. 50, abstract 202; Vol. II, p. 43, abstract 135; Vol. III, P. 42, abstract 175; p. 79, abstract 323; p. 134 ff., abstract 495. See and J. Hirschberger, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, I (Altertum und Mittelalter), Herder Verlag, Basel-Freiburg-Wien ⁹1974, p. 180, 258 ff.

28. See *Ἐννεάδες* I, 8, 5. Cf. and *Ἐννεάδες* I, 8, 6: «ἡ δὲ βούλησις ἡ νόησις, βούλησις

However, we can find this ontological union of intellect and free will in Greek language which is, as it is known, particularly influenced by the ancient Greek philosophy. It is not at all a coincidence that the verb «βουλεύεσθαι», which denotes the internal theoretical function of the spirit, as also the verb «βούλεσθαι», which denotes the external practical function of it, have common etymological root (βούλ). Indeed, the ontological, as also the significative union between these two verbs is mainly obvious from their derivative noun «βουλή» which means the logical thought as also the willing decision. And even today this term has exactly the same meaning. When we say for example «Βουλὴ τῶν Ἑλλήνων», we mean a body of representatives of the Greek nation which not only deliberates but also decides.

The Fathers on the basis of these facts of Greek philosophy and language, underline with particular emphasis the ontological union of spirit and will or of rational and freewill according to the common used terminology. For them the rational is indissoluble interwoven with the freewill and is not to be understood independently. Especially saint John Damascene, who –as it is known– summarizes in a prolific and creative way the earlier patristic tradition, refers repeatedly to the union of rational and freewill underlining its indisputable ontological character. As he mentions characteristically, coping at this point the same Nemesius of Emesa verbatim, «Ἐξ ἀνάγκης παρυφίσταται τῷ λογικῷ τὸ αὐτεξούσιον· ἢ γὰρ οὐκ ἔσται λογικὸν ὂν κύριον ἔσται πράξεων καὶ αὐτεξούσιον»[29] .

In fact exactly because the ontological union of rational and freewill is general in the Fathers, therefore some times themselves are able and at home in attributing the «κατ᾽ εἰκόνα» ("in the image") of God in man without any hesitations and reservations sometimes only to rational[30]

δ᾽ ἐλέχθη, ὅτι κατὰ νοῦν. καὶ γὰρ [the] λεγομένη βούλησις τὸ κατὰ νοῦν μιμεῖται».
29. See Ἔκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως 2, 27, PG 94, 960D. Cf. Nemesius of Emesa, ibid., 41, PG 40, 776A.
30. See indicatively Athanasius the Great, Λόγος περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπίσεως τοῦ Λόγου, καὶ τῆς διὰ σώματος πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐπιφανείας αὐτοῦ 3, PG 25, 101B; 6, PG 25, 105C; Basil the Great, Ἐπιστολὴ 233, Ἀμφιλοχίῳ ἐρωτήσαντι, 1, PG 32, 864C; Εἰς τό «Πρόσεχε σεαυτῷ» 6, PG 31, 212BC; Περὶ εὐχαριστίας 2, PG 31, 221C; Ὁμιλία ἐν λιμῷ καὶ αὐχμῷ 5, PG 31, 317A; Ὅροι κατὰ πλάτος 2, 3, PG 31, 913B; Gregory of Nyssa,

sometimes only to the will and freewill[31] and sometimes to rational and to freewill[32]. If someone does not take into consideration that the reason for this differentiation is the self-evident union of rational and free will which exists in their thought, then he would think that there are oppositions and contradictions in relation to this point in orthodox tradition.

That however, which shows the deeper significance of the union of rational and freewill for the Fathers is its use in their dogmatic doctrine, mainly facing the heresies of Arianism and Monotheletism.

While referring first and foremost to the dogmatic importance that the union of rational and freewill has for them so as to overturn Arianism, we must underline that, Athanasius the Great already takes advantage of this ontological and semantic union of rational and freewill, which profoundly characterizes the Greek philosophy and language, in his fight against Arians, as we have argued thoroughly in one of our previous studies[33]. In fact based on relevant passages of the Old and the New Testament, which make, as he believes, this union clear and indisputable, formulates

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Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου 11, PG 44, 156B; 12, PG 44, 161C; 164A; 16, PG 44, 185C. See also Clement of Alexandria, *Προτρεπτικὸς πρὸς Ἕλληνας* 10, PG 8, 212C-213A.

31. See indicatively Basi the Great, *Εἰς τὸν 48 ψαλμὸν* 8, PG 29, 449C; *Ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιος τῶν κακῶν ὁ Θεὸς* 6, PG 31, 344BC; Gregory of Nyssa, *ibid.* 16, PG 44, 184B; *Λόγος κατηχητικὸς ὁ μέγας* 5, PG 45, 24C; 21, PG 45, 56CD; *Περὶ παρθενίας* 12, PG 46, 369C; Constantine the deacon, *Ἐγκώμιον εἰς πάντας τοὺς ἁγίους ἐνδόξους καὶ πανευφήμους μάρτυρας τοὺς ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἀθλήσαντας* 14, PG 88, 496C; Maximus the Confessor, *Ζήτησις μετὰ Πύρρου*, PG 91, 304C; John Damascene, *Περὶ τῶν ἐν Χριστῷ δύο θελημάτων καὶ ἐνεργειῶν καὶ λοιπῶν φυσικῶν ἰδιωμάτων, ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς δὲ καὶ περὶ δύο φύσεων καὶ μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως* 28, PG 95, 165D.

32. See indicatively Basil the Great, *Εἰς τὸν 48 ψαλμὸν* 8, PG 29, 449BC; John Damascene, *Ἔκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως* 2, 12, PG 94, 920B. See also and the above mentioned quotations of Basil the Great and Gregory of Nyssa, where they attribute the «κατ᾽ εἰκόνα» ("in the image") sometimes to rational and sometimes to freewill.

33. See G. D. Martzelos, „Die Freiheit Gott-Vaters als trinitätstheologisches Problem in der griechische Uberlieferung", in: *Gott, Vater und Schöpferr*, *Pro Oriente*, Bd. XXXI, Wiener patristische Tagungen III (PRO ORIENTE – Studierung «Le Mystère de Dieu, Père et Créateur» – „Das Geheimnis Gottes: Vater und Schöpferr", Luxemburg, Juni 2005, hrsg. Von Ysabel de Andia und Peter Leander Hofrichter), Tyrolia-Verlag, Innsbruck-Wien 2007, p. 65 ff.

a very strong argument against Arians in order to prove the non-created nature of Logos.

Arians, as it is known, claimed that Logos is a creature, because he comes into being, like all the other creatures, by the will of the Father. Athanasius, realizing very well the biblical sense of the Son as the Word of God, and identifying, due to the ontological union of spirit and will, the Word of God with spirit, freewill and his will, he supports against Arians that it is not possible for the Son to originate from the will of the Father, for himself as Word and Spirit is also the living will and the will of the Father, by which all the creatures were made. Consequently, we should not attribute another will to God before the Word, to which the Word owes his existence. Will and freewill is for Athanasius the Word Himself[34]. « *Πῶς οὖν δύναται βουλὴ καὶ θέλημα τοῦ Πατρὸς ὑπάρχων ὁ Λόγος γίνεσθαι καὶ αὐτὸς θελήματι καὶ βουλήσει;*»[35] «*Καὶ εἰ ἡ βούλησις αὐτός, πῶς ἐν βουλήσει ἡ βουλή;*»[36]. The identification of Word and will in God was undoubtedly one of the strongest arguments of Athanasius the Great against Arians and clearly indicates the theological importance of the union of spirit and will in the patristic tradition.

The same applies to the effort of John Damascene to face the heresy of Monotheletism. Damascene realizing very well the theological importance that reflects the union of rational and free will, uses it completely as a background of his theological arguments, in his attempt to overturn Monotheletism, using also in connection with it the soteriological argument of Gregory the Theologian against Appolinaris.

Gregory the Theologian, as it is known, in his attempt to overturn the doctrine of Appolinaris, who considered the spirit as being the main cause and vehicle of sin in man and therefore he denied the existence of a human spirit in Christ, characterizes the spirit («*πρωτοπαθῆ νοῦ*») and stresses that if the Word did not assume in his incarnation the human spirit («*πρωτοπαθήσαντα νοῦ*»), the spirit which is the first cause, but also the first victim of sin, was not saved , for as he epigrammatically

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34. See *Κατὰ Ἀρειανῶν* 3, 63, PG 26, 456C-457A.
35. *Ibid*., 64, PG 26, 457B.
36. *Ibid*., 67, PG 26, 464C-465A.

underlines, «τὸ ἀπρόσληπτον, ἀθεράπευτον· ὅ δὲ ἥνωται τῷ Θεῷ, τοῦτο καὶ σώζεται»[37].

Damascene based upon this argument of Gregory the Theologian and using the ontological union of rational and free will, of spirit and will, considers not only spirit but also the human will as «πρωτοπαθῆ» ("first suffered") and stresses against Monothelests, who –as it is known– denied the existence of human will in Christ, that if Word did not assume the «πρωτοπαθῆσαν» human will, then redemption is not complete, since that which was the first cause of sin was not saved[38]. In fact, thinking of rational and free will, as we have said, as the «κατ᾽ εἰκόνα» ("in the image") of God in man, emphasizes that, if the Word did not assume the human will, then he did not assume the «κατ᾽ εἰκόνα» ("in the image") and as result the redemption of man is impossible[39]. The incarnation is unable to fulfill any redemptive aim, if the Word did not assume the rational and the free will, which as «πρωτοπαθῆ» ("first suffered") elements of human nature need mainly and pre-eminently the treatment and the renovation[40]. This argument of Damascene would not have any demonstrative cogency, as we understand, if himself did not accept, according to the whole orthodox tradition, the union of rational and free will.

Consequently, rational and free will, spirit and will are for the Fathers two aspects of the one and he same thing, where the one necessarily presupposes the other. For that reason, exactly, the products of the spirit and of the will, which are the theory and the practice respectively, constitute for them an unbreakable unity, which is impossible without the ontological unity of the two organs of their origin, that is spirit and will. In this sense it is completely understandable, the reason why in the patristic tradition is emphasized at the same time the unity of rational and free will and the unity of theory and practice[41], which

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37. See Ἐπιστολὴ 101, Πρὸς Κληδόνιον Πρεσβύτερον, PG 37, 181C-184A.
38. See Περὶ τῶν ἐν Χριστῷ δύο θελημάτων καὶ ἐνεργειῶν καὶ λοιπῶν φυσικῶν ἰδιωμάτων, ἐξ ἐπιδρομῆς δὲ καὶ περὶ δύο φύσεων καὶ μιᾶς ὑποστάσεως 28, PG 95, 161C.
39. See *ibid*., PG 95, 165D.
40. See Ἔκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως 3, 18, PG 94, 1072C.
41. See Nemesius of Emesa, *ibid*., 29, PG 40, 717C; 39, PG 40, 764BC; John Damascene,

deeply characterizes the theological as also the philosophical tradition of the East, and in fact as distinct from the West.

Indeed, from the Middle Ages and onwards, the theological western thought as also the philosophical, are characterized by a dialectical tension between spirit and will, which is reduced quite often to their complete split. Characteristic is the dialectic tension that exists in the field of theology as also in the field of philosophy or even in the field of psychology between (*Intellectualismus*) on the one hand, with Thomas Aquinas, the mystics of the Middle Ages, Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz, Hegel, Kant or even the modern neo-Thomists, as representatives, and (*Voluntarismus*) on the other hand with Duns Scotus, Luther, Fichte, Schopenhauer, Hartmann, Wund, Paulsen etc. as representatives.

This tension, which acquired dramatic dimensions mainly during the modern period, is not of course inexplicable, but has –as it is known– its roots mainly and pre-eminently in the philosophical and theological reflection of Scholasticism, which was intensively occupied with the problem of the ontological priority between spirit and will. Thus, whereas early and middle Scholasticism with main representative Thomas Aquinas supported the priority of spirit over will on the basis of the principal "*Intellectus est superior voluntate*", the late Scholasticism with Duns Scotus as representative who was followed close behind by Luther, supported the priority of will over against spirit on the basis of the principle "*Voluntas est superior intellectu*"[42]. In this way Scholasticism brought up for discussion the presuppositions of a dialectical relationship

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Ἔκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως 2, 24, PG 94, 953A; 25, PG 94, 957C. See also Maximus the Confessor, *Πρὸς Θαλάσσιον περὶ διαφόρων ἀπόρων τῆς θείας Γραφῆς*, PG 90, 689D-692A; Ἔτερα Κεφάλαια 2, PG 90, 1401B: «Ἀρχὴ παντὸς ἀγαθοῦ λόγος ἔμπρακτος καὶ πρᾶξις ἐλλόγιμος»; *Περὶ διαφόρων ἀποριῶν*, PG 91, 1032A: «Σοφίας δὲ κάλλος ἐστὶ γνῶσις ἔμπρακτος ἢ πρᾶξις ἔνσοφος».

42. See J. Hirschberger, *ibid.*, p. 511, 540. W. Röd, *Der Weg der Philosophie. Von den Anfägen bis ins 20. Jahrhundert*, 1. Bd. (Altertum, Mittelalter, Renaissance), Verlag C. H. Beck, München 1994, p. 345 ff. 364 ff. Ph. Böhner – E. Gilson, *Christliche Philosophie. Von ihren Anfägen bis Nikolaus von Cues*, Verlag F. Schöningh, Paderborn ³1954, pp. 544, 587. N. A. Matsoukas, Ἱστορία τῆς Φιλοσοφίας (*with a brief introduction in Philosophy*), Thessaloniki 1981, p. 300 ff. Id., Ἱστορία τῆς βυζαντινῆς Φιλοσοφίας (*With an appendix about scholasticism in the Middle Ages in the West*), Thessaloniki 1994, p. 317.

between spirit and will, which made him to differentiate completely itself from the earlier Greek patristic tradition.

The question which is posed in this case is: How is this differentiation explained, the very moment that Scholastics refer, indeed sometimes excessively, to the Greek Fathers as for example to Athanasius the Great, the Cappadocians, Maximus, Damascene etc., who all of them emphasize, as we have seen, the unbreakable unity of spirit and will or else of rational and free will, so that any kind of independence or dialectic relationship between them to be excluded? To answer this question, we have to examine the sources of this scholastic conception, who are certainly to be found as we think in the Trinitarian theology of saint Augustine.

Indeed, saint Augustine, completely independently from the Greek Fathers, considers mind or even better intellect (*intellectus*) and will (*voluntas*) as the two fundamental component attributes of human spirit, which is according to him the rational organ of the soul (*mens*), each one with different functions. Intellect is according to him the vehicle of knowledge and theory, whereas will the vehicle of use and practice[43]. There is not such a unity between them which would lead to the identification of the one with the other, as it is the case for example by the Greek Fathers. They are of course united to each other, although they differ as it refers to their function, but this unity is simply due to their common nature, which is the essence of the one and only rational organ of the soul namely the mind (*mens*)[44]. Augustine holds that mind (*mens*) is that which constitutes the in the image or rather the image of God (*imago Dei*) in man, for only he, as also God, has the attribute to know, to remember to think and to want[45]. In this respect mind (*mens*) not only is differentiated from will, but also outbalances in relation to it.

In particularly, however, the relation between mind or intellect and will is clearly brought out through the psychological trinities of Augustine, with the help of which the holy father attempts, as it is known, to make the trinity as also the existential relationships between the persons of

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43. See *De Trinitate* X, 11, 17; XV, 27, 50.
44. See *ibid*., X, 11, 18.
45. See *ibid*., IX, 2, 2; X, 12, 19; XV, 1, PL 42, 1057; *De Genesi ad litteram* VI, 12, PL 34, 348.

the Holy Trinity[46], clear and understandable. The parallel that he draws between the psychological trinities and the persons of the Holy Trinity is apparently closely connected with his doctrine that man through his mind is an image of God, as also with the fact that the three parts of these trinities, despite their dissimilarity, are in essence inseparable of each other.

Already in his *Confessions*, in his attempt to present figuratively the unity of the persons of the Holy Trinity, holy Augustine adduces the unity which exists in man's soul between existence, knowledge and will (*esse-nosse-velle*)[47], obviously taking advantage of a similar psychological unity which is found in the neo-platonic philosopher Porphyry (essence-knowledge of essence-and between them existing friendship)[48]. As man exists knowing and willing, knows that exists and wills, and wills to exist and to know, likewise God exists as a Trinity of persons, knows and wills His trinitarian existence[49]. It is characteristic in this case that the «γιγνώσκειν» (*nosse*) as an attribute of knowledge is attributed to the person of the Son, whereas the «βουλεύεθαι» (*velle*) as an attribute of the will to the person of the Holy Spirit so as to differentiate clearly one from another.

Similar are the psychological trinities which are found in his work *Περὶ Ἁγίας Τριάδος*, such as «μνήμη-νόηση-βούληση» (*memoria-intellectus-voluntas*)[50], «νοῦς-γνώση-ἀγάπη» (*mens-notitia-amor*)[51], «μνήμη-νόηση-

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46. Regarding the psychological trinities of Augustine and their importance for his Trinitarian theology see the very important article of E. Portalié, "Augustine (Sait)" in: *Dictionnaire de Théologie Catholique* 1, 2, v. 2349; 2351 ff. as also the study of M. Schmaus, *Die psychologische Trinitätslehre des hl. Augustinus*, Münster 1927.

47. See *Confessiones* XIII, 11, 12.

48. See Porphyry, Ἀφορμαὶ πρὸς τὰ νοητὰ 40, 51-68. See and S. G. Papadopoulos, «Αὐγουστῖνος Ἱππῶνος (†430). Ὁ μέγιστος ἐκκλησιαστικὸς Πατέρας τῆς Δύσεως», *Θεολογία/Theologia* 79, 2 (2008), p. 473.

49. See *Confessiones, ibid*. See and N. A. Matsoukas, «Θρησκευτικὸ βίωμα καὶ Θεολογία στὶς Ἐξομολογήσεις τοῦ Αὐγουστίνου», *Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρίδα τῆς Θεολογικῆς Σχολῆς τοῦ Ἀριστοτελείου Πανεπιστημίου Θεσσαλονίκης/Epistimoniki Epetirida Theologikis Scholis Aristoteleiou Panepistimiou Thessalonikis* 25 (1980), p. 212.

50. See *De Trinitate* IV, 21, 30.

51. See *Ibid*., IX, 4,4.

βούλησ» (*memoria-intelligentia-voluntas*)[52] and «μνήμη-νόηση-ἀγάπη» (*memoria-intellegentia-amor*)[53], with the help of which he tries to develop more explicitly his Trinitarian theology and particularly his doctrine about the origin of the Holy Spirit «καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ»[54] ("and from the Son"). As according to him exists in man a unity of essence between memory or his mind, knowledge or intellect, with which man knows himself, and will or love, with which loves himself and the knowledge that has for himself, so there is in God respectively a unity of essence between Father, Son and Holy Spirit. As mind, knowledge, and love or memory, intellect and will (or love) are three things that differ from each other, but also indwell mutually, so as each of them to exist not only by itself, but in relation to the other two, the same happens *mutatis mutandis* with the persons of the Holy Trinity. Each person exists by himself, but at the same time in the other two, so that the three of them to indwell mutually without mingling. The second and the third, namely, the Son and the Holy Spirit, originate, although in a different way, from the first, that is the Father, whereas the third, the Holy Spirit as originating from the first and the second, connects them one another, as the will or love connects mind with knowledge and memory with intellect.

We could say that in terms of the relation of mind or intellect to will the above mentioned psychological trinities are classified in two groups. In the first group belongs the psychological trinity «νοῦς-γνώση-ἀγάπη» (*mens-nottitia-amor*)[55], where mind (mens) which is paralleled

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52. See *Ibid.*, X, 11, 18.

53. See *Ibid.*, XV, 17, 28.

54. As it refers the doctrine of holy Augustine about the origin of the Holy Spirit «καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Υἱοῦ» ("and from the Son") (*Filioque*) see G. D. Martzelos, Ὀρθόδοξο δόγμα καὶ θεολογικὸς προβληματισμός. Μελετήματα δογματικῆς θεολογίας Αʹ, P. Pournaras Publications, Thessaloniki 1993, p. 113 ff. G. D. Martzelos, „Die Anfänge und die Voraussetzungen des Filioque in der theologischen Überlieferung des Abendlandes", *Orthodoxes Forum* 13 (1999), Heft 1, p. 37 ff.; L. Ayres, "Sempiterne Spiritus Donum: Augustine's Pneumatology and the Metaphysics of Spirit", in: A. Papanikolaou & G. E. Demacopoulos (eds.), *Orthodox Readings of Augustine*, ed. by St Vladimir's Seminary Press, Crestwood, New York 2008, p. 126 ff. See also B. Oberdorfer, *Filioque. Geschichte und Theologie eines ökumenischen Problems*, Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, Göttingen 2001, p. 107 ff.

55. See *De Trinitate* IX, 4, 4.

to the person of the God-Father, is the organ, from which originate knowledge and love[56], whereas the last two, which are paralleled to the persons of the Son and the Holy Spirit respectively, are distinctive functions of mind which are related to but do not identified with each other. Indeed, in this case, the concept of love (*amor*), which refers to the person of the Holy Spirit, is identified with the concept of will (*voluntas*), as it already explicitly appears and from the rest psychological trinities of Agustine. In this sense mind as also the function of knowledge are clearly differentiated according to Agustine from the function of love and will.

In the second group belong the rest psychological trinities that could essentially be summarized in to one: «μνήμη» (*memoria*), «νόηση» (*intellectus or intelligentia*) and «βούληση» (*voluntas*) or «ἀγάπη» (*amor*), which Augustine himself considers as the most successful from the previous[57]. In this trinity there is no reference to mind as the rational organ of the soul (*mens*), but to its intellectual functions, memory, intellect and will or love, which are not understood independently from mind, since it is the common ontological background of these three of its functions, which in addition reassures their unity[58]. However, also in this case intellect and will or love are not identified with each other neither in the human nor in the divine level. Hence however Agustine considers the Son as the intellect of the three persons of the Holy Trinity and the Holy Spirit as the will or love which characterizes them. However, will as an intellectual function presupposes the intellect and follows it and cannot function independently from it, considering that, to want something we first have to know it[59]. So also, the Holy Spirit, mutatis mutandis, is identified with the will and love of God, and therefore does not operate independently from the Son, but presupposes Him and follows Him, as the will the intellect, and for

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56. See indicatively L. Karfikova, „Das Geheimnis Gottes des Vaters in Augustinus De Trinitate IX-X und XV" in: *Gott, Vater und Schöpferr, Pro Oriente, ibid.*, p. 252 ff.
57. See *De Trinitate* X, 1, 1.
58. See *ibid.*, X, 11, 18. See and L. Karfikova, *ibid.*, p. 255 ff.
59. See *De Trinitate* X, 1, 1-3, 5.

that reason proceeding from the Father (*principaliter a Patre*), who is the cause, proceeds at the same time and from the Son (*Filioque*)[60].

Consequently, for Agustine, unlike the Greek Fathers, mind is neither as rational organ of the soul nor as intellectual function (intellect) identified with will, in addition there is not between them the ontological unity which is attested in the Greek patristic tradition. If there is any unity between them it is a unity of distinctive things due to the unity of soul's essence. It's characteristic that whereas for Athanasius the Great- as we have seen- mind, intellect and will are identified with each other, so that the Son is considered as mind, intellect and will of the Father, according to holy Agustine mind intellect and will differentiate clearly from each other, so that mind is considered as the Father, intellect as the Son and will as the Holy Spirit. However, this distinction, irrespective of its different variations, which are found in the psychological trinities, is for holy Augustine an argumentation, in order to explain and found rationally not only the unity of the persons of the Holy Trinity, but also the proceeding of the Holy Spirit «καὶ ἐκ τοῦ Ὑιοῦ» ("and from the Son").

However, we must point out that, despite the clear distinction between intellect and will in Agustine and the apparent priority that acknowledges to intellect compared to will in their function, something that is -as we have seen-impressed on his Trinitarian theology with his doctrine about *Filioque*, the holy Father has never put forward a philosophical principle similar to the one that was prevailing in the early and middle Scholasticism according to which "*Intellectus est superior voluntate*" that we are aware of. From the moment however that the Scholastics, based almost unilaterally on him, and despite the quite often impressive use from their side of the Greek Fathers, saw the relation of intellect and will in the light of the importance for the trinitarian theology of the psychological trinities of Agustine, which they used in their Trinitarian theology[61], the formulation of this principle in the scholastic tradition was a matter of time. We must underline that the

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60. See *Ibid*. XV, 17, 29, PL 42, 1081.
61. See Thomas Aquinas, *Summa Theologiae* 1a, 27, 1-5 *Compendium Theologiae* 31-34; 37-39.

use of the psychological trinities of Agustine in the trinitarian theology from the greatest representative of Scholasticism, Thomas Aquinas, was realized in such a way that, the Son is considered and characterized as the second principle (*principium*) of the origin of the Holy Spirit after the Father[62], something which as far as we know is never to be found in Agustine[63]. For him the source and the principle (*principium*) of the origin of the Holy Spirit is only the Father[64].

We are of the opinion that Scholastics, taking advantage of the importance of the psychological trinities of holy Agustine for the trinitarian theology, according to which-as we have seen-intellect (*intellectus*) in the Holy Trinity is identified with the person of the Son, whereas will (*voluntas*) with the person of the Holy Spirit, and expanding his doctrine about *Filioque*, so that the Son as inner trinitarian intellect (*intellectus*) of God to be considered as the second principle of the proceeding of the Holy Spirit which is His inner trinitarian will (*voluntas*), they were naturally and inevitably led to the elevation of the ontological priority of mind in relation to will, differentiating themselves clearly at this point from the Greek patristic tradition. From that point on the appearance of a dialectic between spirit and will in the context of Scholasticism was inevitable, since, as it is known, it was closely connected with the very opposite trends that prevailed among Scholastics regarding the ontological priority of intellect against will or of will against intellect in man.

However, as we have pointed out, it was not holy Agustine the one who formulated the philosophical principle that prevailed in the earlier and the middle period of Scholasticism, according to which intellect has supremacy over will, but the same scholastic theologians, using

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62. See *Summa Theologiae* 1a, 27, 4. Cf. *ibid.*, 1a, 36, 4.
63. In this point see the very interesting remark of Lewis Ayres: "In the atemporal context of the divine communion, questions of whether the Son mediates the Spirit or acts as secondary cause become extremely difficult to pose, and it is perhaps no accident that Agustine offers no discussion of the question" (L. Ayres, *ibid.*, p. 148).
64. As Bernd Oberdorfer very accurately attested in this case, „Zweifellos lehrt Augustinus den „Hervorgang" des Geistes „aus dem Vater und dem Sohn" bzw. „aus beiden"; er verittelt dies ja sogar mit dem traditionellen Gedanken von der Monoprinzipialität des Vaters" (B. Oberdorfer, *ibid.*, p.126).

the psychological trinities of Agustine in their Trinitarian theology and interpreting its doctrine about *Filioque* in such a way, that the Son becomes the second principle of the proceeding of the Holy Spirit. In this way, we believe, the Scholastics contributed decisively to the differentiation of the western thought from the Greek patristic tradition, with regard to the relation of intellect and will, laid the foundations for the discussion concerning the ontological priority between them, which occupied the philosophical and theological thought throughout the Middle Ages, regardless of the very opposite answers that they gave to this discussion. Thus they paved the way for a dialectic juxtaposition between intellect and will, and as a result the subsequent western thought was led to two opposing sides, that of the intellectualists, and that of the voluntarists, and by extension to the independence of theory from practice and the clash of them, the reverberations of which we experience so far. However, we believe, that the western thought wouldn′t have been differentiated from the Greek patristic tradition to such an extent, if the scholastics had not used and given impulse to the impact of the relationship between intellect and will which set up with his Trinitarian theology holy Agustine.

c. Ontological evaluation of man

The ontological evaluation of man in the orthodox tradition is directly connected both with the twofold nature of man, which-as we have seen-consists of a material body and an intellectual soul, and with the conception of his creation «*κατ᾿ εἰκόνα*» ("in the image") of God.

Man, consisting of body and soul, composes in himself the visible and the invisible world, according to Gregory the Theologian, who decisively determines in this case the orthodox patristic tradition, and in this sense is the connection of the whole creation, a second world, who as a microcosm depicts the macrocosm[65]. As st. Gregory refers, showing off in

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65. See Gregory the Theologian, *Λόγος 28 Περὶ θεολογίας*, 22, PG 36, 57A; *Λόγος 38, Εἰς τὰ Θεοφάνια, εἴτ᾿ οὖν γενέθλια τοῦ Σωτῆρος*, 11, PG 36, 324A; *Λόγος 45, Εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Πάσχα*, 7, PG 36, 632A; Leontius the Monk, *Κατὰ Νεστοριανῶν καὶ Εὐτυχιανιστῶν 1*, PG 86 1284C; Cosmas, Egyptian monk, *Χριστιανικὴ τοπογραφία 5*, PG 88, 320A; John Damascene, *ibid.*, 2, 12, PG 94, 921A.

a masterly and poetic way the wider ontological value of man, «*Τοῦτο δὴ βουληθεὶς ὁ τεχνίτης ἐπιδείξασθαι Λόγος, καὶ ζῶον ἓν ἐξ ἀμφοτέρων, ἀοράτου τε λέγω καὶ ὁρατῆς φύσεως, δημιουργεῖ τὸν ἄνθρωπον· καὶ παρὰ μὲν τῆς ὕλης λαβὼν τὸ σῶμα ἤδη προϋποστάσης, παρ᾿ ἑαυτοῦ δὲ πνοὴν ἐνθείς (ὃ δὴ νοερὰν ψυχὴν καὶ εἰκόνα Θεοῦ οἶδεν ὁ λόγος), οἷόν τινα κόσμον δεύτερον, ἐν μικρῷ μέγαν, ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς ἵστησιν, ἄγγελον ἄλλον, προσκυνητὴν μικτόν, ἐπόπτην τῆς ὁρατῆς κτίσεως, μύστην τῆς νοουμένης, βασιλέα τῶν ἐπὶ γῆς, βασιλευόμενον ἄνωθεν, ἐπίγειον καὶ οὐράνιον, πρόσκαιρον καὶ ἀθάνατον, ὁρατὸν καὶ νοούμενον, μέσον μεγέθους καὶ ταπεινότητος· τὸν αὐτόν, πνεῦμα καὶ σάρκα· πνεῦμα διὰ τὴν χάριν, σάρκα διὰ τὴν ἔπαρσιν· τὸ μὲν, ἵνα μένῃ καὶ δοξάζῃ τὸν εὐεργέτην· τὸ δέ, ἵνα πάσχῃ, καὶ πάσχων ὑπομιμνήσκηται καὶ παιδεύηται τῷ μεγέθει φιλοτιμούμενος· ζῶον ἐνταῦθα οἰκονομούμενον, καὶ ἀλλαχοῦ μεθιστάμενον, καὶ πέρας τοῦ μυστηρίου τῇ πρὸς Θεὸν νεύσει θεούμενον*»[66]. Indeed the fact that man as microcosm composes in himself the visible and the invisible world, having a giver of life spirit which gives life and connects his body, makes him according to saint Gregory Palamas superior even to the angels, who are not by their nature in position to do so[67].

We must notice here that Gregory the Theologian characterizing man as microcosm which depicts the macrocosm uses the stoic notion of man, from the Christian point of view, according to which man is being traversed and kept together by the seminal principle, which is the soul in his body, depicts as microcosm the macrocosm of the universe, which is traversed and kept together by the universal and catholic logos[68]. However, we must point out that the Christianization of this stoic notion from Gregory is clear and unobjectionable, since this anthropological notion of Gregory is irrelevant to the stoic pantheism. In other words,

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66. *Λόγος 38, Εἰς τὰ Θεοφάνια, εἴτ᾿ οὖν γενέθλια τοῦ Σωτῆρος*, 11, PG 36, 321C; *Λόγος 45, Εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Πάσχα*, 7, PG 36, 632ΑΒ.

67. See *Κεφάλαια φυσικά, θεολογικά, ἠθικά τε καὶ πρακτικά* 38, PG 150, 1145D-1148Α; 62, PG 150, 1165ΑΒ.

68. See relatively J. Hirschberger, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, I. Teil (Altertum und Mittelalter), Verlag Herder, Basel – Freiburg – Wien ⁹1974, p. 259; W. Röd, *Der Weg der Philosophie von den Anfängen bis ins 20. Jahrhundert*, Bd. I (Altertum, Mittelalter, Renaissance), Verlag C. H. Beck, München 1994, p. 207.

the relation which exists between these two notions is restricted to a clearly morphological level.

Besides, as it refers to the notion of the «*κατ᾽ εἰκόνα*» ("in the image") of God creation of man there are, as it is known two main interpretative approaches in the patristic tradition: The first is represented by the majority of the Fathers, and locates the «*κατ᾽ εἰκόνα*» ("in the image") in rational and in free will, with which man is endowed in his creation[69]. This interpretation is closely connected with the fact that man as rational and sovereign being depicts according to the Fathers the Word of God who is as apostle Paul emphasizes the "image of the invisible God" («*εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ ἀοράτου*»)[70]. He is namely created in the image of God who is the Word and, on this account, man is rational and sovereign. The second interpretative approach is mainly represented from the Antiochian theologians, who connecting the «*κατ᾽ εἰκόνα*» ("in the image") with the passage in *Gen*. 1, 26[71], accept that this lies in the sovereign and dominating place that man has in the creation. That is as God is lord and dominates over the whole world, He created man in His image, so as to dominate over the whole earth[72]. However, we must underline that with the first as well as with the second interpretation

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69. See characteristically Athanasius the Great, *Λόγος περὶ τῆς ἐνανθρωπήσεως τοῦ Λόγου καὶ τῆς διὰ σώματος πρὸς ἡμᾶς ἐπιφανείας αὐτοῦ 3*, PG 25, 101B; 6, PG 25, 105C; Basil the Great, *Εἰς τὸν 48 ψαλμὸν 8*, PG 29, 449BC; *Εἰς τό «Πρόσεχε σεαυτῷ» 6*, PG 31, 212BC; *Περὶ Εὐχαριστίας 2*, PG 31, 221C; *Ὁμιλία ἐν λιμῷ καὶ αὐχμῷ 5*, PG 31, 317A; *Ὅτι οὐκ ἔστιν αἴτιος τῶν κακῶν ὁ Θεὸς 6*, PG 31, 344BC; *Ὅροι κατὰ πλάτος 2*, 3, PG31, 913B; *Ἐπιστολὴ 233, Ἀμφιλοχίῳ ἐρωτήσαντι*, 1, PG 32, 864C; Gregory of Nyssa, *Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου 11*, PG 44, 156B; 12, PG 44, 161C; 164A; 16, PG 44, 184B; 185C; *Λόγος κατηχητικὸς ὁ μέγας 5*, PG 45, 24C; 21, PG 45, 57CD; *Περὶ παρθενίας 12*, PG 46, 369C; Constantine deacon, *Ἐγκώμιον εἰς πάντας τοὺς ἁγίους ἐνδόξους καὶ πανευφήμους μάρτυρας τοὺς ὑπὲρ Χριστοῦ τοῦ Θεοῦ ἡμῶν κατὰ τὴν οἰκουμένην ἀθλήσαντας 14*, PG 88, 496C; Maximus the Confessor, *Ζήτησις μετὰ Πύρρου*, PG 91, 304C; John Damascene, *ibid.*, 2, 12, PG 94, 920B. See and G. D. Martzelos, *Ὀρθόδοξο δόγμα καὶ θεολογικὸς προβληματισμός*, *op.cit.*, p. 109, 121 ff.

70. See *Col 1*, 15. See and *2 Cor* 4, 4.

71. «*καὶ ἀρχέτωσαν τῶν ἰχθύων τῆς θαλάσσης καὶ τῶν πετεινῶν τοῦ οὐρανοῦ καὶ τῶν κτηνῶν καὶ πάσης τῆς γῆς καὶ πάντων τῶν ἑρπετῶν τῶν ἑρπόντων ἐπὶ γῆς*».

72. See Diodore of Tarsus, *Εἰς τὴν Γένεσιν*, PG 33, 1564CD; John Chrysostom, *Εἰς τὴν Γένεσιν 9*, 2, PG 53, 78; 23, 5, PG 53, 202-203; Theodoret of Cyrus, *Εἰς τὴν Γένεσιν*, Quest. 20, PG 80, 105AB. Cf. and Basil the Great (dub.), *Περὶ τῆς τοῦ ἀνθρώπου κατασκευῆς 8*, PG 30, 20C.

of the «*κατ' εἰκόνα*» ("in the image"), from the one hand is presented the princely and dominant role of man in relation to the rest of the creatures and from the other hand his holiness as a person who depicts God in the whole creation is ensured. Indeed, this holiness acquires for the Fathers an even greater importance since man having himself mind, reason, and spirit depicts the three persons of the Holy Trinity, as also the unity that exists between them[73]. Therefore, the Fathers consider man due to his «*κατ' εἰκόνα*» ("in the image") of God creation not only as the «*βασιλέα καὶ ἄρχοντα πάσης τῆς γῆς*»[74], but also as the only creature, to which is allowed to attribute honorable worship on behalf of the rest of his fellow beings[75]. Accordingly the twofold nature of man as also his creation «*κατ' εἰκόνα*» ("in the image") of God are the two basic elements which according to the Fathers show off the incomparable ontological value and his superiority to the rest of the creatures.

d. Anthropological dimension and ontology of the "person"

It's evident that the term "person" in ancient Greek philosophy had the sense of appearance, countenance, or façade, and exactly with this meaning was used from the ancient Greek dramatic composition as also from the heretic of the 3rd century Sabellius, who was perceiving the persons of the Holy Trinity as simple facades of the unique God. However, the Cappadocian Fathers, after they discerned the terms «*οὐσία*»

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73. See Gregory the Theologian, *Λόγος 23, Εἰρηνικὸς γ´ εἰς τὴν σύμβασιν, ἣν μετὰ τὴν σύστασιν ἐποιησάμεθα οἱ ὁμόδοξοι*, 11, PG 35 1161C; Gregory of Nyssa, *Περὶ τοῦ τί ἐστι τὸ κατ' εἰκόνα Θεοῦ καὶ καθ' ὁμοίωσιν*, PG 44, 1340C-1341B; Theodoret of Cyrus, *ibid.*, PG 80, 108AB; John Damascene, *ibid.*, 1, 6-7, PG 94, 804A-805B; *Πρὸς τοὺς διαβάλλοντας τὰς ἁγίας εἰκόνας 3*, 20, PG 94, 1340D.
74. See John Damascene, *Ἔκδοσις ἀκριβὴς τῆς ὀρθοδόξου πίστεως* 2, 11, PG 94, 909D-912A. See and Gregory the Theologian, *Λόγος 38, Εἰς τὰ Θεοφάνια, εἴτ' οὖν γενέθλια τοῦ Σωτῆρος*, 11, PG 36, 324A; *Λόγος 45, Εἰς τὸ ἅγιον Πάσχα, 7*, PG 36, 632B; Gregory of Nyssa, *Περὶ κατασκευῆς ἀνθρώπου 2*, PG 44, 132D-133A; 4, PG 44, 136 BCD; Cosmas, Egyptian monk, *Χριστιανικὴ τοπογραφία 3*, PG 88, 153AB.
75. See John Damascene, *ibid.*, 4, 16, PG 94, 1169A. See and G. D. Martzelos, *ibid.*, p. 144 ff; G. D. Martzelos, „Die dogmatischen Grundlagen der Orthodoxen Ikonnlehre", *Ἐπιστημονικὴ Ἐπετηρίδα Θεολογικῆς Σχολῆς / Epistimoniki Epetirida Theologikis Scholis* [New series], *Department of Theology, Special edition in honor of Antonios-Aimilios Taxiaos, Professor Emeritus* 8 (1998), p. 278.

("essence") and «ὑπόστασις» ("hypostasis"), they identified the term «πρόσωπον» ("person") with the term «ὑπόστασις» ("hypostasis"), and they used it in their theology, establishing it definitely in the whole Greek orthodox tradition[76]. It's characteristic that Basil the Great in order to avoid a possible understanding of the term «πρόσωπον» ("person") in accordance with its ancient Greek and as a result Sabellian meaning, when he refers to the hypostases of the Holy Trinity, he does not only confine himself to notice the danger that the simple use of the term «πρόσωπον» ("person") with its traditional content hides, but he is also obliged to underline clearly the ontological meaning that the term must have so as to avoid the danger of Sabellianism: «Οὐ γὰρ ἐξαρκεῖ», emphasizes, «διαφορὰς προσώπων ἀπαριθμήσασθαι, ἀλλὰ χρὴ ἕκαστον πρόσωπον ἐν ὑποστάσει ἀληθινῇ ὑπάρχον ὁμολογεῖν»[77]. The simple enumeration of the three divine persons could have, despite their difference, very well been understood in the Sabellian way as an enumeration of simple facades of God, and for that reason only the ontological conception of the person as a real hypostasis could have prevented such a danger. Both Gregory of Nyssa and Gregory of Nazianzus attempt, with their own way, following Basil the Great, the same, when they identify conceptually the terms «ὑπόστασις» ("hypostasis") and «πρόσωπον» ("person") with each other, so as to exclude the Sabellian understanding of the term «προσώπου» ("person") and to ensure in this way the orthodox Trinitarian theology[78]. Thus, the Cappadocian Fathers identifying the terms «ὑπόστασις» ("hypostasis") and «πρόσωπον» ("person") with each other, not only they lend ontological content to

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76. Cf. J. D. Zizioulas, «Ἀπὸ τὸ προσωπεῖον εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον. Ἡ συμβολὴ τῆς πατερικῆς θεολογίας εἰς τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ προσώπου», in: *Special edition in honor of Metropolitan Revd. Father Melito of Chalcedon*, Thessaloniki 1977, p. 287 ff.

77. See Basil the Great, *Ἐπιστολὴ 210*, 5, PG 32, 776C.

78. See Gregory the Theologian, *Λόγος 20, Περὶ δόγματος καὶ καταστάσεως ἐπισκόπων*, 6, PG 35, 1072CD; *Λόγος 21, Εἰς τὸν μέγαν Ἀθανάσιον ἐπίσκοπον Ἀλεξανδρείας*, 35, PG 35, 1124D-1125A; *Λόγος 39, Εἰς τὰ ἅγια Φῶτα*, 11, PG 36, 345CD; *Λόγος 42, Συντακτήριος, εἰς τὴν τῶν ρν΄ ἐπισκόπων παρουσίαν*, 16, PG 36, 477A; Gregory of Nyssa, *Πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν*, PG 45, 175A-181A 185A, D; *Κατὰ Εὐνομίου* 1, PG 45, 320CD; 405B; 2, PG 45, 472CD; *Ἐπιστολὴ 24, Ἡρακλειανῷ αἱρετικῷ*, PG 46, 1092A.

the sense of «πρόσωπον» ("person") differentiating it completely from the ancient Greek and Sabellian meaning, but also, they underline the unique and unprecedented existential dissimilarity, due to its exclusive hypostatic individuality, according to which is discerned from the other «πρόσωπα»[79] ("persons"). Indeed, we must point out that, in the context of the Greek orthodox Trinitarian theology, this hypostatic individuality is understood by the Cappadocian Fathers only in absolute connection with the existential and at the same time loving communion of the persons of the Holy Trinity. In other words, the Cappadocian Fathers giving meaning to the term «πρόσωπον» ("person") and using it in their Trinitarin theology, they offer essentially the basic elements which compose its existential content, namely the unprecedented existential individuality and the loving sociability which characterizes it.

It's a fact that, although the Cappadocian Fathers developed clearly the sense and the ontological content of the term «προσώπου» ("person") in the context of their Trinitarian theology, they avoid, obviously owing to the absence of relevant provocations, to proceed to the expansion of its importance for the Trinitarian theology in the field of Anthropology. However, in their effort to explain the meaning and the ontological content of this term, in order to use it in their Trinitarian theology, they refer to clearly anthropological examples which show off at least the relationship which according to them exists between the Trinitarian theology and the anthropological importance of the term «προσώπου» ("person").

Specifically, according to what they refer, as Peter, Paul and Barnabas or Paul, Silvanus and Timothy have as humans common essence but differentiate as individual persons or hypostases on the basis of his own each one of them exclusive hypostatic attributes, mutatis mutandis, this is the case with the persons of the Holy Trinity they are consubstantial, but also they differentiate from each other on the basis of their hypostatic attributes, which characterize them as persons, so that each one has its own hypostatic individuality: the Father is *unbegotten*, the source and the

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79. See characteristically Gregory of Nyssa, *Κατὰ Εὐνομίου 2*, PG 45, 472C: «Ἡ μὲν γὰρ τῶν ὑποστάσεων ἰδιότης τρανήν τε καὶ ἀσύγχυτον ποεῖται τὴν προσώπων διαστολήν».

cause of the persons or hypostases of the Son and of the Holy Spirit, the Son is *begotten* and the Holy Spirit is *proceeded*[80]. And, as we have seen, referring to the sense of divinity according to the Fathers of the Church, this existential individuality which characterizes forever the persons of the Holy Trinity is not obligatory, but is connected indissolubly with the free and loving communion that exists forever between them. For that reason, however, as Dionysius Areopagita notices, God is characterized not only as divine love ἔρωτας and love ἀγάπη but also as dear ἐραστός and beloved ἀγαπητός which notices from his point of view st. Maximus the Confessor[81] saying that: «Ὁ Θεὸς καὶ Πατὴρ κινηθεὶς ἀχρόνως καὶ ἀγαπητικῶς προῆλθεν εἰς διάκρισιν ὑποστάσεων»[82]. We must underline that the analogy which is found out in the patristic thought between the importance of the term «προσώπου» ("person") from the aspect of Trinitarian theology and that from the anthropological aspect, is simply confined only to the pointing out of the existential individuality, which is based on the hypostatic attributes of the human as well as of the three divine persons, and is not expanded to the free and loving communion, which characterizes, according to the Fathers, the persons of the Holy Trinity.

Those who for the first time in the history of the Christan thought expanded from the level of the Trinitarian theology to the anthropological level the element of the existential individuality as also the element of free and loving communion, which both constitute, according to the Fathers, the ontological content of the «προσώπου» ("person") are Theodore of Mopsuestia and Nestorius in the frame of their Christian doctrine.

As it is known, both these Antiochian theologians in their effort to emphasize against Apollinaris the perfection of the human nature of Christ, they supported that this perfection has as a consequence the

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80. See Basil the Great, Ἐπιστολὴ 38, Γρηγορίῳ ἀδελφῷ περὶ διαφορᾶς οὐσίας καὶ ὑποστάσεως, 2-3, PG 32, 325B-329A; Ἐπιστολὴ 214, Τρεντίῳ Κόμητι, 4, PG 32, 789A; Gregory of Nyssa, Πρὸς τοὺς Ἕλληνας, ἐκ τῶν κοινῶν ἐννοιῶν, PG 45, 177CD; 181CD; 185AB. See and John Damascene, Κεφάλαια φιλοσοφικὰ 42-43, PG 94, 612A-613B; Εἰσαγωγὴ δογμάτων στοιχειώδης 2, PG 95, 101A.
81. See Περὶ διαφόρων ἀποριῶν, PG 91, 1260BCD.
82. See Σχόλια εἰς τὸ Περὶ θείων ὀνομάτων, PG 4, 221A.

perfection of the human person in Christ, who as perfect is characterized by the existence of human free will[83]. Besides, accepting the metaphysical principle, according to which the «κατ᾽ οὐσίαν ἤ κατὰ φύσιν» ("in essence or in nature") union takes place out of necessity and therefore applies only to consubstantial things, whereas the «κατὰ θέλησιν» (" in will") or «κατ᾽ εὐδοκίαν» ("in good will") union takes place freely and suits to things different in substance[84], they do not accept that the union of the two natures in Christ, which are different in substance became in nature, for that would meant that this union was out of necessity, and as a result Christ would not had human will and consequently a perfect human person, which would inevitably led to Apollinarianism. Therefore, the union of the two natures in Christ should have been realized in a will level, that is to be moral in other words to be based on the free will of the human nature-person, so that the human person of Christ to be freely and with love conformed to the divine will and to be amenable to moral evolution and progress[85]. That's what they mean, when they characterize this union as «κατ᾽ εὐδοκίαν συνάφεια»[86] ("indwelling of good pleasure") or when Nestorius refers to «συνάφεια» ("indwelling")

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83. See Theodore of Mopsuestia, Ἀπόσπ. ἀπὸ τὸ Κατὰ Ἐνανθρωπήσεως τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ 8, PG 66, 981BC; ἀπόσπ. ἐκ τοῦ ιδ΄ λόγου, PG 66, 989CD; Fr. Loofs, Nestoriana. Die Fragmente des Nestorius, Halle 1905, pp. 219, 224; F. Nau, Nestorius. Le livre d᾽ Héraclide de Damas (traduit en Français) Paris 1910, p. 144; G. R. Driver – L. Hodgson, Nestorius. The Bazaar of Heracleides (Newly translated from the Syriac), Oxford 1925, p. 163.

84. See Theodore of Mopsuestia, Ἀποσπ. ἀπὸ τὴν Ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Δόμνον, PG 66, 1013A; Fr. Loofs, ibid., p. 219 ff. See and F. Nau, ibid., p. 142 ff.; G. R. Driver – L. Hodgson, ibid., p. 161 ff. With reference to the metaphysical problematic of the Christology of Theodore of Mopsuestia and of Nestorius see. J. S. Romanides, "Highlights in the debate over Theodore of Mopsuestia's Christology and some suggestions for a fresh approach", The Greek Orthodox Theological Review 5 (1959-60), p. 162 ff. and L. Hodgson, "The Metaphysics of Nestorius", The Journal of Theological Studies 19 (1918), p. 46 ff.; A. Grillmeier, „Das Scandalum oecumenicum des Nestorius in kirchlich-dogmatischer und theologiegeschichtlicher Sicht", Scholastik 36 (1961), p. 339 ff.

85. Theodor of Mopsuestia, Ἀπόσπ. ἀπὸ τὸ Κατὰ Ἐνανθρωπήσεως τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ 7, PG 66, 977A-980B; 14, PG 66 989CD; 15, PG 66, 992C; Fr. Loofs, ibid., p. 239; F. Nau, ibid., pp. 35, 59 ff., 158, 159, 187; G. R. Driver – L. Hodgson, ibid., pp. 38, 62 ff., 179, 181, 211.

86. See Theodore of Mopsuestia, Ἐπιστολὴ πρὸς Δόμνον (frag. 1), PG 66, 1012C-1013A; Fr. Loofs, ibid., pp. 178, 292.

and «*κοινωνία τῶν ὀνομάτων ἤ τῶν ἰδιωμάτων*» ("communion of names or of attributes") between the two natures or persons of Christ[87]. It᾽s certain that these two Antiochian theologians refer to one person in Christ, which however does not have ontological content, so as to refer either to the divine or to the human hypostasis, but exists only in moral level, and is understood as a communion of will between the two natures or persons in Christ[88] or as «*μήνυμα τῶν δύο φύσεων*» ("message of the two natures") as Nestorius characterizes it calling it with the name «*Χριστός*»[89]. Exactly for that reason the Fathers of Chalcedon (451) in the Canon that they compiled emphasized that the one person of Christ, who is known «*ἐν δύο φύσεσι*» ("in two natures") after the incarnation is nothing else but the hypostasis of the Only-begotten Son of God, God the Word[90].

As it appeared from what we have said, the expansion of the ontological content of the «*πρόσωπον*» ("person") from the Trinitarian theology to Anthropology which was accomplished by the above mentioned two Antiochian theologians is due to clearly theological reasons which are connected with their Christological problematic. Nevertheless, particularly in our age it is attested among orthodox theologians and intellectuals an expansion of the ontological content of the term «*προσώπου*» ("person") from the Trinitarian theology to Anthropology for clearly philosophical reasons in order to give an orthodox answer to the challenge of existentialism (G. Marcel, R. Guardini, K. Barth, E. Brunner, F. Gogarten, D. Bonhoeffer, P. Tillich, N. Berdiaeff, M. Heidegger) and

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87. See Fr. Loofs, *ibid.*, pp. 178 ff. ; 248 ff.; F. Nau, *ibid.*, pp. 53 ff., 66, 141 ff., 212 ff. ; G. R. Driver – L. Hodgson, *ibid.*, pp. 56, 69, 160, 240 ff.

88. See Theodore of Mopsuestia, Ἀπόσπ. ἀπὸ τὸ Κατὰ Ἐνανθρωπήσεως τοῦ Κυρίου ἡμῶν Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ 8, PG 66, 981BC; F. Nau, *ibid.*, pp. 141ff., 191 ff.; R. Driver – L. Hodgson, *ibid.*, pp. 163, 219 ff.

89. See Fr. Loofs, *ibid.*, p. 295 F. Nau, *ibid.*, pp. 146, 184, 18; G. R. Driver – L. Hodgon, *ibid.*, pp. 166, 207, 209. See and A. Grillmeier, *ibid.*, p. 333 and G. S. Bebis, Συμβολαὶ εἰς τὴν περὶ Νεστορίου ἔρευναν (ἐξ ἐπόψεως Ὀρθοδόξου), Athens 1964, p. 137 ff.

90. See Mansi (=J. D. Mansi, *Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio*, Graz 1960-1961) VII, 116 ACO (=*Acta Conciliorum Oecumenicorum*, ed. E. Schwartz, Berolini et Lipsiae 1927-1940) II, 1, 2, 129 [325] ff. See and G. D. Martzelos, Γένεση καὶ πηγὲς τοῦ Ὅρου τῆς Χαλκηδόνας. Συμβολὴ στὴν ἱστορικοδογματικὴ διερεύνηση τοῦ Ὅρου τῆς Δ΄ Οἰκουμενικῆς Συνόδου, P. Pournaras Publications, Thessaloniki 1986, p. 192.

of personalism (M. Scheler, J. Lacroix, J. Maritain, G. Mandinier, M. Nédoncelle, E. Mounier, M. Buber), which show off emphatically the existential individuality of the hypostasis or person in relation to the hypostases or the persons of the other humans. Thus it developed in Orthodoxy a strong stream with main representatives His Eminence Ioannis Zizioulas Bishop of Pergamon[91] Christos Giannaras[92] and the Reverend Father Dumitru Staniloae[93], which aims to show off not only the unique an unprecedented existential individuality of the person, but also his loving sociability and freedom as elements which constitute his ontological content, and in this way showing of the Fathers of the Church as the fathers and the founders of the orthodox understanding of the term «πρόσωπον» ("person") in the framework of the anthropological and philosophical reflection.

Although this attempt was disputed by some as a misinterpretation of the patristic theology[94], and as a result to arise a serious and important

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91. See characteristically his works: «Ἀπὸ τὸ προσωπεῖον εἰς τὸ πρόσωπον. Ἡ συμβολὴ τῆς πατερικῆς θεολογίας εἰς τὴν ἔννοιαν τοῦ προσώπου», *ibid.*, pp. 287-323, and *Being as Communion. Studies in Personhood and the Church*, Contemporary Greek Theologians Series, No 4, New York 1985.

92. See characteristically his works: *Τὸ Πρόσωπο καὶ ὁ Ἔρως*, Domos Publications, Athens ⁷2006 and *Ὀντολογία τοῦ προσώπου (προσωποκεντρικὴ ὀντολογία)*, Ikaros Publications, Athens 2016.

93. See characteristically the doctoral dissertation of N. Neaskou, referring to this subject *Πρόσωπο καὶ κοινωνία στὴ θεολογία τοῦ πατρὸς Δημητρίου Στανιλοάε*, Thessaloniki 2014.

94. See Ioan. Panagopoulos, «Ὀντολογία ἢ Θεολογία τοῦ Προσώπου. Ἡ συμβολὴ τῆς πατερικῆς Τριαδολογίας στὴν κατανόηση τοῦ ἀνθρωπίνου προσώπου», *Σύναξις/ Synaxis* 13 (1985), pp. 63-79; 14 (1985), pp. 35-47; id., «Ἡ εἰκόνα τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τὸ πρόσωπο», *Σύναξις/Synaxis* 21 (1987), pp 59-62; S. Agouridis, «Μποροῦν τὰ πρόσωπα τῆς Τριάδας νὰ δώσουν τή βάση γιὰ Περσοναλιστικὲς ἀπόψεις περὶ τοῦ Ἀνθρώπου;», *Σύναξις/Syntaxis* 33 (1990), pp. 67-78; Chr. Stamoulis, «"Ἐγώ εἰμι ὁ ὤν". Ἡ διαλεκτικὴ φύσεως καὶ προσώπου στὴ νεώτερη ὀρθόδοξη θεολογία καὶ ὁ θεολογικὸς ὁλισμὸς τοῦ ἁγίου Γρηγορίου τοῦ Παλαμᾶ», *Σύνθεσις/Sythesis* (online journal of the Department of Theology, AUTH) 1 (2012), pp. 104-120; Hierotheos (Vlachos) Bishop of Nafpaktos and Hagios Vlasios, «Ἡ ὀντολογία τοῦ "προσώπου": ἡ συστηματικὴ παρερμηνεία τῶν ἁγίων Ἀθανασίου, Καππαδοκῶν καὶ Μαξίμου ἀπὸ τὸ Μητροπολίτη Περγάμου Ἰωάννη Ζηζιούλα», in: http://www.parembasis.gr/images/anakoinoeis/2016/NI-ONTOLOGIA%20 PROSWPOYP-PI-FEB2916.pdf, Nafpaktos 2016; M. Berkoutakis, «Περὶ Τριάδος καὶ προσώπου. Ἤγουν, ἐπὶ τῆς Ὀρθοδόξου Τριαδολογίας, σχόλιον ἐκτενὲς εἰς ιβ΄ (12) ἐρωταποκρίσεις», in: http://www.oodegr.com/oode/theos/trias-proswpo.htm; Sp Tsitsigos,

theological dialogue[95] about this issue, we must notice that, thus far in what we have been saying, this effort has by far its origin in the Fathers of the Church, and particularly the Cappadocians, who in order to define the sense of the term «*πρόσωπον*» ("person"), so as to use it in their Trinitarian theology, they refer –as we have seen– to anthropological examples which make clear the unique and unpreceded existential individuality of the «*προσώπου*» ("person") in the level of Trinitarian theology and in the anthropological level. From that moment on, the patristic doctrine that man is a creature «*κατ᾽ εἰκόνα*» ("in the image") of God, depicting in his mind, word and spirit the persons of the Holy Trinity[96], is definitely a basic presupposition for the expansion of the free and living sociability from the level of Trinitarian theology to the level of Anthropology. However, this analogy between Trinitarian theology and Anthropology in terms of these two elements which constitute the ontological content of the term «*προσώπου*» ("person") that is the unique and unprecedented existential individuality and his free and living sociability, must take into account the apophatic theology of the Fathers, so as to avoid an anthropological understanding of the elements which characterize the patristic Trinitarian theology, on the basis of the scholastic *analogia entis*, and leading to the distortion of the patristic theology. The ontological distinction between created and non-created is decisive for the understanding of the analogy between the Trinitarian theology and Anthropology.

Conclusion

After of what we have said, it became –as we believe– clear that all the individual ontological doctrines mentioned were developed

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«Πρὸς τοὺς ἀκρίτως ταυτίζοντας πρόσωπο καὶ ὑπόσταση στὴν Ὀρθοδοξη χριστιανικὴ Θεολογία», in: http://www.romiosini.org.gr/a206c8d2.el.aspx.

95. See His Eminence Ioannis Zizioulas Bishop of Pergamon, «Τὸ εἶναι τοῦ Θεοῦ καὶ τὸ εἶναι τοῦ ἀνθρώπου. Ἀπόπειρα θεολογικοῦ διαλόγου», *Σύναξη / Synaxi* 37 (1991), pp. 11-36; Chr. Giannaras, «Περὶ ἀπυροβλήτου πτώματος ἢ ἀποκλίσεων ὑπαρξιστικῶν καὶ περσοναλιστικῶν», *Σύναξη / Synaxi* 37 (1991), pp. 7-45.

96. See footnote 73.

from the Fathers of the Church during their effort on the one hand to fundamentally overturn the various heretical challenges, basing their theology, and particularly the orthodox Trinitarian theology and Christology, on indisputable ontological conditions. In this respect the Fathers were somehow obliged to answer to individual philosophical problems of ontological content, contributing in this way decisively to the renewal of ontological refection beyond that of ancient Greek philosophy and became the proponents and founders of a new ontology that could rightly be characterized as Christian.

In fact it is extremely characteristic that this Christian ontology, with its unquestionable theological and philosophical originality, is not born of any primary philosophical interest of the Fathers but, as we have said, through their painstaking effort to secure Orthodox Theology, and especially Orthodox Trinitarian Theology and Christology, from the various philosophical and heretical forgeries of their time. Thus, starting exclusively from theological starting points, they contributed decisively to the genesis and development of the Christian ontological reflection, highlighting its enormous theological and philosophical significance. And here we can find the great and indisputable contribution of the Fathers in the promotion not only of theological but also of philosophical thought in general.